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Hate Speech on Social Media:
Content Moderation in Context
RICHARD ASHBY WILSON & MOLLY K. LAND
For all practical purposes, the policy of social media companies to suppress
hate speech on their platforms means that the longstanding debate in the United
States about whether to limit hate speech in the public square has been resolved in
favor of vigorous regulation. Nonetheless, revisiting these debates provides
insights essential for developing more empirically-based and narrowly tailored
policies regarding online hate.
First, a central issue in the hate speech debate is the extent to which hate
speech contributes to violence. Those in favor of more robust regulation claim a
connection to violence, while others dismiss these arguments as tenuous. The data
generated by social media, however, now allow researchers to empirically test
whether there are measurable harms resulting from hate speech. These data can
assist in formulating evidence-based policies to address the most significant harms
of hate speech, while avoiding overbroad regulation.
Second, reexamining the U.S. debate about hate speech also reveals the
serious missteps of social media policies that prohibit hate speech without regard
to context. The policies that social media companies have developed define hate
speech solely with respect to the content of the message. As the early advocates of
limits on hate speech made clear, the meaning, force, and consequences of speech
acts are deeply contextual, and it is impossible to understand the harms of hate
speech without reference to political realities and power asymmetries. Regulation
that is abstracted from context will inevitably be overbroad.
This Article revisits these debates and considers how they map onto the
platform law of content moderation, where emerging evidence indicates a
correlation between hate speech online, virulent nationalism, and violence against
minorities and activists. It concludes by advocating specific recommendations to
bring greater consideration of context into the speech-regulation policies and
procedures of social media companies.
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Hate Speech on Social Media:
Content Moderation in Context
RICHARD ASHBY WILSON & MOLLY K. LAND *
INTRODUCTION
Hate speech and hate crimes are trending. In the past five years, there
has been an upsurge in extreme nationalist and nativist political ideology in
mainstream politics globally. In the United States, the President regularly
mobilizes a political constituency by vilifying Mexican immigrants as
“criminals” and “rapists” who “infest” America,1 and by promoting a “zero
tolerance” policy at the border that punitively separates children from their
parents, including persons exercising their right to apply for asylum.2 Data
suggest a connection between this rise in rhetoric to increases in hate
crimes in the United States.3 Similar trends are evident abroad as well. In
the United Kingdom, the 2016 Brexit referendum elicited conspicuous
expressions of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment and coincided
with the sharpest increase in religiously and racially motivated hate crimes
ever recorded in British history.4
In the United States, there has been vigorous debate on the regulation
of hate speech for decades, but the dominant legal frameworks for
addressing the harms in hate speech were created in a world without the
internet and urgently need updating. Historically, those advocating for the
suppression of hate speech concentrated their efforts on measures that
*
Richard Ashby Wilson is the Gladstein Chair of Human Rights and Professor of Law and
Anthropology at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Molly Land is the Catherine Roraback
Professor of Law and Human Rights at the University of Connecticut School of Law and Associate
Director of the Human Rights Institute. We extend our thanks to Nadine Strossen for her astute
comments on our arguments, and to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for their careful
feedback and editing. We are grateful to Allaina Murphy and Danielle Nadeau for research assistance.
1
Andrés Oppenheimer, Immigrant Families Don’t “Infest” America—But Trump’s Racist
Rhetoric Does, MIAMI HERALD (June 20, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/newscolumns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article213543104.html.
2
Catherine E. Shoichet, ‘Zero Tolerance’ a Year Later: How the US Family Separations Crisis
Erupted, CNN (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/04/us/immigrant-familyseparations-timeline.
3
Griffin Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President Trump’s Election on Hate Crimes 3
(Jan.
14,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3102652.
4
May Bulman, Brexit Vote Sees Highest Spike in Religious and Racial Hate Crimes Ever
Recorded, INDEPENDENT (July 7, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/racisthate-crimes-surge-to-record-high-after-brexit-vote-new-figures-reveal-a7829551.html.
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compelled gatekeepers, such as district attorneys, newspaper editors,
publishers, or university provosts, to restrict certain classes of speech.
Now, in the cacophony on social media, gatekeeping itself has been
transformed.5 Governments still attempt to regulate speech through
gatekeepers such as social media platforms, but the sheer volume of speech
involved requires operationalizing the definition of hate speech through
algorithmic processes and tens of thousands of human content moderators.
Governments are no longer the primary regulators of speech.6 Their
regulatory capacity has been far outstripped by some of the largest
companies in the world by public stock valuation,7 which together regulate
the speech of 3.7 billion active social media users.8 Facebook, which
moderates the online speech of over 2.4 billion active monthly users, is the
largest publisher of content in human history.9 In a reversal of the historic
roles, private corporations have even become the de facto regulators of
government speech, as when Facebook banned the Commander-in-Chief of
Myanmar’s military from the platform and removed over 400 other news,
entertainment, and lifestyle pages linked to the military.10
For all practical purposes, the decision of social media companies to
prohibit hate speech on their platforms means that the longstanding debate
in the United States about whether to limit hate speech in the public square
has been resolved in favor of regulation. The new realities of the internet
do not mean that the prior debates on hate speech are irrelevant, however.
Instead, we contend that a reexamination of the debates over hate speech
that occurred in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s can help chart a
course toward a more empirically-based and narrowly tailored policy
regarding online hate speech.
Social media policy might be informed by the terms of the U.S. hate
speech debate in two vital ways. First, social media creates data that allow
us to determine whether hate speech that nonetheless falls short of direct
incitement can still contribute to violence. Those in favor of more robust
5

EMILY B. LAIDLAW, REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE: GATEKEEPERS, HUMAN RIGHTS
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, at xi–xii (2015) (describing gatekeeping by private companies on
the internet).
6
See DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET 112
(2019) (noting that “a few private companies” control social media).
7
See FB Facebook, Inc. Class A Common Stock, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/marketactivity/stocks/fb (last visited Jan. 14, 2020) (listing Facebook’s common stock value); GOOG
Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/goog
(last visited Jan. 14, 2020) (listing Google’s capital stock value).
8
SIMON
KEMP,
DIGITAL
2019:
Q4
GLOBAL
DIGITAL
STATSHOT
6,
https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/key/NSBCWzcfsbGXTg (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
9
Facebook Q3 2019 Results, FACEBOOK, https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/
2019/q3/Q3-2019-Earnings-Presentation.pdf (last visited May 1, 2020).
10
Removing Myanmar Military Officials from Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/.
AND
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regulation of hate speech have long claimed a connection to violence,
while free speech advocates have dismissed such claims as too tenuous to
support regulation.11 The data now available on social media, however,
allow researchers to empirically test whether there are visible, measurable
harms resulting from hate speech. Studies thus far indicate that speech that
denigrates and generates discriminatory animus against social groups such
as immigrants or religious minorities does increase the risk of real-world
violence against them.12 Thus, contrary to justifications underlying the
highly deferential standard of the U.S. First Amendment, it is no longer
possible to discount the real-world risks of hate speech that falls short of
incitement or true threat.
Second, reexamining the U.S. debate about hate speech also reveals the
serious shortcomings of social media policies that seek to regulate content
without reference to context. The policies that social media companies
have developed define hate speech based on content alone. Currently, they
have no mechanism for taking into account the context of the speech.
However, if there is one thing that we can learn from Critical Race
Theorists who sought to ban “assaultive speech,”13 it is that words and
meaning are deeply contextual. Defining hate speech in ways that are
abstracted from local realities, relationships, and power will inevitably be
overbroad.
Third, our approach draws from theories of legal pluralism to highlight
how prevailing social norms about the regulation of speech have been as
influential as legal doctrine in shaping the regulatory frameworks that have
emerged in the past five years.14 Legal pluralism embraces the mutually
constitutive nature of law and social norms and shares with Critical Race
Theory an account of how law is embedded in and often reinforces
inequality based on status. The greater part of political discourse currently
takes place online on privately-owned fora where standard international
and domestic legal protections in general do not apply.15 In that space,
11

See John T. Bennett, The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the Empirical and Legal Bases of
Hate Speech Regulation, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445, 498 (2016) (“The harm caused by words is
nebulous, easily exaggerated, and readily contrived.”).
12
See infra Part II.
13
See Charles R. Lawrence III et al., Introduction to WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 1 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
14
See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2007)
(discussing the applicability of global legal pluralism); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 869, 875–79 (1988) (reviewing the history and relevance of the theory of legal pluralism);
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 39 (2002) (defending the idea of legal pluralism from its critics).
15
Companies have limited direct obligations under the human rights standards that govern
freedom of expression. See Molly K. Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 393, 444–48 (2013); see also Molly K. Land, Against Privatized Censorship: Proposals for
Responsible Delegation, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. 363, 392–93 (2020) (examining application of international
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changing social norms around hate speech have become a driver of
increased regulation. Hate speech is being censored at a scale that was
unthinkable twenty-five years ago. On the one hand, this may well be
justified given the emerging consensus in social science research that there
is a correlation between hate speech on social media and offline violence.
However, the hate speech policies of social media platforms go beyond
what was urged by even the most ardent proponents of banning hate speech
in the 1980s and 1990s.
This Article examines this debate in Part I, recalling both the
arguments of those who advocated in favor of greater regulation of hate
speech, as well as the responses of those who worried that such restrictions
would stifle dissent. Part II then examines how these debates play out
against the background of social media, where emerging evidence indicates
a correlation between hate speech online, virulent nationalism, and
violence against minorities and activists. In Part III, we evaluate the
platform law of hate speech, arguing that social media regulation is
abstracted from context and power and, thus, is substantially overbroad.
Finally, in Part IV, we suggest recommendations for how social media
platforms might alter their policies and procedures to better account for the
context of online speech.
I. DEBATING HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
Although legal interpretations of the U.S. First Amendment have
changed significantly over the last century, current jurisprudence is highly
deferential to speech. A high water mark for the First Amendment was
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, which applied a heightened
standard for public officials in defamation lawsuits.16 This was followed by
Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1968, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute that had been the basis for the conviction of a
KKK member for inciting speech that included racist and anti-Semitic
elements.17 In the decades that followed, a debate raged about whether the
pendulum had swung too far and whether the robust protections of the First
Amendment for racist speech carried too many risks for vulnerable
minority groups.18
law to the speech-regulating activities of social media companies).
16
376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
17
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
18
See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA (1986) (defending Brandenburg’s approach to racist speech); Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982) (advocating a tort remedy for racist speech); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321 (1989) (arguing that public
prosecution is an appropriate response to racist speech of the Ku Klux Klan).
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A. The Case for Restricting Hate Speech
In the hate speech debate in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s,
the first challenge was to define the type of speech that required restriction.
Advocates argued that speech should be considered hate speech when it is
used as a weapon to “ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade.”19
Mari Matsuda, a leading advocate of restrictions on “words that wound,”
argued that racist speech presents ideas “so historically untenable, so
dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the
very classes of human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is
properly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.”20 Another
influential definition conceived hate speech capaciously, as “any form of
expression through which speakers primarily intend to vilify, humiliate, or
incite hatred against their targets,” and proposed defining “hate speech” as
attacks “so virulent that an observer would have great difficulty separating
the message delivered from the attack against the victim.”21
Proponents of restricting hate speech focused their attention on
changing the culture of political dialogue at universities in the United
States. This was a response to a genuine problem, namely the perception
that universities were an unreceptive environment for members of racial
and ethnic minorities, female students, and other historically disadvantaged
groups who had only gained significant access to elite public and private
universities in the previous decade.22 They encouraged university
administrators to promulgate campus speech codes, citing studies that
racist or sexist language and conduct can create a hostile learning
environment.23 Campus speech codes were often broadly worded and
restricted speech that was already prohibited (e.g., true threats, incitement)
along with speech protected by the First Amendment and prevalent in
public and private discourse (e.g., racist speech, or speech that intends to
humiliate).24 In the five years between 1986 and 1991, approximately 137
19

Lawrence et al., supra note 13, at 1.
Matsuda, supra note 18, at 2357.
21
Kenneth D. Ward, Free Speech and the Development of Liberal Virtues: An Examination of the
Controversies Involving Flag-Burning and Hate Speech, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 765–66 (1998).
22
Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 164–65 (1991) (“If we can ever construct rules that successfully balance the rights
and liberties of dominant and subordinate groups in hopes of creating a more just and equal society, the
university, increasingly a site of racist and sexist incidents, seems like an appropriate and necessary
place to begin.”).
23
Id. at 177 n.223 (“[The National ACLU] urges each university . . . ‘to develop comprehensive
plans aimed at reducing prejudice, responding promptly to incidents of bigotry and discriminatory
harassment, and protecting students from any such further incidents.’”).
24
See Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins but Race Loses in
America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153, 158–59 (1999) (providing examples of prohibited
“discriminatory harassment” at the University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin).
20
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colleges and universities adopted new speech codes. Their half-life was
rather short, and all the campus speech codes challenged in the courts by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) were struck down on First
Amendment grounds.26 The message from the courts was clear: State
universities must permit all speech that the government cannot itself
censor.
Current approaches adopted by proponents of hate speech regulation
bear little resemblance to the early campus codes. Jeremy Waldron’s
influential book, for example, emphasizes the broader dignitary harms in
hate speech, illustrated not through social science studies or other
empirical evidence, but through hypothetical scenarios—such as one in
which a Muslim father has to explain to his son and daughter why there is
an ethnic slur daubed on a wall in their neighborhood blaming Muslims for
9/11.27 Waldron reviews various formulations of hate speech without
endorsing any of them, and instead builds his case around the concept of
group libel or defamation, as contemplated by the Beauharnais case of
1952.28 Chris Demaske similarly makes an expansive argument for
regulating hate speech based upon a positive case to achieve greater social
equality.29
International law, in turn, is more permissive of regulation than the
U.S. First Amendment but does not go as far as Waldron or Demaske, and
requires that hate speech express an explicit intent to incite harm or possess
an identifiable causal nexus to actual harm. For instance, a 2019 report by
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression emphasized the empirical connection
between hate speech and incitement to violence in contemplating
companies’ hate speech policies.30 Others have proposed definitions of
“hate speech” closer to incitement or threat, forms of speech that are
already banned by law in the United States and most other countries.
25
Id. at 158; see also Steven R. Glaser, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, but Words Can
Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on University Campuses, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 267 (1992)
(developing a critical view of campus hate speech codes); Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The
Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 486 (2009)
(analyzing the legality of speech codes on college campuses).
26
NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP
31 (2018). Relevant cases include: DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008);
Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482 (E.D. Mich. 1993); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
27
JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 1 (2012).
28
Id. at 51–52 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 283–84 (1952) (Reed, J., dissenting);
343 U.S. at 292 (Jackson, J., dissenting); and 343 U.S. at 271–72 (Black, J., dissenting)).
29
Chris Demaske, Social Justice, Recognition Theory and the First Amendment: A New Approach
to Hate Speech Restriction, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y, 347, 393 (2019).
30
David Kaye, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019).

2021]

HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA

1037

Synthesizing free speech theory and Critical Race Theory, Andrew
Sellars identifies eight traits indicative of hate speech: (1) the speech
targets a group, or individual as a member of a group; (2) the content in the
message expresses hatred; (3) the speech causes harm; (4) the speaker
intends harm; (5) the speech incites harmful acts beyond the speech itself;
(6) the speech is either public or directed at a member of the group; (7) the
context makes a violent response possible; and (8) the speech has no
redeeming purpose.31 In sum, modern legal definitions of hate speech have
moved away from prohibiting merely offensive speech and concentrated
more on incitement or threat, that is, forms of speech that are already
banned by most national legal systems.
B. The Freedom of Expression Riposte
The U.S. Supreme Court has eschewed a constitutional definition of
hate speech and repeatedly rejected efforts to establish a hate speech
exception to the First Amendment.32 Thus, much hate speech in the United
States, even that which is highly offensive, is protected speech. Current
constitutional law only suppresses hate speech that also represents a “true
threat” or incitement to imminent lawless acts.33 Even then, any regulation
of inciting or threatening speech must be consistent with the
long-established principles of viewpoint and content neutrality that prevent
the state from disfavoring certain messages, ideas, subject matter, or
opinions, for instance, simply because they are offensive or disagreeable.34
Nadine Strossen’s book, Hate: Why We Should Resist It with
Counterspeech, Not Censorship, distills the modern “free speech
advocacy” standpoint. Strossen starts with the observation that there is no
clear and consistent definition of “hate speech.”35 Hate speech is not a term
of legal art and, in her view, it is factually wrong to assert that “hate speech
31

ANDREW F. SELLARS, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y RESEARCH, DEFINING
HATE SPEECH 25–31 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2882244.
32
See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“[T]he proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”); Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (“As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”).
33
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49
(1969) (per curiam). See Richard Ashby Wilson & Jordan Kiper, Incitement in an Era of Populism:
Updating Brandenburg After Charlottesville, 5 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 56, 62–72 (2020) (reviewing the
legal history of incitement and true threat).
34
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (stating that laws restricting speech
based on its content are presumptively unconstitutional); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218,
2222 (2015) (holding that laws may not restrict speech based on its content). See David L. Hudson, Jr.,
The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 259, 260 (2019) (reviewing the central analytical role of the content-discrimination principle in
First Amendment jurisprudence).
35
STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 3.
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36

is not free speech.” According to Strossen, the term is deployed to
demonize views people find offensive and to punish a broad swathe of
expression, including political discourse that is integral to democratic
deliberation.37 Reviewing hate speech laws in the United States and
globally, Strossen concludes that it is not possible to draft hate speech laws
that are not “unduly vague,” overbroad, and counter-productive.38 She
critiques the legal systems of Germany, France, and other European
countries, which convict hundreds of defendants a year for offenses as
imprecise as “incitement to hatred,” including a number of cases that seem
disproportionately chilling of political speech.39
Strossen correctly observes that speech regulations tend to disfavor
minority viewpoints. Indeed, there is a long, repressive history of
government censorship in the United States going back to the Early
Republic.40 In the 1830s, Southern states banned abolitionist speech on the
grounds that it had the potential to incite violence and rebellion.41 For
much of the twentieth century, incitement law was used to stifle socialist
thought and speech, including the mere reading and discussion of books by
Marx and Engels.42 Strossen observes that the Republican National
Committee and some state legislatures have included the Black Lives
Matter movement in resolutions condemning hate speech.43 She concludes
that government censorship of political speech is a greater threat than
individuals expressing discriminatory bias, and she endorses the aphorism,
“[t]he cure is worse than the disease” when it comes to hate speech
regulation.44
There is ample recent evidence to support the observation that
censorious regimes frequently abuse incitement laws to stifle political and
religious dissent. For instance, in 2019, the Chinese government convicted
a Christian pastor for incitement of subversion of state power and
sentenced him to nine years in prison for saying that the Chinese
Communist Party’s ideology was “morally incompatible with the Christian

36

Id. at 1, 3.
Id. at 1.
38
Id. at 13.
39
See id. at 83–86 (discussing hate speech laws around the world).
40
See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW 2 (2010) (describing the
repressive speech laws of the first fifty years of the republic).
41
See id. at 340 (discussing prohibitions on abolitionist speech).
42
See Wilson & Kiper, supra note 33, at 65–69 (reviewing the legal suppression of socialists and
communists in the United States during the twentieth century). See generally John F. Wirenius, The
Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (1994) (reciting the history of First Amendment jurisprudence in the twentieth century).
43
STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 17.
44
Id. at 14.
37

HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA

2021]

1039

45

faith.” In the same year, the Governor of South Dakota proposed new
legislation banning “incitement to riot” to stamp out protest by indigenous
and environmental activists at the Keystone XL pipeline.46 Around the
world, defamation laws are used to target and silence human rights
defenders. 47
Strossen’s thesis, which is representative of free speech advocacy more
generally, can be summarized in three points: (1) there is insufficient
evidence that hate speech falling short of incitement or true threat causes
the harms attributed to it; (2) hate speech laws do not effectively reduce
such putative harms; and (3) even if hate speech laws did reduce the feared
harms, the damage to democratic legitimacy and freedom of speech would
be too great to justify them.48 By the early 2000s, the free speech advocates
had largely won the argument, at least in U.S. courts. Although a number
of scholars continued to write about the need to mitigate the harms of hate
speech, their efforts at changing policy were largely unsuccessful, and
municipalities, states, and state universities generally refrained from
proclaiming hate speech codes.49 The apparent success of free speech
advocacy was, however, short-lived.
II. THE HARMS OF ONLINE HATE SPEECH
Debates about the scope of acceptable political speech are adamantine
and date back at least to Aristotle’s Rhetoric,50 but what is new and
different about the present moment is the outsized role played in popular
political discourse by a small number of global technology corporations. In
the past ten years, the rise of social media companies and their content
moderation policies have transformed the hate speech debate. We are now
in a brave new world in which the First Amendment applies to only a
fraction of public discourse about the issues of the day. Democratic
45

Eva Dou, Activist Chinese Pastor Gets Nine-Year Prison Sentence, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-chinese-pastor-gets-nine-year-prison-sentence11577698307.
46
Stephen Groves, South Dakota Governor Plans Revision of Riot-boosting Laws, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/42f4533aac4913f2bb686d8d06c14b7b; see also South
Dakota Governor Drops Anti-Protest Laws in Settlement Agreement with ACLU, ACLU (Oct. 24,
2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/south-dakota-governor-drops-anti-protest-laws-settlementagreement-aclu (announcing settlement agreement with ACLU).
47
OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDELINES ON
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 70 (2014).
48
STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 36.
49
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 778, 798–99 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS
OF AMERICA (1999)) (advocating for solutions such as hate speech codes and the application of tort
principles in order to limit hate speech on college campuses).
50
See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 3–6 (Paul Negri & Jenny Bak eds., W. Rhys Roberts trans., Dover
2004) (1910) (outlining Aristotle’s views on political speech).
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deliberation now happens online, and in particular, on Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and Reddit, which are owned by private corporations that set
their own terms and conditions.51 Across the world, social media is the
town square in which current affairs are discussed and political opinions
hashed out.52
There is much that is positive about the relationship between
democracy and social media. Information flows more freely and quickly in
the body politic. Government and citizens can communicate directly,
without the filter of traditional media, and in this way social media shrinks
the space between citizens and their official representatives, permitting
average people to pose questions to officials and state their views on policy
issues. Social media can also enhance accountability of state institutions by
providing video evidence of violence and violations of rights committed by
police or the security forces.53
At the same time, it is indisputable that social media is being exploited
to promote populist and nativist politics around the globe. The number of
populist governments has doubled worldwide since the early 2000s, and
populist leaders have been elected in Brazil, Guatemala, Hungary, India,
the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Venezuela, among other places.54 As part of a “cultural backlash”
against elites, populists win approval by harshly criticizing and even
ridiculing established political elites and nostalgically harking back to
bygone days when (it is imagined) things were better for working people.55

51

See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2004) (arguing that private
corporations that control online platforms for deliberation will try to limit the participation and
expression of users in the pursuit of their own economic interests).
52
See NANJALA NYABOLA, DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, ANALOGUE POLITICS: HOW THE INTERNET
ERA IS TRANSFORMING POLITICS IN KENYA 1 (2018) (showing the connectedness of Kenyan citizens
via social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Twitter); Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards,
Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1355–56
(2018) (“Rather than just the virtual town square, the Internet is bound up in everything we do and
everywhere we do it . . . .”).
53
Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere Revisited: How Digital Technologies and Social Media
Aid and Inhibit Human Rights Documentation and Advocacy, 11 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 373, 374 (2019).
54
Paul Lewis et al., Revealed: The Rise and Rise of Populist Rhetoric, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6 2019,
9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-riseof-populist-rhetoric; Richard Javad Heydarian, Understanding Duterte’s Mind-Boggling Rise to Power,
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/
2018/03/20/duterte/; Clarence Page, Comedians as Populist Leaders? Ukrainian Comic—And Our
Own President—Proves It’s No Joke, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 23, 2019, 2:05 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/
columns/clarence-page/ct-perspec-page-ukraine-president-donaldtrump-comedian-slovenia-guatemala-20190423-story.html.
55
Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic
Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 3 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty, Working Paper No. RWP16-026,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659.
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Populist speech is often graphic and brimming with crude insults, racial
resentment, chauvinistic intolerance, and xenophobia.56
For some observers, the simultaneous rise of social media and populist
politics is no coincidence, as social media “privileges discourse that is
simple, impulsive, and uncivil” and debases serious-minded democratic
deliberation.57 Observers blame social media for the creation of “echo
chambers” of like-minded individuals and the deepening of political
polarization that allows populist politics to take root and thrive.58 Others go
a step further and claim that online disinformation campaigns have
undermined democratic elections and influenced the outcome of the Brexit
vote and the 2016 presidential election in the United States. Susan Morgan,
for example, notes that, “days before the election, messages circulated on
social media that Hillary Clinton had died. And in some key battlegrounds,
messages were targeted at Democrat voters claiming that the date of the
election had changed.”59
Once populist leaders achieve political power, they frequently take
advantage of the affordances of social media—including the ability to
transmit and amplify their messages directly to a wide audience—to
consolidate their hold on government.60 In some cases, they mobilize troll
armies to flood social media with disinformation and angry rhetoric
targeting their political opponents, a phenomenon that has been termed
“digital populism.”61 “Digital authoritarianism” is another newly coined
term that describes the more sinister uses of social media by states or
state-aligned actors that includes surveilling, harassing, threatening, and
inciting violence against their political opponents.62
56
Id. at 7; see also Jonathan T. Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist Political
Views: The Case of Donald Trump 1 (Working Paper, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822059 (examining support for Donald Trump and racial resentment).
57
Brian L. Ott, The Age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the Politics of Debasement, 34
CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 59, 59 (2017).
58
JOSHUA A. TUCKER ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICAL POLARIZATION, AND POLITICAL
DISINFORMATION: A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 16 (2018), https://www.hewlett.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Social-Media-Political-Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-LiteratureReview.pdf.
59
Susan Morgan, Fake News, Disinformation, Manipulation and Online Tactics to Undermine
Democracy, 3 J. CYBER POL’Y 39, 40 (2018); see also Martin Innes et al., Disinformation and Digital
Influencing After Terrorism: Spoofing, Truthing and Social Proofing, CONTEMP. SOC. SCI., Jan. 2019,
at 1, 1–15 (discussing the effects of disinformation campaigns in the aftermath of terrorist attacks);
Nicholas Thompson & Issie Lapowsky, How Russian Trolls Used Meme Warfare to Divide America,
WIRED (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ira-propaganda-senate-report/
(discussing a Senate report that shows how Russia’s online disinformation campaign might have
affected the 2016 election).
60
Ergin Bulut & Erdem Yörük, Digital Populism: Trolls and Political Polarization of Twitter in
Turkey, 11 INT’L J. COMM. 4093, 4094 (2017).
61
Id. at 4093.
62
CARLY NYST & NICK MONACO, INST. FOR THE FUTURE, STATE-SPONSORED TROLLING: HOW
GOVERNMENTS ARE DEPLOYING DISINFORMATION AS PART OF BROADER DIGITAL HARASSMENT
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The fact that hate speech has moved online means that its character and
effects are much easier to study than when it was confined to traditional
media.63 Indeed, social scientists have begun to identify a correlation
between online hate speech and offline violence.64 The preponderance of
studies conducted during the recent upsurge of right-wing populism
pinpoint both direct and systemic harmful effects of hate speech. The Irish
human rights organization Front Line Defenders writes that, “[t]here is a
well-evidenced link between defamatory attacks online and in
pro-government media and an escalation to physical attacks on individuals
and their families.”65
Establishing that hate speech on social media directly causes or even
correlates with hate crimes is always difficult, but there is a growing body
of evidence that widespread attacks on immigrants and other minorities in
recent years have been instigated online. Social scientists such as Edwards
and Rushin have found evidence for what they call the “Trump effect”—a
correlation between Trump’s election and an increase in hate crimes in the
United States during 2016.66 Using panel regressions, they find that
“counties that voted for President Trump by the widest margins in the
presidential election also experienced the largest increases in reported hate
crimes.”67 They conclude that Trump’s election may have resulted in
approximately 410 additional hate crimes nationally per quarter, or 2048
additional hate crimes since his electoral victory.68 Additionally, Müller
and Schwarz identify a statistically significant correlation between
anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim tweets and actual physical attacks on
CAMPAIGNS 1 (2018), https://www.iftf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/images/DigIntel/IFTF_State_
sponsored_trolling_report.pdf (describing state sponsored threats and incitements); Gregory, supra note
53, at 380; see generally MUNA ABBAS ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, INVISIBLE THREATS: MITIGATING THE
RISK OF VIOLENCE FROM ONLINE HATE SPEECH AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN GUATEMALA
(2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/invisiblethreats-online-hate-speech/
(describing incitement against human rights defenders in Guatemala).
63
Neurolinguistic analysis of social media has involved the design of classifiers for hate speech
detection with a high level of accuracy. See Mai ElSherief et al., Hate Lingo: A Target-based Linguistic
Analysis of Hate Speech in Social Media, A SS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Apr.
11, 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.04257.
64
Peter Neumann, Foreword to JOHANNES BALDAUF ET AL., HATE SPEECH AND RADICALISATION
ONLINE: THE OCCI RESEARCH REPORT 5 (2019); Josh Jacobs, Does Online Hate Drive Anti-Migrant
Violence?, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/a3d4b800-9bf3-11e8-88de49c908b1f264.
65
FRONT
LINE
DEFS.,
GLOBAL
ANALYSIS
2018,
at
6
(2019),
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/global_analysis_2018.pdf.
66
Edwards & Rushin, supra note 3, at 3; see also Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, From
Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Anti-Minority Sentiment 2 (Nov. 2, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3149103 (analyzing the relationship
between Twitter posts of Donald J. Trump and offline violence against minorities).
67
Edwards & Rushin, supra note 3, at 3.
68
Id. at 13.
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Muslims and immigrants in Germany and the United States in 2016. In a
study of 100 U.S. cities between 2011-2016, Relia et al. find that hate
crimes correlate with tweets containing targeted discrimination on the basis
of race, ethnicity, and national-origin.70
The genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar stands out as the most
egregious and harmful use of social media by a government thus far.
According to a report on the situation in Myanmar issued by the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, anti-Muslim rhetoric
and threats of violence against Rohingya were posted on Facebook by
high-ranking members of Myanmar’s military and Buddhist nationalists
beginning in 2012.71 In two waves of violence in 2016 and 2017, military
and non-Rohingya civilians violently attacked Muslim Rohingya villages
in Rakhine State.72 The most conservative estimate is that the Myanmar
armed forces (“Tatmadaw”) killed 10,000 Rohingya civilians,73 but some
observers put the number higher.74 As of September 2018, there had been
6097 documented incidences of gender-based violence, including sexual
violence,75 and approximately 780,000 Rohingya had been forcibly
displaced to neighboring Bangladesh.76
Posts on Facebook are believed to have both incited specific acts of
violence against the Rohingya and contributed to a general climate that
made the genocide possible. A UN-sponsored fact-finding mission
documented over 150 public social media accounts, pages, and groups on
Facebook that “regularly spread messages amounting to hate speech
against Muslims in general or Rohingya in particular.”77 The report noted a
number of these accounts were “particularly influential” in light of “the
number of followers (all over 10,000, but some over 1 million), the high
levels of engagement of the followers with the posts (commenting and
sharing), and the frequency of new posts (often daily, if not hourly).”78 The
Myanmar government deployed online narratives evoking several different
themes about the supposed threat posed by the Rohingya Muslims,
69

Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime
27, 42 (Nov. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082972.
70
Kunnal Relia et al., Race, Ethnicity and National Origin-based Discrimination in Social Media
and Hate Crimes Across 100 U.S. Cities (Jan. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.00119 (testing the relationship between social media and hate crimes).
71
Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-01/19, Situation in the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ¶ 59 (July 4, 2019).
72
Id. ¶¶ 5, 67–68.
73
Id. ¶ 90.
74
Id. ¶ 89.
75
Id. ¶ 94.
76
Id. ¶ 69.
77
Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, ¶ 1310 (Sept. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Myanmar Report].
78
Id.
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including descriptions of them as “an existential threat to the country,” “a
threat to Burmese racial purity,” and “a threat to Buddhist religious
sanctity.”79 According to the UN mission, “[s]uch narratives latch onto
long-standing anti-Muslim prejudices and stereotypes; they are designed to
stoke fear.”80
Anecdotal evidence indicates that these campaigns were influential in
inciting specific attacks. For example, while a widespread and systematic
attack on the Rohingya civilian population was underway, young soldiers
in the Myanmar military posted derogatory and inciting messages on
Facebook containing the same narratives deployed by propaganda
accounts. On August 26, 2017, a soldier wrote that he could not wait to be
deployed to Rakhine State because the “Muslim dogs” represented a threat
to the citizens, and the next day he posted, “on the battlefield, whoever is
quick will get to eat you, Muslim dogs.”81 On August 27, 2017, a police
officer involved in forcibly removing and killing Rohingya civilians posted
that he “[h]a[s] been wanting to kill these ‘Kalar’ for so long. Only got to
kill them just now.”82 In its assessment of the situation, the Office of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court noted: “A lieutenant of the
33rd LID deployed to Rakhine in early August 2017 posted a ‘smirking
emoji’ on Facebook, along with the commentary, ‘[i]f they’re Bengali [. . .]
they’ll be killed.’”83 In a report released in 2018, Reuters documented more
than 1000 posts, comments, images, and videos on Facebook attacking the
Rohingya or Muslims generally in extremely derogatory terms and
threatening them with violence.84 All the posts were in the Burmese
language. Further, the UN mission affirmed that in addition to direct
incitement, anti-Rohingya speech on social media “contributed to and
exacerbated a climate in which hate speech thrives and in which
individuals and groups may be more receptive to calls of incitement to
violence.”85
The impact of these derogatory messages was amplified by the lack of
alternative channels for information and low levels of digital literacy in
Myanmar. The dependence of the population on Facebook for internet
access is so great that, “[t]he word ‘Facebook’ has become synonymous
with the internet itself in Myanmar.”86 The Report of the Independent
79

Id. ¶¶ 1315–17.
Id. ¶ 1314.
81
Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 71, ¶ 176.
82
“Kalar” is an anti-Muslim racial epithet. Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. ¶ 59.
85
Myanmar Report, supra note 77, ¶ 1327.
86
Megha Rajagopalan et al., How Facebook Failed the Rohingya in Myanmar, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/facebook-myanmarrohingya-genocide.
80
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International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded, “[t]he role of
social media is significant. Facebook has been a useful instrument for those
seeking to spread hate, in a context where, for most users, Facebook is the
Internet.”87 The use of Facebook by Myanmar’s military to incite and
pursue genocide is not in dispute, and Facebook has since publicly
accepted responsibility for its central role in the genocide.88
Faced with the evidence from the above scenarios, it is no longer
credible to maintain that hate speech that would be protected under the
First Amendment (such as ethnic slurs or speech that denigrates a group
but does not directly advocate violence) does not have the potential to
cause substantial harm and injury. There is ample research showing that in
certain circumstances hate speech correlates with, and possibly has a
causal nexus to, measurable harms. Of course, an empirical consensus on
the deleterious effects of denigrating and inciting speech does not in itself
determine the normative question of hate speech regulation, since one
might reasonably support freedom of expression for other reasons,
including its value in the process of democratic decision-making.
However, given the mounting evidence of the systemic and corrosive
effects of hate speech, including speech that does not rise to the level of
incitement or threat, we need to be asking what kinds of speech have which
effects, and what would be the cost and consequences of taking action to
address those effects.
III. THE PLATFORM LAW OF HATE SPEECH
David Kaye, the former UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and
Protection of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, has used the term
“platform law” to refer to the rules that social media companies have
developed to determine what user-generated online content may be posted
to their platforms.89 Platform law accurately captures the degree to which
private corporations have established stable definitions of key terms like
hate speech, operational rules about how to handle harmful or abusive
content, and enduring mechanisms to enforce those rules. This Part
discusses first how these platforms have defined “hate speech” and then
introduces two significant limitations of this approach: the lack of
87

Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/64, ¶ 74 (Sept. 12, 2018).
88
Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebookgenocide.html; Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmarfacebook.html.
89
David Kaye, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1046

[Vol. 52:3

transparency and accountability in how platforms apply their rules, and
their failure to consider the context of speech.
A. Defining Hate Speech Online
Although it is true that some platforms such as Gab, 4Chan, and 8Chan
engage in little or no moderation of the content posted on their platforms,90
most mainstream platforms actively moderate content. Platforms have
responded to the criticism that they are too permissive of online hate
speech by creating infrastructures of regulation, including algorithms that
remove content and mechanisms by which users can flag potentially
abusive content that is then sent to tens of thousands of moderators for
review.91 The companies have wide discretion in designing their content
moderation policies since they are not government institutions and
therefore not directly subject to the First Amendment.92 Although they
have been regulated in many places around the world and are increasingly
subject to much more stringent legal requirements in Europe, they
otherwise operate like private clubs that set their own terms of service, to
which all users must agree in order to participate on the platform.
In the early years, platform policies on the regulation of hate speech
were strongly influenced by the First Amendment, but current hate speech
policies of these private entities more closely resemble a European
approach to speech regulation.93 The amount of hate speech that internet
90

See Jane Coasten, Gab, the Social Media Platform Favored by the Alleged Pittsburgh Shooter,
Explained, VOX (Oct. 29, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/29/
18033006/gab-social-media-anti-semitism-neo-nazis-twitter-facebook (“[U]sing little to no moderation,
Gab has become the go-to social networking site for the alt-right and, moreover, the furthest fringes of
the far right.”); Emily Stewart, 8chan, a Nexus of Radicalization, Explained, VOX (Aug. 5, 2019, 12:56
PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/3/18527214/8chan-walmart-el-paso-shooting-cloudflarewhite-nationalism (“4chan’s content moderation policies are, to put it lightly, pretty lax, but 8chan’s are
nearly nonexistent.”).
91
TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION,
AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (2018); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues
of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 55–76 (2015) (providing a taxonomy of moderation in online
communities); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1635 (2018) (examining how content is moderated ex ante vs. ex
post); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1357 (2018)
(considering different policies on content moderation).
92
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck that merely
hosting speech is not a traditionally exclusive public function and on its own does not transform private
entities into state actors subject to First Amendment constraints. 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019). Citing
this precedent, the Ninth Circuit established that YouTube is a private forum, not a public forum
subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991,
995 (9th Cir. 2020).
93
See David Kaye: Speech Police: The Global Struggle to Govern the Internet, YOUTUBE (June
6, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6PDZ-o5Khg (quotation at 39:34) (“[O]ne of the
interesting things about the platforms, and our reaction to the platforms, is how much there is a
clamoring, in our public, for the taking down of hate speech. . . . There may be a difference between

2021]

HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA

1047

platforms remove is staggering, given that Facebook has over 2.4 billion
active monthly users and Twitter has over 330 million monthly users94
sending over 500 million tweets per day.95 In 2019, social media
companies including Facebook, Google, and Twitter, removed seventy-two
percent of hate speech on their platforms that violated the European
Commission’s code of conduct.96 Facebook reported in 2017 that it was
deleting nearly 288,000 hate speech posts per month,97 and this tripled to
nearly 1 million hate speech posts per month by the third quarter of 2018.98
In the first quarter of 2020, Facebook reported taking action on 9.6 million
posts, or 3.2 million per month.99 The rate of removal can spike even
higher during critical incidents, such as when the New Zealand mosque
shooter streamed on Facebook Live in 2019.100 In the twenty-four hours
after that tragedy, Facebook reported that it prevented the uploading of
more than 1.2 million videos of the attack and removed approximately
300,000 additional copies after they were posted.101
Platform law employs capacious and far-reaching definitions of hate
speech. For example, YouTube’s policy is to “remove content promoting
violence or hatred against individuals or groups based on any of the
following attributes: age, caste, disability, ethnicity, gender identity and
expression, nationality, race, immigration status, religion, sex/gender,
sexual orientation, victims of a major violent event and their kin, veteran

our legal norms and our social norms, and the social norms in the United States, at this particular
moment, may not be all that different from European norms. So, as the companies move to restrict
more and more what they call ‘hate speech’ or ‘hateful conduct,’ I don’t know if there’ll be much of a
real difference between European and American attitudes.”).
94
KEMP, supra note 8, at 24.
95
Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS, https://www.internetlivestats.com/twitterstatistics/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
96
Elizabeth Schulze, EU Says Facebook, Google and Twitter Are Getting Faster at Removing
Hate Speech Online, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 6:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/facebookgoogle-and-twitter-are-getting-faster-at-removing-hate-speech-online-eu-finds--.html. Hate speech,
according to the European Commission, is “the public incitement to violence or hatred directed to
groups or individuals on the basis of certain characteristics, including race, color, religion, descent and
national or ethnic origin.” Id. (citation omitted).
97
STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 32.
98
Mehreen Khan, More ‘Hate Speech’ Being Removed from Social Media, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/868f9d96-27bc-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7 (reporting that Facebook
took action against 2.9 million pieces of content in the third quarter of 2018, a rate of nearly 1 million
per month).
99
Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.facebook.com/
community-standards-enforcement#hate-speech (last visited May, 26 2020).
100
Nick Perry & Mark Baker, New Zealand Mosque Shooter Broadcast Slaughter on Facebook,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 15, 2019), https://apnews.com/ce9e1d267af149dab40e3e5391254530.
101
A Further Update on New Zealand Terrorist Attack, FACEBOOK (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/technical-update-on-new-zealand/.
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102

status.” Indeed, YouTube’s policy goes beyond Germany’s incitement
to hatred laws by prohibiting speech based on message alone and without
reference to the potential for real-world impact.103 Twitter’s Hateful
Conduct Policy hews more closely to the First Amendment and censors
tweets that “promote violence against or directly attack or threaten other
people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, caste, sexual
orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or
serious disease.”104 Except for hateful images or symbols in a profile image
or header that express hate towards a person, group, or protected category,
Twitter’s rules allow hate speech as long as it does not incite violence or
attack someone on the basis of their membership in a group.105
Of the mainstream social media companies, Facebook’s definition of
hate speech is the broadest and is implemented by the most aggressive
procedures for moderating content. Facebook defines hate speech as “a
direct attack on people based on what we call protected characteristics—
race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation,
caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or disability.”106
Facebook also provides “some protections for immigration status.”107 It
defines an attack “as violent or dehumanizing speech, statements of
inferiority, or calls for exclusion or segregation.”108
Facebook separates attacks into three tiers: Tier 1 attacks are those that
target a person or group of people who share one of the above-listed
characteristics or immigration status, when the attack is violent or
dehumanizing speech.109 Dehumanizing speech involves referring to or
comparing the target to, among other things, insects, animals, filth, disease,
or criminals.110 Tier 2 attacks target persons or groups sharing the
above-listed characteristics, when the attack includes statements of
inferiority or an image implying a person’s or a group’s physical, mental,
or moral deficiency or expressions of contempt or disgust.111 Tier 3 attacks
102
Hate Speech Policy, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en
(last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
103
See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], June 19, 2019, BGBL I at 844, § 130, no. 1
(Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (discussing penalties for
“[w]hoever, in a manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace, incites hatred
against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origin”).
104
Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hatefulconduct-policy (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
105
Id.
106
Hate Speech, FACEBOOK COMMUNITY STANDARDS, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/hate_speech (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
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are calls to exclude or segregate a person or group of people based on the
above-listed characteristics and content that describes or negatively targets
people with slurs; slurs are defined as words commonly used as “insulting
labels for the above-listed characteristics.”112
Platform law is enforced by automated content tools and human
moderators who assess content that has been reported by users.113
Facebook has spent half a billion dollars on creating a regulatory structure
that outsources the bulk of its content moderation to approximately 15,000
third-party contractors who employ over 35,000 moderators.114 Harmful
online content is classified through both automated moderation tools
(algorithms) as well as user flagging.115 Algorithms identify particular
classes of harmful material such as child pornography, extremist content,
and hate speech.116 Additionally, Facebook and Twitter rely on users to
identify harmful content, and each has created a flagging mechanism for
users to tag content that is then sent to a human reviewer.117
The processes for identifying problematic content vary between
Facebook and Twitter: Facebook allows users to report abusive content
through a “Find Support or Report” link.118 Twitter outlines how to
respond to offensive posts on its “About Online Abuse” page, which
suggests unfollowing and blocking abusive accounts and reporting posts to
Twitter.119
At Facebook, a three-tier structure guides human content evaluation.120
The bottom tier121 consists of tens of thousands of moderators situated in
various geographical locations around the world, clicking through
hundreds of thousands of posts per day that have been flagged by users.122
112

Id.
See GILLESPIE, supra note 91, at 4.
114
Id.; SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF
SOCIAL MEDIA (2019); David Gilbert, Facebook Is Forcing Its Moderators to Log Every Second of
Their Days — Even When They’re in the Bathroom, VICE (Jan 9. 2020, 10:55 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/z3beea/facebook-moderators-lawsuit-ptsd-trauma-trackingbathroom-breaks; Can Facebook Really Rely on Artificial Intelligence to Spot Abuse?, BUS. DAY (Nov.
11,
2019),
https://businessday.ng/financial-times/article/can-facebook-really-rely-on-artificialintelligence-to-spot-abuse/.
115
Kaye, supra note 89, ¶¶ 32–34.
116
Press Release, Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement (Nov.
15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-andenforcement/10156443129621634/.
117
Id.
118
How to Report Things on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
181495968648557 (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).
119
About Online Abuse, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/cyber-bullyingand-online-abuse (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).
120
Klonick, supra note 91, at 1639.
121
Id. at 1639–40.
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Andrew Arsht & Daniel Etcovitch, Commentary, The Human Cost of Online Content
Moderation, JOLT DIG. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/the-human-cost-of-online113
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They are the first reviewers of reported content, judging its admissibility
using Facebook’s content moderation policies, and reviewing everything
from attacks on race or sexual orientation to violent or pornographic
content.123 Tens of thousands of content moderators work under reportedly
grim conditions, and they typically have under a minute to make a decision
about whether an item of content violates the platform’s rules.124
Facebook’s moderators are instructed to follow an ever-changing
document they call “the bible,” a 10,000-word document that has
twenty-four different categories, broken down into three groups: harmful
behavior, sensitive content, and legal violations.125 If a moderator is unsure
whether a post is appropriate, they will escalate it to a more senior
moderator, who is usually the supervisor of a content moderation center
and has more experience in the field.126 Finally, if that moderator still
cannot determine whether the post is appropriate, the matter is escalated
again, often to lawyers or policy makers at the main Facebook
headquarters in Palo Alto, California.127
Over time, the regulatory reach and capacity of platform law has
ratcheted up inexorably. It is worth noting that no rules or mechanisms
governing the regulation of hate speech have been reversed or dismantled
after they were designed and implemented. Furthermore, in 2018, 2019,
and 2020, platforms made a flurry of policy changes, leading to new and
even more protective community guidelines on hate speech. Google is at
the forefront of addressing hate on its YouTube platform and made more
than thirty policy updates in 2018 alone.128 YouTube’s policy changes had
tangible consequences, including the removal of Alex Jones’ Infowars
Channel for hateful posts about Muslims and transgender people.129 In June
2019, YouTube announced plans to remove thousands of videos and
channels that advocated neo-Nazism, and in December it banned videos
that “maliciously insult” people based on race, gender, or sexual
orientation.130 Also in 2019, Facebook decided to remove all white
content-moderation.
123
Klonick, supra note 91, at 1640.
124
Gilbert, supra note 114.
125
Id.
126
Klonick, supra note 91, at 1640–41.
127
Id.
128
Our Ongoing Work to Tackle Hate, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (June 5, 2019),
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019/06/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate.html.
129
Janko Roettgers, Following Apple and Facebook, YouTube Bans Alex Jones,
Infowars Channels, VARIETY (Aug. 6, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/youtube-alexjones-ban-1202896074/.
130
Mark Di Stefano, YouTube Will Ban Videos That “Maliciously Insult” People Based on Race,
Gender, or Sexual Orientation, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 11, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/ markdistefano/youtube-harassment-guidelines-crowder-maza; Kevin Roose
& Kate Conger, YouTube to Remove Thousands of Videos Pushing Extreme Views, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
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nationalist groups’ pages, depriving them of the ability to promote white
supremacist ideas on a mainstream platform.131 At around the same time,
Twitter banned speech that dehumanizes a group of people based on their
religion.132
In 2020, bowing to pressure to create an impartial regulatory
mechanism to review its content removal decisions, Facebook created an
oversight board managed by an independent trust.133 The board of forty
members134 is empowered to review individual cases of content removal
referred by Facebook or brought by users who disagree with Facebook’s
decision to remove their post.135
Some commentators hailed the oversight board as a “Supreme
Court”136 that will be “completely autonomous to Facebook”137 and “can
overrule Zuckerberg.”138 However, its authority will be quite limited, and
its autonomy is circumscribed in important ways. Specifically, there is no
provision in the bylaws for the board to review material that remains
posted on the platform, only content that Facebook has taken down.139
Further, the board lacks the authority to review Facebook’s content
moderation policies or procedures that guide removal decisions, including
the algorithm that curates users’ feeds and prioritizes hateful content.140 In
addition, the board’s rulings must comply with “Facebook’s content
policies and values,”141 which limits its ability to apply alternative sources
of guidance, such as international human rights law.
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/youtube-remove-extremist-videos.html.
131
Liam Stack, Facebook Announces New Policy to Ban White Nationalist Content, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar.
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/business/facebook-white-nationalistsupremacist .html. See Community Standards: Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/hate_speech (last visited April 30, 2020) (setting out the policy that prohibits
statements of inferiority or calls for exclusion or segregation).
132
Emily Birnbaum, Twitter Moves to Ban ‘Dehumanizing’ Language Toward Religious Groups,
HILL (July 9, 2019, 2:09 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/452226-twitter-expands-hatefulconduct-policy-to-include-dehumanizing-language;
Hateful
Conduct
Policy,
TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
133
Facebook Oversight Board Bylaws, art. 4 (2020) [hereinafter Bylaws],
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Bylaws_v6.pdf.
134
Id. art. 1, § 1.4.
135
Id. art. 1, § 3 (Case Review and Decisions).
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Rebecca Bellan, Facebook Announces Members of Its Supreme Court, FORBES (May 6, 2020,
3:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccabellan/2020/05/06/facebook-announces-members-ofits-supreme-court/#3759e11a3f12.
137
Id.
138
Elizabeth Culliford, Facebook Names First Members of Oversight Board That Can Overrule
Zuckerberg, REUTERS (May 6, 2020, 1:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebookoversight/facebook-names- first- members- of- oversight- board- that- can- overrule-zuckerbergidUSKBN22I2LQ.
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Bylaws, art. 3.
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Müller & Schwarz, supra note 69, at 27, 42.
141
Bylaws, art. 1, § 3.
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The board’s decisions are binding on just one case at a time and do not
unambiguously establish a policy precedent for all similar cases, a power
that would be essential to ensuring that the board’s decisions would have
policy impact. Facebook must implement a board decision within a
week,142 unless the decision would be illegal according to national law. It is
unclear how the board and Facebook will navigate jurisdictional issues
surrounding national laws on hate speech and disinformation.143
The board’s authority is limited in both scope and speed. The board
cannot review content on Facebook Dating or Marketplace, or messages
sent through WhatsApp, Messenger, or Instagram Direct, all services
owned by Facebook.144 Since its review process can take ninety days,145 the
board cannot act expeditiously to tackle viral content contributing to
imminent public violence, as occurred during the genocide of the
Rohingya.146 The bylaws make allowance for expedited review requests
which might speed the process up, but “expedited” can still mean up to
thirty days.147 Finally, the board can amend certain sections of the bylaws,
but on the fundamental question of case review procedures (i.e., which
cases are selected and how they are reviewed), Facebook reserves its right
to veto any board amendments it disagrees with.148
As a result of these substantial restrictions, some critics have written
off the oversight board as “toothless”149 and inherently unable to address
the source of Facebook’s content moderation problems, namely its
“attention economy”150 business model that incentivizes contentious and
hateful speech to sell more advertising.151 They have also portrayed the
board as a half-measure to forestall government oversight and anti-trust
investigations, an assertion that seemed vindicated in May 2020 when

142
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See Jennifer C. Daskal, Speech Across Borders, 105 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1607–08 (2019)
(discussing how social media companies navigate conflicting speech regulation regimes across national
borders).
144
Bylaws, art. 2, § 1.2.1.
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Id., art. 5, § 1.
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28, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/28/under-consideration/.
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Facebook launched an advocacy group called “American Edge” to lobby in
Washington against regulation of the tech sector.152
B. The Limits of Platform Law
Social media companies today prohibit hate speech on their platforms.
If promulgated by federal, state, or municipal authorities in the United
States, platform law would undoubtedly violate the First Amendment,
which prevents suppression of speech based on its content or viewpoint.153
The U.S. government could not ban speech that “maliciously insults”154 a
person based on their sexual orientation (YouTube),155 or forbid speech
that dehumanizes a group based on religion (Twitter),156 since both would
violate constitutional prohibitions on content or viewpoint discrimination.
But despite Strossen’s call for platforms to refrain from removing
“expression that the First Amendment shields from government
censorship,”157 the companies have been charting a different course guided
more by social norms than law. Social media platforms have created
systems for suppressing speech—including speech protected under
national and international law—in what has functionally become our
public square. Indeed, according to the platforms, approximately 90% of
hate speech is currently removed by automated evaluation tools even
before it is seen by viewers.158
Given that these platforms operate globally and a majority of their
users are located outside the United States,159 a U.S.-centric approach to
regulation of speech would not be appropriate, effective, or legitimate.
152
Tony Romm, Facebook Is Quietly Helping to Set Up a New Pro-tech Advocacy Group to
POST,
(May
12,
2020,
6:00
AM),
Battle
Washington,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/ 2020/05/12/facebook-lobbying-american-edge/?mc_cid.
153
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015) (holding that content-based laws
are presumptively unconstitutional); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (reversing the
City of St. Paul’s censoring of speech on the basis of bias-motivated content because it only placed
prohibitions on speech that discriminated on the basis of “race, color, creed, religion or gender”); Bible
Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 247 (6th Cir. 2015) (considering Wayne County’s suppression
of an evangelical group’s anti-Muslim speech).
154
Harassment and Cyberbullying Policy, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2802268?hl=en&ref_topic=9282436 (last visited July 12, 2020).
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Hate Speech Policy, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en
(last visited July 12, 2020).
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Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hatefulconduct-policy (last visited July 12, 2020).
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STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 31.
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community-standards-enforcement#hate-speech (last visited May 26, 2020).
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Further, although in the United States there is no legal compulsion for
companies to limit hate speech—under § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, platforms cannot be held liable for content posted on
their platforms160—the laws of other jurisdictions are increasingly
imposing such liability. In addition, there are a host of commercial reasons
for companies to moderate. Moderation of uncomfortable speech—as
much as First Amendment advocates may resist it—is part and parcel of
the service that social media companies offer. As Tarleton Gillespie
explains, “moderation, far from being occasional or ancillary, is in fact an
essential, constant, and definitional part of what platforms do. Moderation
is the essence of platforms. It is the commodity they offer. It is their central
value proposition.”161 Platforms remove hate speech to create the
environment they believe their users want and to comply with legislation in
the national jurisdictions in which they operate.
Moreover, this ever-increasing prohibition on hate speech in platform
law coincides with shifts in public attitudes in the United States.
Successive surveys indicate that U.S. users broadly endorse what the
companies are doing. In a 2018 survey in the United States conducted by
the Anti-Defamation League, fifty-nine percent of respondents believed
that “online hate and harassment make hate crimes more common.”162 A
survey of 1500 undergraduate students at public and private universities in
the United States found that fewer than half of respondents believed that
the First Amendment protected “hate speech.”163 There was little variation
by political affiliation or type of college (private v. public) but significant
gender variation, with only thirty-one percent of females versus fifty-one
percent of males indicating a belief that hate speech was constitutionally
protected.164 These results have been confirmed by subsequent surveys of
college students, with one finding that only thirty-five percent of students
think hate speech should be protected by the First Amendment.165 Almost
160

See Citron & Wittes, supra note 93, at 402–04 (reviewing the implications of § 230).
Tarleton Gillespie, Platforms Are Not Intermediaries, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 198, 201 (2018).
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163
John Villasenor, Views Among College Students Regarding the First Amendment: Results from
a New Survey, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/09/18/
views-among-college-students-regarding-the-first-amendment-results-from-a-new-survey/. The survey
indicates a margin of error of two to six percent. The survey was funded by the conservative Charles
Koch Foundation and has been reviewed critically, for instance by Lois Beckett, “Junk Science”:
Experts Cast Doubt on Widely Cited College Free Speech Survey, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/22/college-free-speech-violence-survey-junk-science.
Whatever its flaws, the Villasenor survey is considered here because its results are mostly confirmed by
the subsequent FIRE survey. See infra note 165.
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SPEAKING FREELY: WHAT STUDENTS THINK ABOUT EXPRESSION AT AMERICAN COLLEGES 5, 17
(2017).
161

2021]

HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA

1055

one-half of students (forty-eight percent) think the First Amendment
should not protect hate speech,166 and a majority (fifty-six percent) “agree
that there are times when a college or university should withdraw a guest
speaker’s invitation after the event has been announced.”167
Thus, the emergence of robust hate speech regulation on social media
is not an aberration but a product of broader cultural shifts. Platform law
has been driven more by the social norms of users and the desire of the
companies to bridge U.S. and European approaches to hate speech than by
the constitutional jurisprudence of the First Amendment.168 Hate speech
regulation by platforms in turn shapes social norms by helping to
normalize regulation in the minds of social media users. Legal theorists
need to be aware of these broad social dynamics since changes in
real-world speech regulation on social media do not exclusively emanate
from the rarified domain of statutes and case law.
Nonetheless, one need not be a free speech absolutist to be concerned
about the emergent system of platform law of hate speech. Two concerns
will be discussed here. First, even those who have advocated regulation of
hate speech have not proposed that this regulation be carried out by private
actors unaccountable to the public for their decisions. Many observers have
expressed unease with the fact that speech is regulated by unaccountable
private companies whose primary obligations are neither to voters nor to
society at large, but to shareholders.169 Rather than constrain this exercise
of power, national governments are compounding it further by outsourcing
their speech regulating powers to private companies with little or no
oversight.170 For example, in 2017, Germany passed the NetzDG (Network
Enforcement Law)171 that established measures imposing fines up to €50
million if platforms fail to remove speech that is “manifestly unlawful”172
under German law (including hate speech, defamation, and inciting
speech) from their platform in as little as twenty-four hours.173
166

Id. at 17.
Id. at 15.
168
Kaye, supra note 89.
169
See, e.g., Luca Belli et al., Law of the Land or Law of the Platform? Beware of the
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REGULATED AND HOW THEY REGULATE US 41, 53 (Luca Belli & Nicolo Zingales eds., 2017) (arguing
that social media companies have too much discretion in enforcing EU Code of Conduct for online hate
speech); Molly K. Land, Against Privatized Censorship: Proposals for Responsible Delegation, 60 VA.
J. INT’L L. 363, 399–415 (2020) (examining the legality of privatized censorship).
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Land, supra note 169, at 412–13.
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18/13013
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173
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Abusive Posts, NPR (Oct. 31, 2017, 7:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/10/31/
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Then there are legitimate concerns about the process of regulating hate
speech itself. David Kaye states that content policies must be consistent
with the principle of legality, in which “[t]he restriction must be provided
by laws that are precise, public and transparent.”174 Platform law regulating
hate speech, however, is anything but transparent. Although social media
companies openly post their hate speech policies, they do not explain how
their policies are translated into lines of operational machine code that
identify and remove posts before they even appear on the platform. The
use of artificial intelligence (AI) by social media companies for content
moderation remains a black box. This matters because it has been widely
observed that AI is poor at taking linguistic, cultural, and societal context
into account and its design often reproduces many of the social biases and
discriminatory schema that it is meant to regulate.175 As Tim Wu wryly
observes, AI is “inherently inhuman, and prone, at least for the foreseeable
future, to make absurd errors that can be funny, horrific, or both.”176
We know little about how companies make determinations in hard
cases. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook announced
that its depleted pool of content reviewers would prioritize content “related
to real-world harm,”177 but we do not know what Facebook’s criteria are
for determining speech that is most likely to cause harm, or how these
criteria are operationalized through automated tools. The process of turning
policy into an ex ante content removal application is currently opaque and
not open to independent scrutiny. Without more information about how
decisions are made—such as, for example, through Kaye’s suggestion that
companies publish their “caselaw”—it is difficult for users to know what
rules are actually governing their speech, and how automated tools enforce
these rules to remove content before users even see it.178
A little more is known about human content evaluation systems, but it
is clear that they are not a panacea to the ills of hate speech either. The
working conditions of the tens of thousands of content moderators located
in warehouses in the Philippines, Ukraine, Ireland, and other places have
561024666/with-huge-fines-german-law-pushes-social-networks-to-delete-abusive-posts/.
174
Kaye, supra note 30, ¶ 6.
175
See Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering
Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2013–18 (2019) (reviewing the role of AI in content moderation);
David Kaye, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 32–38, U.N. Doc. A/73/348 (Aug. 29, 2018) (discussing the propensity of
AI to perpetuate bias and discrimination). See also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161
U. PENN. L. REV. 1445, 1448–52 (2013) (reviewing the implications of AI for speech regulation more
generally).
176
Wu, supra note 175, at 2021.
177
Update on Content Review Work, FACEBOOK (Apr. 21, 2020, 3:30 PM),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/coronavirus/.
178
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been studied by researchers, and the conditions are distressing. Silicon
Valley moderators, paid the federal minimum wage of fifteen dollars per
hour without any health care or retirement benefits, are said to have the
“worst job in technology.”180 Sarah Roberts documents the deleterious
psychological effects of viewing child pornography, hate speech against
marginalised groups, and users encouraging other users to commit suicide
for eight hours a day, as well as how in 2018 and 2019 a group of former
content moderators filed lawsuits in California and Dublin, Ireland against
Facebook.181
There are also legitimate concerns about the accuracy of content policy
enforcement. According to a study by ProPublica, human moderators
inconsistently apply the guidelines in “the bible” of Facebook content
evaluation.182 ProPublica conducted a crowd-sourced study of 900 posts
flagged by users as potential violations of Facebook’s Community
Guidelines and asked the company about a random sample of forty-nine
posts.183 The company admitted that moderators made mistakes in their
review of nearly half of them (twenty-two).184
Further, governments can and do take advantage of the real problems
presented by online hate speech and disinformation in order to control
social media and, in so doing, stifle public dissent.185 Digital
authoritarianism is a real and growing phenomenon. There are more and
more examples with each passing day, as outright authoritarian
governments or illiberal democracies have realized that, in order to win the
propaganda war, they need to control social media.186 For example,
179
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Singapore’s recent crackdown on fake news has garnered significant
controversy. The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act
came into effect in Singapore in late 2019.187 One of its first official
measures was to compel Facebook to include a disclaimer at the bottom of
a post accusing the government of running rigged elections stating,
“[Facebook] is legally required to tell you that the Singapore government
says this post has false information.”188 The Act also bans the use of fake
accounts or bots to spread “false statements,” and imposes penalties of
over $700,000 and/or a prison sentence of up to six years.189 In Nigeria, a
bill called the “Protection from Internet Falsehoods and Manipulation and
Other Related Matters Bill 2019,” which is almost identical to the
Singapore Act, has catalyzed significant opposition.190 Around the world,
broad definitions of hate speech and other prohibited content in platform
law are used by governments to suppress the speech of activists and
minority groups.191
The current regime of hate speech regulation by social media platforms
is also flawed because it is deeply acontextual. This regime is more
aggressive than the approach advocated by Critical Race Theorists such as
Matsuda and Lawrence thirty years ago, when they defended municipal
hate crimes ordinances.192 Certainly, the basic outlines of platform hate
speech law prohibit the kind of speech that these theorists were critiquing.
For example, Facebook’s platform law prohibits dehumanizing speech and
statements of inferiority based on race.193 Twitter’s policy against
dehumanizing speech prohibits users from “[d]irect[ing] hate against a
have access to the information that is required to make fully informed democratic choices. Fareed
Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22–23 (1997).
187
Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act of 2019 (Bill No. 10/2019) (Sing.),
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/10-2019/Published/20190401?DocDate=20190401#pr8-.
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Facebook Bows to Singapore’s ‘Fake News’ Law with Post ‘Correction’, BBC NEWS (Nov.
30, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50613341.
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MANIPULATION AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS BILL, 2019 (SB 132) (2019),
https://placng.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Protection-from-Internet-Falsehood-BillSummary.pdf; Alexander O. Onukwue, Nigeria’s Social Media Bill Suffers Its Biggest Defeat Yet,
TECHCABAL (Mar. 9, 2020), https://techcabal.com/2020/03/09/social-media-bill-public-hearing/;
Emmanuel Paul, Everything You Need to Know About Nigeria’s Social Media Bill and What You Can
Do About It, TECHPOINT.AFRICA (Nov. 28, 2019), https://techpoint.africa/2019/11/28/nigerias-socialmedia-bill/.
191
Casey Newton, Why Activists Get Frustrated with Facebook: When Political Speech Gets
Removed, They Have Little Recourse—And a Lot to Lose, VERGE (Jan. 14, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/1/14/21063887/activists-facebook-iran-free-speechauthoritarianism.
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Hate Speech, FACEBOOK COMMUNITY STANDARDS, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/hate_speech (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
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protected category (e.g., race, religion, gender, orientation, disability).”194
A Twitter user who encounters a toxic tweet “can report abusive or
harmful content directly from a tweet or profile.”195 These policies resonate
with the arguments of Charles Lawrence, who urged regulation of “group
defamation”196—“insulting words” that are “aimed at an entire group with
the effect of causing significant harm to individual group members.”197
However, Facebook’s policies are far broader than anything suggested
by Lawrence or Matsuda. A central idea of Critical Race Theory is
“skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color
blindness, and meritocracy.”198 Critical race scholars reject false
equivalences and seek to recognize and embed in regulation a recognition
of power. Matsuda, for example, advocated prohibition of speech only
when it meets three criteria: “1. The message is of racial inferiority[;] 2.
The message is directed against a historically oppressed group[; and] 3.
The message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading.”199 The second
element, that the speech be directed to a vulnerable group, “recogniz[es]
the connection of racism to power and subordination.”200 These limiting
principles—treating as particularly harmful speech that is directed to a
member of a vulnerable group as opposed to any speech that is hateful
regardless of its target—“narrows the field of interference with speech.”201
In support of this limiting principle, Lawrence argued that the impact
of speech crucially depends on the status of the listener to whom it is
directed. He recounts the story of one of his students who was targeted by
homophobic insults that left the student “in a state of semishock, nauseous,
dizzy, unable to muster the witty, sarcastic, articulate rejoinder he was
accustomed to making.”202 When asked if he reacted similarly to insults
directed against him on the basis of his membership in a less vulnerable
group—for example, insults such as “honkey,” “chauvinist pig,” or
“mick”—the student said that he had not experienced the same effects.
Lawrence notes: “The question of power, of the context of the power
194

Someone on Twitter Is Engaging in Abusive or Harassing Behavior, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/forms/abusiveuser (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
195
Toxic Twitter—The Reporting Process, AMNESTY INT’L (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-chapter-4/.
196
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
53, 75 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
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relationships within which speech takes place, and the connection to
violence must be considered as we decide how best to foster the freest and
fullest dialogue within our communities.”203
Social media prohibitions on hate speech, in contrast, prohibit speech
based on content rather than context. There is no consideration of local
context, country- or region-specific meanings, the identity of the speaker or
the target, or the relationship between speaker and listener. For example,
under Facebook’s hate speech policy, “white people” constitute a protected
group. An attack on someone based on their membership in a group
defined by whiteness triggers Facebook’s hate speech policy because,
under this policy, it is an attack based on race.
This deliberate disregard of power and context leads to overbroad and
even irrational results. For example, because of the unfortunate way in
which Facebook operationalized its policy, this meant that at one point in
time, posts about “white men” would violate its community standards,
while posts about “black children” would not.204 (In short, this was because
“men” is a protected category but “children” is not—thus, a post about
“white men” could be a slur about a racial category while a post about
“black children,” a subset of an unprotected category, was not.) For those
seeking to talk about racism—which may require discussing the actions of
white people—Facebook’s approach is a real barrier.205 Definitions of hate
speech that try to treat all speech as equivalent without regard to context
end up taking down speech that—while perhaps uncomfortable—is also
essential for important issues of public discourse.
Given the extensive regulation that now applies to speech on
platforms, the debate about whether or not to regulate hate speech in these
domains is for all practical purposes over. Now, it is more a matter of how
speech will be restricted and with what consequences. What is urgently
needed, however, is a recalibration of platform hate speech policies to
integrate context and thus narrow its scope to prohibit only the most
harmful instances of hate speech and to protect robust freedom of
expression. The next part discusses how this might be accomplished.
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IV. TOWARDS CONTEXT-SPECIFIC CONTENT MODERATION
Although limits on hate speech on social media platforms may be
inevitable at this point in time, the approach that companies have adopted
to implement these limits is simultaneously overbroad and under-inclusive.
Because they don’t consider the context of speech, SMCs end up
restricting speech that is either benign or in the public interest (or both),
while missing pervasive denigrating speech with corrosive environmental
effects. The purpose of this Part is to discuss the importance of context in
distinguishing between speech that is harmful and that which is merely
uncomfortable; describe the ways in which platform law fails to consider
context; and provide recommendations for contextual moderation.
A. The Role of Context
In understanding the meaning of a speech act, context is everything.
This is evident in both U.S. and international approaches to freedom of
expression. David Kaye has called on platforms to use international human
rights law as the basis for their approach to content moderation.206 Given
that a majority of users are located outside the United States,207 and
recognizing the wide variation in national laws on freedom of expression,
human rights law provides a helpful and practical baseline.
International law regarding speech regulation requires consideration of
context. In his report to the UN General Assembly regarding online hate
speech, Kaye recommends that “any enforcement of hate speech rules
involves an evaluation of context and the harm that the content imposes on
users and the public.”208 In particular, context is essential to assessing the
impact of speech. Human rights law requires that any limits on speech be
proportional to the legitimate ends that they serve,209 and determining
206
Kaye, supra note 178, ¶¶ 5–14. See Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of
Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26, 42–57 (2018) (applying international human rights
law to the content moderation policies of social media companies).
207
Leading Countries Based on Facebook Audience Size as of April 2020, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-facebook-users/ (last
visited Apr. 30, 2020). Only 189 million out of 1.623 billion (or 11%) of Facebook’s daily active users
are based in the United States and Canada. Facebook Q3 2019 Results, supra note 9.
208
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Moderation, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 939, 979 (2020) (explaining that context is important in assessing
the necessity of the limitation); Michael Karanicolas, Squaring the Circle Between Freedom of
Expression and Platform Law, 20 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 175, 197 (2020) (“[I]nternational courts
have repeatedly found that assessing whether something is hate speech is an inherently contextual
determination, based on whether the material was released under circumstances where it is likely to
actually generate harm.”).
209
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proportionality requires assessing speech in its context. We insist on this
principle as critical to the conversation about online hate speech: the need
to evaluate expression in the context of its usage. In our understanding, the
full meaning and potential effect of any speech act lies with the intent of
the speaker, the content of the expression, and the context in which it is
uttered.
This view is consistent with the entire thrust of philosophy of language
since the middle of the twentieth century. In the ordinary language
philosophy of John L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and Ludwig Wittgenstein,
meaning is not to be found in the semantic genealogy of an expression or
its putative essence, but instead in its immediate and contextual usage in a
community of speakers who follow the rules of particular
“language-games.”211 This theory of language is encapsulated in
Wittgenstein’s statement that “the meaning of a word is its use in the
language.”212 Derrida extends the analysis further by noting that, like a
signature, the meaning of a word or expression can never be fixed because
it is dependent on the setting in which it is communicated, consumed, and
(re)positioned, and its context constantly changes over time.213
Contextual analysis of an utterance has also been an essential
component of First Amendment jurisprudence for the past one hundred
years. In Schenck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes replaced the overly
broad “bad tendency” standard with the more stringent clear and present
danger test,214 which asked “whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”215 We
understand Holmes’s emphasis on the circumstances of speech acts and
their proximity to “substantial evils” as an instruction to consider speech in
its context of usage.
In First Amendment jurisprudence, it is now received wisdom that “the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
210
The Rabat Plan of Action, a report produced in 2013 by a group of human rights experts
convened by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, emphasized in particular the role of
context in determining whether speech was so harmful as to require criminalization; their factors
required consideration of the “social and political context,” the “status of the speaker,” the “[e]xtent or
reach of the speech act,” and the extent to which it was likely to result in harm. Kaye, supra note 185,
¶¶ 13–14.
211
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 14 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim
Schulte eds., 4th ed. 2009).
212
Id. at 25.
213
Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 307 (Alan Bass trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1971).
214
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 627 (1919) (using the expression “clear and imminent danger”).
215
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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216

done.”
Brandenburg v. Ohio established that for an expression to
constitute incitement, it had to be likely that it would cause imminent
lawless action, thus requiring an analysis of the circumstances of inciting
speech.217 In a workplace milieu, courts have held that the determination of
whether an employee’s speech is a matter of public concern depends on the
“content, form, and context” of their statement.218 Contextual evaluation
has become increasingly relevant in recent years, as courts scramble to
adapt First Amendment law to the fast-moving advertising, internet, and
social media environment, and address the challenges raised by hate
speech and terrorist propaganda.219
The reasons for a contextual analysis are plainly evident. The same
words that are benign in a peaceful setting may constitute incitement in a
violent situation: “[An] utterance in a context of violence can lose its
significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of
force.”220 Because the impact of speech depends on the context in which it
is uttered, it is not possible to respond to anti-Rohingya sentiment—in a
country where an authoritarian military government is engaged in
genocidal acts against that population—using the same framework that one
adopts to tackle the use of racial slurs in conversations between individuals
in an established democracy.221
B. Law Without Context
Most platform policies readily acknowledge that context is relevant to
content moderation. YouTube, for example, states that, “context matters,
so some videos could remain up because they discuss topics like pending
legislation, aim to condemn or expose hate, or provide analysis of current
events.”222 Twitter says that context is important when evaluating
harassment and it needs to hear from the person being targeted to most
effectively review this type of content.223
216

Id.
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Practically, however, platform consideration of “context” is limited to
what appears in the post itself. Thus, in distinguishing satire from a slur,
Twitter’s rules focus on the words used in the post, but do not reference
external information or events to which that post might pertain, the specific
meaning those words might have in that region, or the local context in
which the post originated. Such a limited definition of context renders the
resulting assessment of harm vastly underdetermined.
In part, platform law is defined without reference to context because of
the problem of scale. In their efforts to ensure consistent application of
their standards, platforms have created ostensibly “objective” rules that are
designed to be applied by any moderator, regardless of that moderator’s
knowledge or expertise.224 Under this approach, context can only be
defined with reference to information that would be available to a
moderator who does not have any pre-existing knowledge of the context.
The companies admit how difficult it is to contextualize posts, and they
have not yet found ways to more systematically integrate geographically
localized meanings into their policies and practices.225 Thus, contemporary
content evaluation procedures, and especially their automated tools, are
largely detached from their socio-cultural and political contexts. This is
apparent in all of the main elements of content evaluation: user flagging,
artificial intelligence, and the growing ranks of human content moderators.
One way that social media companies purport to respond to the context
of posts is through user flagging of content, and Twitter and Facebook both
rely on user flagging to identify violations of their terms of service.226 In
the past, Facebook relied almost completely on user flagging for content
evaluation.227 After the genocide of the Rohingya, Facebook defended its
inaction by stating that not enough of the offensive and inciting posts were
flagged by users, so it could not review and remove them.228 And for
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224
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Twitter, certain objectionable content is only considered for removal if the
target of the post flags the concern.229
User flagging alone, however, provides very little information about
context. When they flag a post, users are generally able to choose from a
range of pre-determined choices about why they are objecting to a
particular piece of content. On Facebook, for example, users can flag
speech as “hate speech” based on particular grounds such as “race or
ethnicity,” but they are not allowed to offer further explanation.230 Further,
user flagging is not a reliable mechanism for identifying harmful speech
because users may not be equally able or motivated, or technologically
literate enough, to flag harmful content consistently. The user flagging
system may also be “gamed” by coordinated campaigns to silence
individuals or viewpoints.231 User flagging also shifts the burden of
protection onto vulnerable groups, who may be wary of condemning a post
by a high-ranking member of the military or government. In cases of
coordinated or systematic harassment, the targets of abuse may be unable
to report all incidences of threatening or abusive language that is being
directed toward them. “Flagging fatigue” by individuals or groups “who
are frequently attacked coupled with a process that depends on users
reporting every instance of harmful behavior represents a troubling aspect
of content moderation practices.”232
Content review through automated means is also devoid of context.
Since 2018, companies have relied more heavily on automated content
moderation tools to determine whether a post merits further evaluation by
content moderators.233 Facebook, the biggest regulator of speech in the
world,234 has nearly replaced user flagging with AI.235 According to
Facebook, in the first three months of 2020, 88.8% of hate speech was

229
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identified through automated means before it was seen by viewers.236
Using AI is arguably indispensable given the scale of online content
moderation requirements and because of its ability to identify coordinated
inauthentic behavior (i.e., integrated networks of “bots”), yet there are
obvious drawbacks to an over-reliance on automated tools. As David Kaye
has noted, social media companies “use the power of artificial intelligence
to drive these systems, but the systems are notoriously bad at evaluating
context.”237
AI may be indispensable for moderating content at scale, but what is
lost is the context of usage that confers meaning, including physical
signals, cultural particularity, and the social or political situation.
Algorithmic identification is imprecise and unlikely to allow for contextual
cues that might be necessary to distinguish extremist speech from parody,
documentary footage, or legitimate protest.238 As a result, some speech
may be removed that is intended to challenge or lampoon hate speech. As
York and Zuckerman note, “content moderation decisions are often highly
subjective when made by humans, a problem that algorithms—designed by
humans—are unlikely to solve.”239 Next, AI is only as effective as the data
it analyzes, and AI is often reliant on large datasets that may incorporate
information generated by biased methods, with the result that AI
reproduces the bias against historically disadvantaged populations.240
Deploying artificial intelligence to flag content comes with the risk of
over-censorship.
There are also limits on the extent to which human moderators can
consider context. Human moderators usually have less than a minute to
review a post,241 and such brevity does not permit a wider consideration of
the circumstances. Moderators review only one isolated post at a time or a
short thread of several posts and may not see the entire ecosystem of posts
in a locale. In this model, moderators may not appreciate the fact that posts
are repeated in great numbers and may have cumulative effects.
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A lack of a diverse moderation workforce also inhibits consideration of
context. Before 2018, there were simply not enough content moderators.242
Although in the intervening period, platforms have added tens of thousands
of human moderators, there are still not enough of them for minority
languages.243 Even if there are numerous moderators in a major language
such as English, Spanish, or Hindi, content moderators are often too far
removed, both in terms of physical location and the local information they
are provided, from the speech contexts they moderate. Content moderators
may know little or nothing about the social, cultural, and political
dimensions of the context from which a post emanates. A content
moderator located in a distant country may not be aware of widespread
election unrest, outbursts of communal violence, or a pattern of violence
against sexual minorities in a locale. Since each moderator only sees a
small sliver of the total range of expression about a topic or person,
campaigns of systemic harassment are harder to identify.244
Then there are the multiple challenges of the universal and the
particular in language. All languages are highly nuanced, with each word
having many shades of meaning that depend on a number of factors
including the speaker’s intention, the listener’s expectations, and the
context in which an utterance is made. Even if a content moderator is a
native speaker of a language, they may not be familiar with idiomatic
usage in a locale far removed from their own personal experience. This is
especially true of world languages and regional languages with hundreds of
millions of speakers. For instance, we would not expect a Spanish speaker
from Madrid to comprehend slang used on the streets of Guatemala City.
Calling someone a “communist” or “destabilizer” may be benign in Madrid
but constitute incitement to violence in Guatemala as a result of the
countries’ different political histories.245 Yet there are credible reports of
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content moderators using Google Translate to gauge the meaning of a post
they are reviewing.246
Social media companies have global lists of words and expressions
that are banned, and these lists are universal; that is, they generally do not
vary according to country or region.247As Chinmayi Arun observes,
however, “[h]armful speech can be hyper-localised, significant in just one
village or district, such that even people from the same state might not
understand. This is the sort of thing that local police and local journalists
might notice and address but a global corporation might miss
completely.”248 Highly local terms, such as the anti-Muslim racial epithet
“kalar” that was repeatedly posted on Facebook by members of the
Myanmar military during their genocidal campaign against the Rohingya,
are often missed by content evaluation procedures either because they are
in minority languages or because they are not on the list of universal hate
speech terms.249
Alongside localized slurs, there is the problem of coded incitement and
implicit threats that do not present as hate speech or violate hate speech
guidelines, but are understood as incitements or threats by those with the
requisite cultural knowledge. The genocidal campaign against the
Rohingya in Myanmar raised with particular urgency the importance of
identifying coded or euphemistic speech threats. For example, the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar noted that it
was difficult to identify online hate speech against the Rohingya because
of “[s]ubtleties in the Myanmar language and the use of fables and
allegories.”250
Coded speech is present in virtually all instances of genocide and mass
atrocity. For instance, after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had to decide whether exhortations
from leaders such as Jean-Paul Akayesu calling on Rwandans to go “to
work” and to fight and kill “the Inkotanyi” (literally in Kinyarwanda,
“warriors”) represented incitement to genocide against the Tutsi
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27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/world/facebook-moderators.html.
247
Billy Perrigo, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There’s
a Catch, TIME (Nov. 27, 2019, 4:42 AM), https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/
(“The algorithms Facebook currently uses to remove hate speech only work in certain languages.”).
248
Chinmayi Arun, Rebalancing Regulation of Speech: Hyper-Local Content on Global WebBased Platforms, MEDIUM (Mar. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/rebalancingregulation-of-speech-hyper-local-content-on-global-web-based-platforms-1-386d65d86e32.
249
Perrigo, supra note 247; see also Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for
Provisional Measures (Gam. v. Myan.), Application, ¶¶ 38–39, 44–45 (Nov. 11, 2019),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178/institution-proceedings.
250
Myanmar Report, supra note 77, ¶ 1311.
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minority. On the basis of expert testimony from Rwandan sociolinguist
Mathias Ruzindana about the use of veiled incitement by Hutu Power
extremists, the ICTR decided that both expressions did constitute direct
and public incitement to exterminate Tutsis.252 Social media posts by a
modern-day Akayesu implicitly inciting harm by encouraging his followers
to “go to work” would likely not be removed under current content
moderation policies because implicit speech requires sufficient contextual
information to render its meaning evident.253 Current content moderation
policies do not integrate contextual factors into the decision-making and
thus may permit coded calls to violence.254
C. Recommendations
There are a number of steps that companies could take to ensure that
context is taken into account more systematically with the aim of
enhancing accurate content evaluation. We recognize that meticulous
contextual analysis is demanding logistically, as well as resource-intensive,
and we do not minimize the challenges ahead. However, there are a few
actions that might be taken to bring more context into account while
regulating hate speech. Many of these recommendations are likely
implemented most effectively at higher levels of review; as a result,
context-based moderation may require an expansion of the workforce at
those senior levels as well as higher rates of escalation from front-line
moderators to more senior levels of review.
First, platforms could start by pausing the dramatic shift in recent years
towards artificial intelligence and by conducting a thorough, transparent,
and independent review of the implications of automation. Along with
independent experts, social media companies should examine the degree to
which their content-generating algorithms elevate hateful speech on user
feeds or perpetuate unconscious biases against particular minority groups.
Companies must disclose the rate of false positives in their flagging
algorithms and investigate how much hate-filled content remains online
because it is coded or implicitly stated in a way that avoids the algorithm.
Companies should design an iterative process in which AI and human
content moderation are integrated and in which both are fully informed and
updated by “a sufficiently large, trained team of internet company
employees who are cognizant of relevant social, political, and cultural
history and context.”255
251
RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL SPEECH
CRIMES 191 (2017).
252
Id. at 192.
253
Id. at 190–92.
254
Hamilton & Land, supra note 221, at 144.
255
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL., supra note 231, at 5.
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Second, we encourage companies to move away from a
one-size-fits-all model of hate speech regulation and to build a number of
different models that are appropriate to the conditions on the ground in the
countries concerned. The work of programmers must be informed by
country specialists as they construct automated tools that are sensitive to
and responsive to local circumstances. This integration of human and
machine systems could lead to the kind of “hybrid social-ordering
systems” that Wu has proposed.256 In sum, we endorse a human rights
approach to artificial intelligence that prioritizes procedural fairness,
transparency, and disclosure, and implies a commitment to human rights
audits and regular reviews of potential discrimination in AI systems.257
Next, companies could take steps towards a pluralistic model of
content moderation, starting with sub-regional or country-specific lists of
slurs and hateful expressions that are drawn up after consultation with local
civil society organizations, sociolinguists, and other experts. Facebook, for
example, maintains country-specific lists of slurs based on input from civil
society and experts,258 and we recommend that other platforms adopt the
same approach. Platforms could also create teams of moderators that look
not at a single post or thread, but at the total range of expression in a
country or region about a person, group, or topical area. When reviewing
content, moderators should be allowed to take into consideration external
information about the political and cultural context of a country and in
particular indicators of the risk of violence against an individual or group.
Platforms could employ moderators who speak the local dialects of the
language and who are culturally and linguistically close enough to the
sources of the posts to be able to detect coded hate speech, threats, and
incitement. As David Kaye stated, human content evaluation
must be based on real learning from the communities in
which hate speech may be found, that is, people who can
understand the “code” that language sometimes deploys to
hide incitement to violence, evaluate the speaker’s intent,
consider the nature of the speaker and audience and evaluate
the environment in which hate speech can lead to violent
acts. None of these things are possible with artificial

256

Wu, supra note 175, at 2021.
Kaye, supra note 175, ¶ 47 (advancing a human rights approach to artificial intelligence).
258
Understanding Social Media and Conflict, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/news/
2019/06/social-media-and-conflict/amp/ (last updated May 21, 2020); see also Sara Rieger, Facebook
to Investigate Whether Anti-Indigenous Slur Should Be Added to Hate Speech Guidelines, CBC (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/facebook-indigenous-slur-1.4877225.
257
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intelligence alone, and the definitions and strategies should
reflect the nuances of the problem.259
There ought to be some flexibility in the categories of persons who are
protected under platform law, and these categories should be determined in
light of local circumstances. In some contexts, the list of categories
currently protected by platform law is underinclusive. For example, human
rights defenders, including judges and prosecutors involved in
anti-corruption efforts, have been subjected to coordinated online hate
campaigns in Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico in recent years.260 In
these three countries alone, over 200 human rights defenders are killed
every year, about half of the global total.261 Where human rights work is
such a hazardous undertaking, it makes sense to designate human rights
defenders as a protected category until the attacks start to decline. If there
are other occupational groups who are not presently protected, such as
social workers or humanitarian aid workers, then they too may be brought
temporarily into the scope of protection.
We recommend that companies run a small number of pilot projects in
at-risk countries that have experienced, or are currently experiencing,
violent clashes during an election cycle; where minority groups are being
persecuted in large numbers; or where watchdog groups, governments, or
international agencies have identified a risk of mass atrocities or genocide.
For countries receiving heightened scrutiny, companies could create
specialist content evaluation teams with a short (three to six month),
renewable mandate. Content regulation policy would be the product of
consultations between multiple stakeholders including companies,
governments, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and civil society organizations with relevant human rights
expertise. Content moderation itself would be carried out by local and
native speakers of the relevant language(s) who are advised by expert
policy analysts who know the history, culture, and politics of the country.
Some companies such as Twitter have explored “trusted partner”
programs where they consult with local users and prioritize their flagging
of problematic posts.262 Trusted individuals or organizations can serve to
identify problematic posts and alert companies through their content
259
Kaye, supra note 206, ¶ 50; see also Jessica Dheere, Considering Countering Violent
Extremism in Lebanon, SMEX (May 1, 2016), https://smex.org/considering-countering-violentextremism-in-lebanon/ (recommending that companies hire and train teams of moderators “with
cultural and linguistic sensitivity”).
260
FRONT LINE DEFS., GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2018, supra note 65, at 16 (reporting incidents of
threats, attacks, and intimidation in Guatemala, Columbia, and Mexico, and that WhatsApp has become
a “powerful tool to disseminate hate messages”); see also FRONT LINE DEFS., STOP THE KILLINGS 26
(2018) (describing intimidation of judges and public prosecutors in Guatemala).
261
FRONT LINE DEFS., GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2018, supra note 65, at 4.
262
ABBAS ET AL., supra note 232, at 39.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1072

[Vol. 52:3

moderation processes. This would also allow for the identification of
harmful posts without having to rely on vulnerable targets, since the act of
reporting can put a target in danger. Trusted flaggers are likely to be more
attuned to problematic posts because they have greater knowledge of the
area, understand the context of the language used, and know how to
navigate the content moderation process in general.263 For example, Waze
uses data to identify which users are trustworthy content moderators on the
basis of positive feedback that the information they provide is accurate and
reliable.264 A similar approach might allow Facebook and Twitter to more
effectively flag harmful speech.
Special content evaluation teams in at-risk countries ought to scrutinize
carefully the social media posts of senior political leaders. There has been
recent controversy over whether hate speech posted by senior politicians
ought to be tolerated on the grounds that it is newsworthy and has
public-interest value. In 2019, Facebook indicated that it would implement
a newsworthy exemption for politicians.265 In 2020, Twitter began to label
President Donald J. Trump’s tweets with a fact-check label after he falsely
claimed that mail-in ballots were fraudulent.266
We have serious concerns about a newsworthiness exception as a
global default on the grounds that senior politicians have played a vital role
in inciting mass violence in almost all prior instances of genocide and
crimes against humanity.267 The weight of social science evidence finds
that “incitement is almost certainly more harmful when uttered by leaders
than by other users.”268 For instance, political scientist Scott Straus
analyzed twenty-four cases of mass violence in Africa and discovered that
the most critical factor in each case was government authorities who
encouraged violence and also coordinated it through their speech acts.269
Other studies corroborate Straus’s findings and show that the greater the
authority of the speaker, the more likely verbal instructions to commit

263

Id.
Id. at 39–40; Places, WAZEOPEDIA, https://wazeopedia.waze.com/wiki/Canada/Places
#What_is_a_trusted_user.3F (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
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Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook: Anything Politicians Say Is Exempt from Platform’s Rules,
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270

violent acts will be acted upon. Given these findings, a newsworthiness
exemption for politicians might be re-examined in at-risk country settings,
even if only on a temporary basis.
Finally, and perhaps most ambitiously, we could envisage a
reorganization of companies’ organizational structures and business
models from industrial to artisanal models of content moderation.271 Social
media companies generate their revenue from advertising, and internet
advertising represented the largest and fastest-growing share of the
advertising market by type of media, totaling $107 billion in 2018.272 In
2019, Facebook’s third quarter results reported that it is on track to make
over $60 billion in advertising revenue.273 Internet advertising is the only
media type experiencing double digit (and nearly 20%) growth year after
year.274 No self-respecting bricks-and-mortar advertising agency would
operate in a market of any size without a physical presence or connection
with a local subsidiary,275 but social media platforms dispensed with this
model to establish, at lightning speed, global empires from their
headquarters in San Francisco or Palo Alto.
The corollaries and shortcomings of this unprecedented growth are
now evident. Platforms are de facto global advertising companies that have
yet to fully come to terms with this reality. In order to become truly global
companies, they need to genuinely engage with the world. Otherwise, their
policies and procedures, even with plenty of multi-stakeholder
consultation, will continue to appear to be a form of U.S. cultural
imperialism to many users outside the United States.276 This must, of
course, be balanced against the safety needs of employees who may be
targets for authoritarian governments. But decentralization of moderation
270
SARAH SORIAL, SEDITION AND THE ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE: FREE SPEECH AND COUNTERTERRORISM 84–85, 115–16 (2012).
271
See ROBYN CAPLAN, DATA & SOC’Y, CONTENT OR CONTEXT MODERATION? ARTISANAL,
COMMUNITY-RELIANT,
AND
INDUSTRIAL
APPROACHES
17
(2018),
https://datasociety.net/library/content -or-context-moderation/ (reviewing artisanal and industrial
models of content moderation employed by internet companies).
272
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, IAB/PWC, INTERNET AD REVENUE REPORT, FY 2018, at 21
(2019). See Rebecca Tushnet, Content Moderation in an Age of Extremes, 10 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH.
& INTERNET 1, 11–12 (2019) (reviewing the implications of the advertising revenue model on content
moderation).
273
Facebook Q3 2019 Results, supra note 9.
274
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 272, at 22.
275
See Emad Rahim, How Global Marketing Is Different From International Marketing, TWEAK
YOUR
BIZ,
https://tweakyourbiz.com/management/how-global-marketing-is-different-frominternational-marketing (last updated Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining how international marketing agencies
normally opened a subsidiary in a country).
276
PAZ PEÑA OCHOA, REPORTE DE LA SITUACIÓN DE AMÉRICA LATINA SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA DE
GÉNERO EJERCIDA POR MEDIOS ELECTRÓNICOS 44 (2017), https://www.codingrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/Latin-American-Report-on-Online-Gender-Violence-final.pdf (last visited
Apr. 30, 2020).
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would be an important means toward greater democratization and
contextualization of content governance.
An artisanal content moderation model could involve dispensing with a
universal list of hate speech terms implemented by automated tools and
content moderators far removed from the circumstances of the speech.
Companies are advised to open local offices or bureaus in each of the
countries in which they operate, staffed by well-trained and recompensed
local employees, at least some of whom are experienced investigative
journalists. Their role would be to design and implement social media
policy and content moderation procedures relating to disinformation, hate
speech, and other forms of problematic expression, tailored to that country
or region’s specific context. Review of escalated moderation cases would
be conducted in-house and would draw on locally generated and
continually revised lists of terms and expressions that are likely to harm.
Local gatekeepers would consciously gatekeep and do so in a way that is
transparent. The companies’ headquarters could exercise oversight and
capacity building and support and maintain the automated tools, but local
offices would have substantial leeway in content moderation policy
formulation and application. This implies an openness on the part of
companies to the “geographical segmentation” of their content moderation
policies, and an acceptance of global legal pluralism in platform law.277
The concerns stated earlier about Facebook’s oversight board are
justified, but the board’s creation also presents opportunities for a more
context-specific moderation policy. The list of the first twenty members is
promising.278 The board is geographically diverse and includes
representation from Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as North
America and Europe.279 It comprises a former editor of The Guardian, a
Nobel Prize winner, a former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Peaceful Assembly and Association, constitutional and human rights law
professors, and others with a demonstrated commitment to freedom of
expression and a willingness to denounce governments for human rights
violations.280 The board may shed light on the currently opaque process of
content moderation, as Facebook must respond publicly to all board
277
See Daskal, supra note 143, at 1655 (proposing geographical segmentation of takedown
policies in content moderation, with limits). See generally Molly K. Land, The Problem of Platform
Law: Pluralistic Legal Ordering and Social Media, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM 958 (Paul Schiff Berman ed., 2020) (discussing how global legal pluralism provides an
analytical model for understanding the competition between private regulation, national law, and
international law); Berman, supra note 14, at 1157–58 (same).
278
See Steven Overly & Alexandra S. Levine, Facebook Announces First 20 Picks for Global
Oversight Board, POLITICO (May 6, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/06/facebookglobal-oversight-board-picks-240150 (considering the geographic diversity and biographical details of
the first twenty oversight board members).
279
Id.
280
Id.
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decisions and provide regular updates. The board can issue advisory
statements on policy matters and Facebook must respond to those within
thirty days.282 As Kadri and Klonick have suggested in their critique of
Facebook’s “newsworthiness” exception,283 the board may be able to
provide greater transparency on how concepts such as these are defined
and applied.
The critics are right that the board lacks the authority to address
essential issues, and the board should consider amendments to the bylaws
immediately and before it starts operations. The board’s competence
should be expanded to include review of account removals
(“deplatforming”) and content left up on the platform, as well as content
taken down. The board should be able to consider content removed by
Facebook in compliance with national laws restricting speech. The board
should also have the authority to review and make binding decisions on the
policies, practices, and procedures relating to content removal and political
advertising. This could include policies that govern decisions about which
terms violate platform law, such as key terms like “abusive” or
“threatening.” Additionally, it could encompass procedures such as
Facebooks’ algorithm for curating users’ personal feeds and news feeds.
For the board to be effective and promote meaningful accountability, the
bylaws must clearly state that its decisions constitute precedent, in the legal
sense that they govern Facebook’s handling of all similar cases. To
enhance transparency, the board should report quarterly rather than
annually.284 Finally, the current bylaws do not take context sufficiently into
account and need to be revised to require staff to provide the board with a
summary analysis of the relevant political, social, and cultural context of
each user post under review, including information on the range of posts
associated with it.
CONCLUSION
The time-honored hate speech debate has now been superseded by the
content regulation policies and procedures of global platforms that remove
tens of thousands of abusive and inciting posts every day. The question is
now not whether hate speech should be regulated in the public sphere, but
how. We urge companies to develop and enhance a contextual element of
their analysis, particularly in countries with a history of intergroup
violence and weak state institutions. There are a number of measures that
platforms could take to improve their content moderation policies and
281

Bylaws, art. 2, § 2.3.2.
Id.
283
Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness
in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 96–97 (2019).
284
Bylaws, art. 1, § 1.3.1.
282
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consider context in their evaluation of potential hate speech, including
drawing up localized lists of banned expression, ensuring that content
moderators are native speakers of languages, and developing procedures to
evaluate coded speech. In at-risk countries, companies should follow a
more intensive strategy in which they provide heightened scrutiny of
potentially harmful content, employ content moderators who are native and
local speakers of languages, engage the guidance and assistance of local
personnel and country experts in developing context-specific content
moderation policies, consider the status of the speaker in evaluating the
effect of speech on their platforms, and improve flagging processes to
facilitate the gathering of context-specific information. These measures are
not designed to be more restrictive of hate speech, but to ensure that any
restrictions that are implemented are more precise, informed, and accurate.
Some of these measures are easily implemented, others require a
sea-change in company mission and philosophy. Platforms are unlikely to
embark upon a radical restructuring on the merits of well-reasoned
arguments alone. However, we believe the current approach to moderation
will become increasingly untenable. Users may be unwilling to tolerate a
toxic environment, but it is also unclear whether they will tolerate a private
platform broadly censoring their speech. Governments are requiring an
adherence to national hate speech policies with little guidance on what that
requires. Furthermore, events like the genocide of the Rohingya in which a
company badly mishandles a situation can cause severe reputational
damage. Until companies revise their content moderation policies to
integrate the context in which speech occurs, they will remain exposed to
accusations of responsibility for real-world violence.
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The Power of the Civic Mindset:
A Conceptual Framework for Overcoming Political
Polarization
DANIEL L. SHAPIRO
This Article proposes a new conceptual paradigm for overcoming political
polarization—the civic mindset. I argue that the primary psychological barrier to
bridging political divides is an adversarial state of mind called the partisan mindset,
and I explain its specific characteristics, fundamental operating principles, and
triggers. To combat polarization, I introduce the civic mindset, elucidate its basic
features and functions, and explain how societal embrace of this unique outlook can
advance a vibrant political space within which partisan competition and national
unity can thrive.

1077

ARTICLE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1079
I. WHAT’S YOUR POLITICAL MINDSET? ......................................... 1080
II. THE PARTISAN MINDSET.............................................................. 1081
A.
B.
C.

KEY ATTRIBUTES ...................................................................... 1082
OPERATING PRINCIPLES ............................................................. 1083
WHAT FOSTERS THE PARTISAN MINDSET? .................................. 1084

III. THE CIVIC MINDSET..................................................................... 1086
A.
B.
C.

KEY ATTRIBUTES ...................................................................... 1087
OPERATING PRINCIPLES ............................................................. 1088
FOSTERING THE CIVIC MINDSET ................................................. 1089

IN SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 1091

The Power of the Civic Mindset:
A Conceptual Framework for Overcoming Political
Polarization
DANIEL L. SHAPIRO *
INTRODUCTION
By design, democracy generates political tension. Opposing advocacy
groups lobby for legislation, competing political parties must write, debate,
and pass laws, and government branches conflict due to intentional overlap
in responsibilities.1 But while tension is expected, contemporary politics is
on fire.2 Political elites humiliate one another, legislators strategize ways to
“win” a policy dispute and showcase the other party’s loss, and community
members refuse to interact with their counterpart—generating a kind of
“political warfare” that risks uprooting democratic institutions and the belief
in their efficacy.3 Partisanship is natural, but intense polarization can
jeopardize the system itself.
Understanding the factors that contribute to political polarization can
direct us to strategies to combat them. Social scientists have uncovered a
variety of reasons for political divisiveness including economic disparities,
discriminatory laws, gerrymandering, and media bias.4 While such structural
*
Daniel L. Shapiro, Ph.D., is Founder and Director of the Harvard International Negotiation
Program, Associate Professor of Psychology at Harvard Medical School / McLean Hospital, and Faculty
Affiliate at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Adam Kuegler,
Alexandria Madjeric, Hannah Kalichman, and the entire team at the Connecticut Law Review for
outstanding feedback and editorial assistance. This Article benefitted from perspectives on civil discourse
examined at the Connecticut Law Review’s symposium, How We Argue: The Moral Foundations of
Politics and Law. I would like to thank fellow panelists Richard Wilson, David Gergen, Carol Anderson,
and Leah Rigueur. I also am grateful to Mikhaila Fogel for her insights on how to sharpen the concept of
the civic mindset.
1
Separation of Powers—An Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx.
2
An alternative metaphor may be that political sentiments are becoming colder. A Pew Research
Center study found that between 2016 and 2019, the number of Republicans who gave Democrats a
“cold” rating on a “feeling thermometer” from 1–100 rose by 14% and the number of Democrats who
gave Republicans a cold rating grew by 16%. Growing Shares in Both Parties Give “Cold” Ratings to
Those in Opposing Party, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.peoplepress.org/2019/10/10/partisan-antipathy-more-intense-more-personal/pp_2019-10-10_state-ofparties_0-01/ (showing a “feeling thermometer” to demonstrate how partisans give members of the
opposite party a “cold rating”).
3
Sean Theriault, Partisan Warfare Is the Problem, in POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 11, 11–15 (Daniel J. Hopkins & John Sides eds., 2015).
4
See 2 RED AND BLUE NATION? CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED
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forces predispose citizens to polarization, the ultimate arbiter of political
behavior is the human heart.5 Political action from policy negotiations to
voting behavior is heavily informed by mood, emotion, and attitude.6 In
contemporary society, politics has become so emotionally charged that
brutal partisan politics is the norm—resulting in gridlock, harsh character
judgments, and, perhaps most ominously, threat to the survival of the
democratic system.7
This Article offers a new conceptual approach for overcoming
polarization. I argue that the major psychological barrier to political
cooperation is a divisive outlook I term the partisan mindset—a state of mind
with specific characteristics, fundamental operating principles, and triggers.
To overcome this psychological obstacle, I conceptualize an alternative state
of mind—the civic mindset—that motivates concern for our own political
interests and the legitimate interests of the multitude of political groups
within society, resulting in a vibrant political space within which partisan
competition and national unity can thrive.
I. WHAT’S YOUR POLITICAL MINDSET?
Mindset frames how we see the world and our place in it—including
what we attend to, what we ignore, and how we make meaning of events.
Politicians who view themselves as adversaries can spend years
unsuccessfully debating legislation while political allies can solve the same
issue in a single hallway conversation. The way they view their relationship
has a big impact on the outcome of their exchange.
Drawing on relational identity theory,8 I conceive of political mindset as
the lens through which we make sense of the political landscape and orient
relationally to political stakeholders. This mindset patterns our cognitive and
emotional world, providing us with affectively tinged assumptions about
whom to trust or doubt. In the public arena, the mindset we adopt acts as a
pair of glasses that colors the way we perceive the entire political landscape
and our place in it. We easily can detect the political mindset in a neighbor

POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008) (containing a variety of essays discussing the
roots of political divisiveness in the United States).
5
See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS
AND RELIGION 34 (2012) (discussing the role human emotion plays in policial behavior and noting “[t]he
head can’t even do head stuff without the heart”).
6
See id. at 152–53 (discussing how the two ends of the political spectrum rely on “moral
foundations”).
7
See Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How a Democracy Dies, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.–Feb. 2018,
at 17, 19 (discussing how modern politics poses a threat to the U.S. democratic system).
8
See Daniel L. Shapiro, Relational Identity Theory: A Systematic Approach for Transforming the
Emotional Dimension of Conflict, 65 AM . PSYCHOLOGIST 634, 634 (2010) (discussing relational identity
theory).
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who asks us, “Why on earth did you vote for that candidate?” This person
holds an adversarial mindset and is primed to attack our views.
We tend to assume everyone wears distorting glasses but us. We think
others see the world through glasses that bias their understanding of reality,
whereas we see the world as it is, a glass-less truth. But this is obviously not
true. Social cognition predisposes everyone toward a biased interpretation
of reality.9 Consequently, becoming aware of our own mindset frees us to
decide whether to adopt a more constructive one.
In the following sections, I introduce two mindsets that offer us choice
on how to view the political landscape. One fuels polarization; the other
quells it.
Chart 1. Two fundamental political mindsets.

Political
Mindset
Partisan
Mindset

Civic
Mindset

II. THE PARTISAN MINDSET
The political mindset most responsible for fueling polarization is what I
term the partisan mindset, a divisive outlook that pits us against another
political entity.10 This Section describes the nature and attributes of the
partisan mindset, its operating principles, and the ways it gets fostered.
To understand the partisan mindset, we must appreciate the basic
elements and function of a tribe. I define a tribe as any group whose
members view themselves as like-kinded, kin-like in their relational
connection, and emotionally invested in the group’s enhancement.11 Being
of like kind signifies that group members identify themselves as part of a
shared political entity, whether a neighborhood organization, religious sect,
or formal political party. Kin-like connection defines the nature of the
relationship between members, who view themselves not as part of a loose
affiliation or coalition but as members of an extended family, a deeply felt
9

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011) (describing how human
impressions, intuitions, and decisions are not conscious choices).
10
See DANIEL SHAPIRO, NEGOTIATING THE NONNEGOTIABLE: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR MOST
EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CONFLICTS, at xvii (2017). The partisan mindset is a politically nuanced
subtype of the tribes effect described in NEGOTIATING THE NONNEGOTIABLE: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR
MOST EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CONFLICTS 26 (2017).
11
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 638.
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bond. Emotional investment refers to the motivation of members to enhance
the tribe’s status, power, and durability even in the face of personal sacrifice.
The partisan mindset activates when we feel a threat to our tribal
identity. Specific social cognitive conditions stimulate this perspective shift.
At a bare minimum, there must be a salient threat to our identity, we must
prioritize our tribal identity over other social identities, and the mindset itself
must be cognitively accessible.12 The result is a relational outlook that
predisposes us to experience divisive feelings, thoughts, and behavior
toward the perceived source of threat.
A. Key Attributes
The partisan mindset has three major elements that affect our political
worldview:13
1. Adversarial
We tend to view competing political parties through an adversarial lens
that magnifies differences and minimizes similarities. A threat to our identity
instigates a kind of relational amnesia, in which we ignore the countless
personal and structural connections and fixate on political differences.
Philosopher Martin Buber describes this movement toward disaffiliation as
a shift from an “I-Thou” to an “I-It” relationship.14 A state of emotional
arousal, such as that triggered during times of political tension, reduces the
cognitive complexity of our social perceptions and results in polarized
evaluations of our counterpart.15 At the extreme, daily confrontation with
our own physical, mental, or collective mortality can heighten the perceived
significance of our own group and lead us to devalue those who threaten our
identity.16
2. Self-righteous
The
political
morality
multiple
12

(2007).
13
14

(1970).

partisan mindset involves the self-serving conviction that our
views are not only right, but morally superior. We assume that
exists on a single, exclusive moral plane and reject the idea that
perceptions of political truth can coexist.17 Self-righteousness is

SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 342
SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 27.
MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 62–64 (Charles Scribner’s Sons trans., Touchstone 1st ed. 1996)

15
Delroy L. Paulhus & David T. K. Lim, Arousal and Evaluative Extremity in Social Judgments:
A Dynamic Complexity Model, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 90, 94 (1994).
16
Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality
Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 308, 317 (1990).
17
The Pew Research Center found that in today’s polarized society, a majority of Democrats and
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founded on arrogance and is distinguishable from righteous indignation—
the boiling anger that emerges when we confront injustice.
3. Insular
The partisan mindset locks us in a closed political system. We watch
news shows that reinforce our political views, frequent social media sites
that support our political values, build friendships with those who maintain
similar perspectives, and resist talking politics with political counterparts.
The more closely we follow public affairs, the more likely we are to express
negative sentiments about the opposing party,18 bolstering hostility toward
our political counterpart.
B. Operating Principles
The partisan mindset operates on a few basic principles. First, loyalty to
the tribe takes priority.19 People who identify heavily with a political tribe
will tend to make greater sacrifices for their own tribe than for other groups.
Social evolutionists have discovered that the likelihood of our committing a
costly altruistic action depends upon the genetic closeness to the recipient
and the benefit to that person or group;20 we sacrifice more for those who
share our bloodlines. Human psychology extends this tendency to
individuals who are connected through perceived kinship, thus imbuing
political tribes with substantial influence over political action.
Second, partisan norms urge blind loyalty to the party platform—
regardless of the degree to which policies serve personal interest.21 This
affords tribal leaders great personal power because they can rely on their
political base to support their policies and block plans of political foes. But
blind loyalty erodes merit-based decision making, because people care more
about maintaining fidelity to their own political party than about finding
ways to advance the legitimate interests of the multitude of political groups
within society.
Third, cooperation with political outgroups is taboo. During times of
polarization, the mere act of being seen talking with members of another
political party, let alone negotiating in good faith, can fuel accusations of
betrayal and result in political and social punishment.
Republicans view the other side as closed-minded, and a substantial set of partisans judged their
counterpart as immoral. Most Republicans and Democrats View Each Other as More Closed-Minded
Than Other Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/10/10/howpartisans-view-each-other/pp_2019-10-10_state-of-parties_2-01/; Growing Shares in Both Parties Give
“Cold” Ratings to Those in Opposing Party, supra note 2.
18
Most Republicans and Democrats View Each Other as More Closed-Minded Than Other
Americans, supra note 17.
19
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 638.
20
W. D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 8
(1964).
21
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 635, 639.
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In sum, the partisan mindset prioritizes allegiance to the tribe, fosters
blind loyalty to the party platform, and condemns cross-party engagement.
C. What Fosters the Partisan Mindset?
There are many roads to political polarization—but through my
international work in conflict resolution over the past thirty years, I have
observed a prevalent dynamic that I call the “Declare-Defend-Descend
Model.”
Declare. This dynamic begins when a person or group communicates
their political identity subtly or explicitly within a conversation or through a
formal or informal platform. Consider an example between two attorneys,
Leigh and Ron. As they enter the elevator to head home after work, Leigh
says, “I can’t believe how awful that congressman’s speech was last night!”
She implicitly declares aspects of her political identity through this
statement. But Ron hears her words as an assault on his own sacred values,
awakening the partisan mindset in him and impelling him to say, “I actually
thought the congressman had a lot of guts to say what he did!” He declares
his political identity.
Defend. Now these lawyers are experiencing a clash of identities, and
their conversation moves toward self-defensive measures.22 Ron frets over
his working relationship with Leigh. Sharing opposing politics feels taboo,
and he worries that if they delve too deeply into political conversation, they
may never get out. Taboos protect their relationship and identities from
harm.
In an attempt to understand Leigh’s perspective, Ron asks, “Why didn’t
you like the congressman’s speech?” His intention is admirable, but his tone
exudes self-righteous indignation. The more Leigh justifies her stance, the
more compelled he feels to argue back. He fights within himself to resist
turning the conversation into a fierce debate and musters willpower not to
pick apart her arguments one-by-one, let alone to dismiss her entire
character.
Descend. Finally, the time comes for Ron to share his own perspective.
The moment he launches into his rationale, she attacks it with unexpected
ferocity, and they get consumed in a vertigo-like swirl of exasperated anger.
Fortunately, they temper their emotions and close the conversation on an
amicable note. That night, Ron laments to a close friend, “How can Leigh—
in her right mind—criticize the congressman’s effectiveness?” The friend
supports Ron’s perspective, bolstering his belief in the legitimacy of his
claims and vindicating him of intellectual and moral ineptitude. This is
identity politics in action—enlisting his friend to affirm his political stance
so he can feel “in the right”—despite that same confirmation fortifying the

22

SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 148.
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partisan mindset. Unsurprisingly, the relationship between Ron and Leigh
descends.
This experience illuminates a set of emotional dynamics that draws us
into the partisan mindset. In my book, Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, I
introduce these “lures,” which often affect our relationships outside of our
conscious awareness:23

23

•

Vertigo is a warped state of consciousness in which a
conflictual relationship consumes our emotional
energies. In a polarized society, we can become
obsessed with conflict amid the twenty-four-hour
news cycle of “breaking news,” the constant stream of
on-line partisan criticism, and daily political smears
by public officials and activists.

•

An assault on the sacred is an attack on the most
meaningful aspects of our identity, whether political
values, views, or beliefs. Leaders easily can incite
constituents to take political action by framing an
issue as an assault on sacred beliefs, values, and
allegiances. A politician, for example, may try to gain
support for war by framing it as a critical means “to
eliminate grave, imminent threats to the lives of our
children here in our homeland.”

•

Taboos are social prohibitions—actions we are not
supposed to do, thoughts we are not supposed to think,
and emotions we are not supposed to feel. During
times of political polarization, a taboo on cross-party
engagement can affect people at all levels of society—
from senior leadership being accused of betrayal if
they talk with the “enemy” to everyday citizens who
avoid political or social conversation with colleagues
holding opposing views.

•

The repetition compulsion lures us to repeat a
dysfunctional pattern of behavior, as when officials
predictably reach political stalemate at the same time
each year over the same policy issue. This lure afflicts
interpersonal relations, too. When discussing heated
political issues, we may reenact a destructive dispute
resolution behavior that we learned in our younger
years, such as treating every conflict as a
confrontation.

Id. at xvii. In Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, I call these forces the “five lures of the tribal mind.”
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Identity politics is the process of allying with a person
or group in order to advance a political purpose. A
political leader delivering a speech may state that “in
the name of our lost soldiers and family members, in
the name of our constitutional ideals, we must stick
together to fight the evil enemy!” This leader builds
affiliation with the audience through shared history
and values, and uses those associations to garner
political support for military action.

These five lures pull us toward the partisan mindset in conflicts of all
sizes, from international divides to everyday political disputes. In fact, if you
re-read the argument between Ron and Leigh, you will notice that each of
the lures was present and drew the colleagues toward the partisan mindset.
The two lawyers’ relationship survived, but a democracy that operates
purely on political tribalism has no backbone and slowly, piece by piece, can
fall.24 It turns out, however, that the partisan mindset is not a fait accompli.
I now introduce an alternative mindset that can be enlisted to increase
societal cohesion and democratic ideals.
III. THE CIVIC MINDSET
The political mindset most responsible for bridging partisan divides in
democratic societies is what I term the civic mindset, a unifying outlook that
connects people together via identification as fellow citizens who work
together to address the legitimate interests of political groups, resolve
differing interests through mutually acceptable processes, and take
communal need into account. This Section introduces the mindset, its
operating principles, and the ways in which it is fostered.
The origin of the word civic provides insight into its meaning. It derives
from the French word civique, meaning citizen, and can be traced further
back to the Latin phrase corona civica, a garland of oak leaves and acorns
awarded to those who saved a fellow citizen from death.25 Civics invokes a
sense of connection, duty, and responsibility to one’s homeland and the
people who reside within it.
I have chosen to describe the mindset as “civic,” not “civil.” While the
two words are closely aligned and share a similar etymology, the word civil
often implies respectful behavior, whereas the word civic emphasizes the
overarching political identity that holds citizens together. My view is that a
society with a strong enough civic foundation can withstand even fierce

24

STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 77 (2018).
Civic, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.
com/us/definition/english/civic (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
25
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political debate and, in the ideal, emerge with new collective understandings
and mutually beneficial action ideas.26
The civic mindset embraces national identity—but not to the exclusion
of tribal identity. In general, both dimensions are equally important to
nurture within the democratic political sphere. A strong national identity
encourages policies and political behavior that serve the common good, and
inclusive politics empowers diverse groups to voice and address their unique
concerns through the shared political system. While tension will inevitably
emerge between national and tribal concerns, the civic mindset motivates
the quest for a pareto-optimal system of political decision making that
optimizes these two concerns to the extent possible.
A. Key Attributes
The civic mindset has three key characteristics that shape our political
worldview:
1. Cooperative – But Not Naïve
The civic mindset motivates us to proactively seek opportunities for
cross-party collaboration while recognizing the inherent competitiveness of
politics. From a civic perspective, the purpose of the republic is to satisfy
citizens’ interests through a combination of competition and cooperation.
Social scientists call this a mixed-motive context, because there is an
incentive for citizens to compete and to collaborate.27 Political parties must
compete for votes and influence while the broader citizenry can cooperate
on countless matters of common concern. Political tribes may battle over
laws on abortion, but the entire society can work together on a public
campaign to stop teen pregnancy. The civic mindset helps us see this kind
of civic possibility. Additionally, this mindset reminds citizens from across
political ideologies of the necessity to work together to strengthen core
democratic institutions and procedures—the very structures in which
political parties compete for power.
2. Pluralistic
In valuing the concept of citizenry, the civic mindset encourages
toleration of diversity and the notion that multiple perceptions of truth can
coexist. This does not mean we must abandon our convictions or assume
26
See, e.g., Civic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/civic (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (defining “civic” as “of or relating to a citizen, a city,
citizenship, or community affairs”); Civil, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/civil (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (defining “civil” as “adequate in courtesy and
politeness”).
27
See, e.g., Philip S. Gallo, Jr. & Charles G. McClintock, Cooperative and Competitive Behavior
in Mixed-Motive Games, J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68, 68 (1965) (explaining that in mixed-motive situations,
the players’ goals are “partially coincident and partially in conflict”).
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others’ beliefs are true. The minimal threshold of pluralism is toleration of
diverse perspectives of truth—as long as those worldviews do not impinge
upon anyone’s constitutional rights or dignity. While this creates space for
all citizens’ voices, society still must decide the limits of pluralism. Should
people tolerate multiple perceptions of truth, accept them at a distance, or
revere them? Pluralism is key to civic life in a democracy, and it is the
people’s responsibility to determine its bounds.
3. Community-spirited
The civic mindset emphasizes broadscale community welfare.28 This
conception of civic responsibility stretches beyond the words in the
Constitution to the spirit of democracy. We serve the broader community
not solely because we must do so by law, but because we want to: we
internalize an emotional commitment to form a “more perfect union.”29 This
expansive identity creates political space for tribes of all types to feel
emotionally included in society and to engage in the political process. Every
citizen is an equal part of the national project. The mission of the United
States Army, for example, is not to protect some citizens over others but to
provide for “the defense of the United States, the Commonwealths and
possessions and any areas occupied by the United States.”30
Chart 2 summarizes the qualities of the partisan mindset and civic
mindset. The partisan mindset lures us toward polarization whereas the civic
mindset opens political space for cooperation.
Chart 2. The contrasting characteristics of the partisan mindset and civic
mindset.
Partisan Mindset
Civic Mindset
1.
Adversarial
1.
Cooperative
2.
Self-righteous
2.
Pluralistic
3.
Insular
3.
Community-spirited
B. Operating Principles
The civic mindset operates on a few basic principles. First, loyalty to the
republic takes on deep importance. Even kindergarteners in most U.S. states
pledge allegiance every day “to the flag of the United States of America, and
to the Republic for which it stands.”31 This does not mean we must abandon
our tribal identity or view it as inferior, but that we locate it—in all its glory
and wholeness—within the broader sphere of a civic identity, at least within
28

The preamble of the U.S. Declaration of Independence states that “all men are created equal.”
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
29
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
30
10 U.S.C. § 7062 (2018).
31
4 U.S.C. § 4 (2018).
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the context of political decision making. Much like the relationship between
an eggshell and yolk, there is a symbiotic relationship between national and
tribal identification. Widespread affiliation with the nation enhances the felt
connection between tribes, which increases trust in the broader political
system and better enables individual tribes to address their concerns.
Second, wherever possible, political issues are tackled through
cooperative decision making rather than through blind loyalty politics.
Political tribes still compete for power and influence but also draw on crossparty cooperation to optimize societal decision making. Inter-party
cooperation may sound like a wishful vision within a polarized society, but
this civic-minded outlook has proven successful at various points in
American political history. A classic example is President Kennedy’s
emphasis on public service. Other cultures also have leveraged the power of
cross-group cooperation for societal benefit. Japanese economic scholars
credit much of their country’s industrial success to the embrace of the
philosophy of its Omi merchants who, beginning in the medieval period,
measured success by the degree to which their business was good for
themselves, the customer, and society.32
Third, the civic mindset fosters the felt duty to negotiate across party
lines to solve societal issues, and to feel ashamed if one fails to do so in good
faith. If enough leaders and social influencers advocate for this approach,
norms of political communication can shift.33 Strikingly, interstate war joins
citizens of opposing political persuasions in a united front against an external
enemy, producing a civic mindset of sorts. As polarization tears at the seams
of democracy, citizens would be wise to adopt that same mindset.
C. Fostering the Civic Mindset
There are at least two major pathways to cultivate a civic mindset. The
first is to adopt the role of a civic leader who acts cooperatively, thinks
pluralistically, and engages with a community-minded spirit. Anyone can
get involved in local politics, write an op-ed, start a political blog, or serve
the community by volunteering at an eldercare facility or school. One also
can encourage others to take up their civic duties. A simple example took
place in my home last week. My fourteen-year old son Noah sometimes gets
32
Kenzo Moriguchi, Forum Holds Up Omi Feudal Merchants as Models of Corporate
Responsibility, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 30, 2001), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2001/10/30/
events/forum-holds-up-omi-feudal-merchants-as-models-of-corporate-responsibility/#.XiqG9mhKh3h.
33
What happens if one political party embraces a civic mindset and the other holds to a partisan
outlook? One might assume that aggressive partisans would pressure civic-minded cooperators to
accommodate to their demands. But this oversimplifies the mechanisms of politics. Within any political
tribe, there are internal forces advocating for and against issues, there are backchannel negotiations
affecting policy decisions, there are cross-party meetings between political advisors—and all of these
forums offer the opportunity for the civic-minded leader to influence the decision-making process and to
produce results that are better for each political tribe and for society as a whole.
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into conflict with his eight-year-old brother Liam. I needed Noah to babysit
Liam but was nervous that they might fight. I nearly told Noah not to bully
his younger brother while I was gone but instead said, “While I’m out, can
you help Liam make his breakfast?” Inviting Noah into the role of household
helper fostered in him a kind of civic mindset that elevated his purpose and
improved my sons’ dynamic that morning.
Another method to foster the civic mindset is via a method I call the
“Connect-Respect-Transcend Model,” which provides an overarching
framework for interacting constructively across tribal lines.
Connect. The first step is to build emotional connection.34 Recall Ron
and Leigh’s conversation about the congressman’s speech. Before launching
into identity declarations, they could have spent a few minutes catching up
on each other’s lives. Small talk has big importance, for people come to view
each other as multifaceted human beings rather than as partisan stereotypes,
and their emotional connection creates a “holding environment” that can
sustain the relationship even in the face of acrimony.35 Ron also could have
been much more cautious in airing political differences. Rather than
responding reflexively in political banter, he could have inquired about
Leigh’s interest in talking politics. Though she initiated the conversation,
she may have intended to make a simple declaration and not to engage in
full-fledged political debate. With mutual consent, they could have entered
the taboo territory of political dialogue with greater sensitivity.
Respect. Ron could have demonstrated greater respect for Leigh’s views
by asking open-ended questions: What provoked her strong reaction to the
congressman’s talk? What values felt assaulted? He could have
communicated his understanding of her views, checked in with her to make
sure he understood correctly, and shared which values of hers most
resonated with him. By respecting her experience, he could have built
greater emotional connection.
Resisting the repetition compulsion was paramount to the modest
success of their conversation. Given the intensity of Ron’s political beliefs,
he was hyperaware of the risk of their conversation becoming adversarial
and sought to temper the expression of his strong views. Nevertheless, he
could have suggested a simple process to guide their conversation, such as
having them each share the personal significance of their views, turning the
34

Emotional connections must be built at the national as well as regional and interpersonal levels.
In examining ways to stem the tide of political tribalism in the United States, Amy Chua notes that
“citizens will . . . need to collectively fashion a national identity capable of resonating with and holding
together Americans of all sorts—old and young, immigrant and native born, urban and rural, rich and
poor, descendants of slaves as well as descendants of slave owners.” Amy Chua, Tribal World: Group
Identity Is All, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 25, 33 (2018).
35
See D. W. Winnicott, The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship, 41 INT’L J.
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 585, 591 (1960) (indicating that the holding environment of infants is a form of
loving).
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debate over whose politics is “right” into an emotionally revealing exchange
about the roots of their political identities.
Transcend. Ron and Leigh could have been more open to listening for
sake of learning. Neither individual’s political views would have changed,
but they could have expanded their understanding of the political terrain and
important interests at stake for various constituencies.
This is the civic mindset coming to life: We approach differences jointly,
commit to the “relentless we,” and refuse to fall prey to political tribalism.36
The more we listen, learn, and share, the more we fall into a positive
vertigo—a free-flowing conversation that stirs enthusiasm, curiosity, and
fulfillment of our civic duty. We maintain our beliefs while transcending
difference.
IN SUMMARY
When political polarization threatens to undermine the ideals and
functionality of democracy, there is a societal imperative to embrace a civic
mindset. While the partisan mindset pits groups against one another and
reduces political space for collaboration, the civic mindset motivates
national cohesion and expands political space for mutually beneficial
decision making. In this frame of mind, citizens across interest groups
cooperate on issues of shared concern, embrace pluralism, and foster a
community-minded spirit. Political parties still compete for power and
influence—but within a broader identity that binds them together in the quest
for a more perfect union.

36

SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 128–29.
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The Role of Lawyers and Law Schools in Fostering
Civil Public Debate
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VIKRAM D. AMAR
Partisanship can make policy discussion and civil debate difficult. Partisan
differences in how facts and policies are understood contribute to the escalation of
conflict and a lack of cooperation. Lawyers are not immune from these human
tendencies. But good lawyers have, and good law schools teach, values,
knowledge, and skills that can aid in fostering and modeling more productive
debate and resolution of conflict.
Lawyers are trained and socialized to internalize and safeguard the
foundational tenets of our constitutional democracy, to uphold the law even when
it does not reflect their own individual preferences. The professional rules of
conduct encourage lawyers to separate the professional from the personal, and
expect that vigorous debate, dissent, and zealous advocacy will be done in a
professional manner. Lawyers are taught to think about issues, cases, or
arguments from multiple sides and to value rational argument, the primacy of
evidence and facts, and neutral processes in which cases are decided on their
merits. The nuanced approaches to conflict that are required of lawyers—
distinguishing productive and unproductive conflict, both creating and claiming
value, and acting as both advisors and advocates—equip lawyers with abilities
that help them generate and manage more productive debate.
Law schools, then, should strive to provide even better grounding in these
values, knowledge, and skills. Lawyers should endeavor to highlight for
themselves, their clients and colleagues, and their opponents nuanced approaches
to conflict and debate. And law schools and lawyers should work to educate the
broader citizenry about the values of our constitutional democracy and to model
effective and civil dispute resolution strategies.
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The Role of Lawyers and Law Schools in Fostering
Civil Public Debate
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT * & VIKRAM D. AMAR **
We are in a time in which political polarization is frequently in the
headlines,1 public opinion polls reveal a pervasive sense of division2 and a
sense that political discussions have become less grounded in facts,3 and
many are concerned about the civility (or lack thereof) with which we treat
each other across political differences.4 Partisanship can, indeed, make
policy discussion and civil debate difficult. And there are many aspects of
human psychology that can contribute to the hurdles. Take a prominent
example: people interpret policies and information differently depending
*
Alice Curtis Campbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois College
of Law. Our thanks go to Jean Sternlight for her very helpful comments and suggestions.
**
Dean, Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1
See, e.g., Jaclyn Gallucci, When It Comes to Politics, Americans Are Divided. Can Data Change
That?, FORTUNE (July 17, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/07/17/political-polarization-inamerica-define/ (discussing “polarization unity” and how polarized voters and campaign donor
influence furthers political division); Natalie Pattillo, As Shutdown Pauses, Coverage Focuses on
Partisan Polarization, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/politics/
shutdown-partisan-coverage.php (describing focus of news coverage on polarization). See also Shanto
Iyengar et al., The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States, 22 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 129, 130–31 (2019) (describing affective polarization and how to mitigate it); Samara
Klar et al., Opinion, Is America Hopelessly Polarized, or Just Allergic to Politics?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/opinion/polarization-politics-democratsrepublicans.html (suggesting that we are less polarized than we think). See generally JOSHUA GREENE,
MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 5, 14–16 (2014)
(describing “us v. them” conflicts and the role they play in moral decision making); JONATHAN HAIDT,
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION, at xi–xii (2012)
(describing how a “righteous” mind enables both cooperation and moralistic conflict).
2
See, e.g., ROBERT P. JONES & MAXINE NAJLE, PRRI, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: THE
FATE OF PLURALISM IN A DIVIDED NATION 28 (2019), https://www.prri.org/research/americandemocracy-in-crisis-the-fate-of-pluralism-in-a-divided-nation/ (finding that “Americans are nearly
unanimous in their belief that the country is divided over politics (91%), with 74% of Americans saying
that the country is very divided”).
3
Most Americans Say Political Debate in the U.S. Has Become Less Respectful, Fact-Based,
Substantive, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/
americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-has-grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-toviolence/ft_19-07-18_toxicpolitics_most-americans-say-political-debate-us-less-respectful-fact-basedsubstantive/ (finding that 76% of American adults believe political debate has grown less fact-based in
recent years).
4
WEBER SHANDWICK, POWELL TATE & KRC RESEARCH, CIVILITY IN AMERICA 2019:
SOLUTIONS FOR TOMORROW 2, 8–9, 10–15 (2019), https://www.webershandwick.com/news/civility-inamerica-2019-solutions-for-tomorrow/.
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5

on their perspective and preferences, and assess evidence in accordance
with preferences and prior beliefs.6 And recent research has found that
people’s ideological beliefs can even make it difficult to evaluate the basic
logical validity of arguments.7
Despite these tendencies, we tend to believe that our own perceptions
and experiences are objective and accurate, and often fail to realize the
ways that our perceptions are influenced by our own perspective,
knowledge, expectations, and desires—a phenomenon known as naïve
realism.8 This naïve realism creates the “feeling that [our] own take on the
world enjoys particular authenticity, and that other actors will, or at least
should, share that take, if they are attentive, rational, and objective
perceivers of reality and open-minded seekers of truth.”9 This feeling tends
to make us confident that we should be able to persuade others of the
rightness of our positions.10 But when others persist in having different
views, it can lead us to conclude that they are unreasonable, biased, or

5

See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 132–34 (1954) (finding partisan interpretations by the fans of
opposing sports teams); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 854–55, 883–85 (2012) (finding that preferences
and prior beliefs influenced interpretations of videotape of a political demonstration); David
Tannenbaum et al., On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioural Policy Interventions, 1 NATURE HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 5 (2017) (finding that people find behavioral interventions more ethical when the nature of
the intervention matches their political beliefs and less ethical when it does not); Leaf Van Boven et al.,
Psychological Barriers to Bipartisan Public Support for Climate Policy, 13 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI.
492, 493, 496–500 (2018) (describing how partisans devalue policy proposals from an opposing party).
6
Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2108
(1979); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 197 (1998).
7
Anup Gampa et al., (Ideo)Logical Reasoning: Ideology Impairs Sound Reasoning, 10 SOC.
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1075, 1082 (2019). See generally Peter H. Ditto et al., At Least Bias Is
Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives, 14 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 273 (2019) (reporting a meta-analysis of the tendency “to evaluate otherwise identical
information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs and allegiances”).
8
Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 646 (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
9
Id. Naïve realism also leads to the belief that we make more accurate assessments of other
people than they make of us. This is the illusion of asymmetric insight. “We insist that our ‘outsider
perspective’ affords us insights about our peers that they are denied by their defensiveness,
egocentricity, or other sources of bias. By contrast, we rarely entertain the notion that others are seeing
us more clearly and objectively than we see ourselves.” Emily Pronin et al., You Don’t Know Me, But I
Know You: The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 639 (2001).
This can mean that we are prone to “talk when we would do well to listen and to be less patient than we
ought to be when others express the conviction that they are the ones who are being misunderstood or
judged unfairly.” Id. at 652–53.
10
Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict
and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 116 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
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ill-motived. Research has found that people commonly conclude that
those who disagree with them are biased, simply because they disagree.12
Once a person attributes bias to another, they tend to see their conflict as
more pervasive, to expect cooperation to be less worthwhile, and to act
more competitively. Not surprisingly, this tends to cause the other person
to respond in kind, creating a spiral of conflict.13 And incivility makes
arguments seem less sound,14 likely contributing to the escalation of
conflict.
When differences in perspective are particularly focal—e.g., two
people are on different sides of a contentious issue—we tend to
overestimate those differences.15 Similarly, we tend to overestimate the
degree to which things like ideology and self-interest influence other
people’s views and behavior, believing that others are more motivated or
influenced by these than we are ourselves.16 One study asked people with
varying views on an issue to express their own judgments and also to
predict how their understandings would differ from those with other
political views.17 While there were, in fact, differences in how people with
different political views perceived the case, these differences were
relatively small compared to the large differences predicted by the
participants.18 These sorts of mispredictions can mean that people are
overly doubtful and cynical about the potential fruits of collaboration or
finding common ground.19
11

Id. at 111; Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 793 (2004); Leigh Thompson & George
Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 193 (1992).
12
Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of Bias and
the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 845 (2008).
13
Id.
14
Jason R. Popan et al., Testing the Effects of Incivility During Internet Political Discussion on
Perceptions of Rational Argument and Evaluations of a Political Outgroup, 96 COMPUTERS HUM.
BEHAV. 123, 130 (2019).
15
Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping into Others’ Shoes, in
HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 297, 304 (Keith D. Markman et al. eds.,
2009).
16
Chip Heath, On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of Motivation
Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 25,
26 (1999); Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM . PSYCHOL. 1053, 1053 (1999); Rebecca K.
Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest and Its Effects on Social Action, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14 (2001); see also Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, “Naive Cynicism” in
Everyday Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 743, 751 (1999) (finding that “people have cynical intuitions about how others assess
responsibility”).
17
Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in
Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414 (1995).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 416.
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Lawyers, of course, are not immune from these human tendencies. The
adversarial nature of our legal system and the representative nature of legal
practice means that lawyers must necessarily operate much of the time
with a partisan perspective.20 This partisan lens can contribute to the sorts
of spirals just described.21 And incivility in the profession has been a topic
of concern.22
But good lawyers have, and good law schools teach, a range of values,
knowledge, and skills that should be useful in fostering and modeling more
productive debate and resolution of conflict.23
Importantly, lawyers are trained and socialized to internalize and
safeguard the foundational tenets of our constitutional democracy.24 The
rule of law in the United States—and the prospect over time of formulating
better policy that itself will be respected as legitimate—depends on notice
and opportunity to be heard, the robust exercise of freedom of speech and a
free press, substantive engagement of ideas, and confidence that dissenting
viewpoints are engaged on their merits rather than merely overridden or
20

See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150–51 (1993) (finding that representation of a party on one side
of a legal case influences perceptions of fairness). See also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838,
887, 896–97 (2009) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize how different people might
interpret a video of a police chase in Scott v. Harris).
21
See, e.g., Stephen M. Garcia et al., Morally Questionable Tactics: Negotiations Between
District Attorneys and Public Defenders, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 731, 737 (2001)
(finding that attorneys viewed questionable negotiation tactics as more appropriate when used in
response to the perceived use of questionable tactics by the other side).
22
See NAT’L CTR. FOR PROF’L & RESEARCH ETHICS, SURVEY ON PROFESSIONALISM: A STUDY
OF ILLINOIS LAWYERS 2014, at 5 (2014), https://www.2civility.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Studyof-Illinois-Lawyers-2014.pdf (noting that more than eighty-five percent of lawyers surveyed reported
experience with some kind of uncivil behavior in the past six months, such as sarcasm, condescension,
misrepresentation, or negotiating in bad faith); LAUREN STILLER RIKLEEN, RIKLEEN INST. FOR
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP, SURVEY OF WORKPLACE CONDUCT AND BEHAVIORS IN LAW FIRMS 33, 38
(2018), https://wbawbf.org/sites/WBAR-PR1/files/WBA%20Survey%20of%20Workplace%20Conduct
%20and%20Behaviors%20in%20Law%20Firms%20FINAL.pdf (describing inappropriate behavior at
law firms); Sam Skolnik, More Than Third of Female Lawyers Harassed at Work, Survey Shows,
BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/more-than-third-of-femalelawyers-harassed-at-work-survey-shows (reporting that more than a third of female lawyers have been
sexually harassed at work).
23
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J.
347, 349–51 (2004) (suggesting that lawyers, as neutral advocates, are well-suited to assist in
democratic discourse).
24
Interestingly, the President of the American Bar Association and the President of the
Association of American Law Schools both recently highlighted the importance of lawyers and legal
education in upholding and educating the public about the rule of law and the “pillars” of constitutional
democracy. Judy Perry Martinez, President’s Letter: Promise to a Nation, A.B.A. J., Sept.–Oct. 2019,
at 6; Vicki Jackson, President, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., 2019 Presidential Address at the Second
Meeting of the AALS House of Representatives: Pillars of Democracy: Law, Representation, and
Knowledge (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/winter-2019/pillars-ofdemocracy/.
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ignored. Lawyers are the cultural custodians of this distinctive
government by the people, for the people, and of the people.26 When we
say—as we often do—that we are a nation of laws, not people,27 what we
mean is that our highest obedience is to a set of principles of governance,
not to the particular people who govern. This is why no person is above (or
below) the law, and why lawyers are required and trained to uphold the
law, even when it does not reflect their own individual preferences.28 That
does not, of course, mean that lawyers passively accept laws that they
believe to be unjust. Indeed, a big part of a lawyer’s role is to work for
legal reform29 through the mechanisms of our constitutional democracy.
That is why lawyers are permitted to take positions that are not supported
by existing law, provided they are, in the words of one important ethics
formulation, “warranted . . . by a nonfrivolous argument for the
exten[sion], modif[ication], or revers[al of] existing law[,] or for [the]
establish[ment] of new law.”30
In serving as institutional and cultural custodians, lawyers are required
to assume particular roles. It is for this reason that professional rules of
conduct encourage—and successful law schools teach—lawyers to
separate the professional from the personal.31 Vigorous debate, dissent, and
zealous advocacy are all valued—and can all be done in a professional
manner. As Shakespeare once said: “[D]o as adversaries do in law, strive
25

Overview – Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/
educational-activities/overview-rule-law (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
26
Former Solicitor General: Government Lawyers Critical to Rule of Law in Troubling Times,
A.B.A. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/
2018/10/former-solicitor-general--government-lawyers-critical-to-rule-of/.
27
David Davenport, A Nation of Laws, Not Men, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Sept. 2, 2013),
https://www.hoover.org/research/nation-laws-not-men.
28
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating the lawyer must
abide by a client’s decision and that representation of a client does not mean the lawyer endorses the
client’s political or moral views).
29
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “[a]s a public citizen, a
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work
to strengthen legal education.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
30
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
31
See, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L COURTESY no. 10 (KY. BAR ASS’N), https://www.kybar.org/
page/procourtesy (“A lawyer should recognize that the conflicts within a legal matter are professional
and not personal and should endeavor to maintain a friendly and professional relationship with other
attorneys in the matter. In other words, ‘leave the matter in the courtroom.’”); OBA STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM r. 2.7 (OKLA. BAR ASS’N 2006), https://www.okbar.org/ec/standardsof
professionalism/ (“We understand, and will impress upon our client, that reasonable people can
disagree without being disagreeable; and that effective representation does not require, and in fact is
impaired by, conduct which objectively can be characterized as uncivil, rude, abrasive, abusive, vulgar,
antagonistic, obstructive or obnoxious.”). For a content analysis of state bar civility codes, see Donald
E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility as an Obligation of
Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 107–28 (2011).
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32

mightily, but eat and drink as friends.” In addition to the rules and norms
of professionalism, lawyers also have their own interests in treating those
on the opposing side of a particular issue, case, or dispute with respect.
Lawyers are repeat-players and are likely to encounter each other in future
cases. Reputation—for ethicality, competence, problem-solving ability, or
civility —is an important asset that should not be squandered.33 Moreover,
someone who is on the opposing side in this case may be a partner or
collaborator in the next.
Lawyers are trained to think about issues, cases, or arguments from
multiple sides.34 Lawyers cannot make good predictions if they have not
thought about an issue in a complex, and multifaceted way. And lawyers
would not be able to act as good advocates if they hadn’t at least
anticipated the counterarguments. As a profession, moreover, we value
principled analysis and rational argument, rather than foregone
conclusions.35 Our system is grounded in the primacy of evidence and
facts36 and the value of neutral processes in which cases are decided on
their merits.37
32

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 1, sc. 2, ll. 281–82 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1921) (1594).
33
See, e.g., Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive
Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 621, 640 (2002) (finding that
negotiator reputation influenced negotiator behavior). See also Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational
Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28
NEGOT. J. 117, 120 (2012) (“Perhaps paradoxically, the negotiators who are most likely to have a
reputation for effectiveness are those who acknowledge that legal negotiation is just as much about the
other people who are involved and abiding by relevant professional norms as it is about the task of
competing for a favorable share of apparently scarce resources.”). See Catherine H. Tinsley et al.,
Reputation in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 255, 256–58 (Chris Honeyman &
Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017) (noting that a lawyer with an integrative reputation is perceived
to be more effective by her negotiation counterpart).
34
Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment,
47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239–41 (1984) (exploring the effects of considering
alternative outcomes); David McCraw, Think Like a Libel Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/opinion/sunday/think-like-a-libel-lawyer.html. See also Russell
Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 281, 296 (2006) (suggesting the utility of taking the perspective of a disagreeable
adjudicator).
35
Vikram David Amar, The Helpful Role Lawyers Can Play in Rebuilding American Democracy,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (Jan. 12, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/01/12/helpful-role-lawyers-can-playrebuilding-american-democracy (“Lawyers apply logic—and not preconceived notions or forgone
conclusions—to the facts. Logic must be tempered by history and experience but at base relies on
principled reasoning.”).
36
Id. (“Lawyers deal in facts, grounded in evidence—they don’t trade in speculation, and
certainly they do not create or promote fabricated falsehood.”). See also McCraw, supra note 34
(discussing the importance of facts to libel lawyers).
37
See, e.g., Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice:
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 748 (2003)
(describing the importance of neutrality to procedural justice).
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Conflict resolution skills—often taught in dispute resolution courses or
clinics—are also an important part of the lawyer’s toolkit.38 Lawyers are
routinely called upon to assist parties on opposite sides of a deal, case, or
issue to come to mutual agreement. Listening actively, with curiosity, and
for understanding—and listening with respect even in disagreement—helps
lawyers understand the interests of the parties.39 Lawyers can help bring
clients along to agreement by counseling them to assess both their own
interests and those of the other side.40 Lawyers rely on empathy and
creativity to craft or frame proposals that will satisfy the interests of both
sides.41 Lawyers know that differences in interests or values make it
possible to create value through exchange.42
Of course, any serious and productive attempt to better align law
school curricula and culture with modes of argumentation that might better
serve individual law school graduates and society must reckon with the
reality that conflict itself and lawyers’ roles are each varied. These
variations, and the nuanced approaches to conflict that they require of
lawyers, may themselves equip lawyers with abilities that can help them
generate and manage more productive debate.
Conflict is often thought of as necessarily bad. But conflict theorists
distinguish between constructive and destructive conflict.43 And, indeed,
38

See RANDALL KISER, SOFT SKILLS FOR THE EFFECTIVE LAWYER 96 (2017) (“Higher levels of
self-control are correlated with . . . superior conflict resolution skills.”); JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT &
JEAN STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 1 (2012) (describing the skills that will help
lawyers to be better negotiators and counselors); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 359–60
(describing conflict management and consensus building skills). See also Symposium, ADR’s Place in
Navigating a Polarized Era, TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming) (considering the pros and cons of
applying alternative dispute resolution techniques to contentious issues in a polarized climate).
39
See, e.g., RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 76–90 (6th ed. 2019) (describing
active listening); Jack Zenger & Joseph Folkman, What Great Listeners Actually Do, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/what-great-listeners-actually-do (“[P]eople perceive the best
listeners to be those who periodically ask questions that promote discovery and insight. . . . Good
listeners may challenge assumptions and disagree, but the person being listened to feels the listener is
trying to help.”). See also Jonathan R. Cohen, “Open-Minded Listening”, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 139,
144 (2014) (discussing the importance of open-minded listening and the factors that hinder and
promote it).
40
Perspective taking is complicated. See, e.g., Tal Eyal et al., Perspective Mistaking: Accurately
Understanding the Mind of Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking Perspective, 114 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 547, 547 (2018) (finding that perspective taking is difficult and that
accuracy about another person is better aided by engaging in conversation with them).
41
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 13, 27–37 (2012).
42
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why We Can’t “Just All Get Along”: Dysfunction in the
Polity and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It, J. DISP. RESOL. 5, 9 (2018) (describing
the importance of focusing on interests and values in conflict resolution).
43
See LEWIS A. COSER, FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 16, 20–21, 47 (1956) (discussing both
the dysfunctional and beneficial aspects of conflict); MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF
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while conflict can sometimes be devastating, it can also be “the seedbed
that nourishes social change”44 or the impetus to engage in creative
thinking about how to accommodate or reconcile legitimate, though
differing, interests. The goal, therefore, is not to eliminate disagreement or
to invariably compromise quickly. Instead, it is important to distinguish
between conflict that is necessary or useful and conflict that is unnecessary
or unproductive. A lawyer might, for example, reasonably choose to
litigate a case rather than agree to a settlement that does not meet her
clients’ interests or might pursue a strategy of litigation in the service of
legal reform. But she might also readily agree to a request for a delay in the
proceedings from opposing counsel, when doing so would not compromise
her client’s interests.
Not only is conflict itself multifaceted, but lawyers are trained to
operate in many different types of advocacy roles. In a transactional
setting, getting to an agreement with other stakeholders (while preserving
the things that are most important to one’s own client) is often the ultimate
mark of success; lawyers who are unable to ultimately facilitate
deal-making have a tough time earning a living in transactional practice
areas. To the extent that naïve realism and other confirmation biases make
it harder to appreciate—much less work to address or accommodate in
relatively low-cost ways—the interests, perspectives, and proposals of
other stakeholders in an agreement, classroom and skills training that helps
students recognize and combat such subjective blind spots can only be to
the good.
In litigation (or litigation-like) arenas, things might get even more
complicated. Even in litigation, most cases end up being settled out of
court45 and, even in cases that go to trial, there are many procedural or
substantive agreements to be made along the way.46 Litigators, therefore,
need to be dealmakers. But not all cases can or should be settled,47 and our
CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 17 (1973) (differentiating constructive and
destructive conflict).
44
DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND
SETTLEMENT 10 (3d ed. 2004).
45
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We
Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994).
Litigation is really a process of “litigotiation.” Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to
Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
46
See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 62 (2016) (describing the range of agreements made by parties throughout the
litigation process).
47
The right balance is debated. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984) (discussing problems with settlement); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:
A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2665–66
(1995) (responding to Fiss); Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1117 (2009) (discussing various views and perspectives on settlements).
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adversarial process is premised on the notion of vigorous advocacy. This
means that litigators must be prepared to simultaneously cooperate and
advocate. It also means that litigators must necessarily think about other
audiences, including judges, juries, and arbitrators. To be sure, to the
extent that these neutral finders of fact (or law) lament needless
disagreement, bickering, and incivility by the participants in a
dispute-resolution process, those lawyers who are best-trained in being
reasonable—and appearing to be reasonable—will be rewarded. But there
is nothing to guarantee that deciders of cases always react negatively to
entrenched or combative presentation.48 A lawyer who has reason to know
(or even think), for example, that a particular “old-school” judge (or a
particular jury panel) will view empathy for and acknowledgement of the
plausibility of the other side’s positions as weaknesses or implicit doubts
about the validity of one’s own arguments, is duty bound by her oath to
take such information into account when framing her presentation.
Even within the roles of transactional dealmaker or litigator, the
lawyer’s role has many facets. For example, to appropriately advise their
clients as to the merits of a deal or lawsuit and the prospects for a better
deal or settlement, lawyers must be able to objectively evaluate the deal or
case. At the same time, to effectively promote clients’ interests, lawyers
must act as advocates. It is not easy to wear these two hats—neutral
observer and partisan advocate—at the same time,49 as these roles require
different skills. Similarly, lawyers “cannot steward . . . effective deal[s]
without both minimizing and facilitating risk taking.”50 As advisors,
lawyers must often simultaneously seek creative solutions for clients while
also ensuring their compliance with the law.51
48
The research literature is sparse and somewhat mixed. See Margaret S. Gibbs et al.,
Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness: Do Hostile Tactics Affect Impressions of a Simulated Jury?,
7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 275, 280 (1989) (finding a negative effect of hostile and leading cross examination
tactics); Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney
Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 548 (1996) (finding that
an aggressive presentation style was more effective than a passive style); William M. O’Barr & John
M. Conley, When a Juror Watches a Lawyer, 3 BARRISTER 8, 11 (1976) (discussing the effects of
language and presentation); Janet Sigal et al., The Effect of Presentation Style and Sex of Lawyer on
Jury Decision-Making Behavior, 22 PSYCHOLOGY 13, 16 (1985) (finding that an aggressive
presentation style was seen as more effective than a passive style). See generally Dominic A. Infante &
Andrew S. Rancer, Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggressiveness: A Review of Recent Theory and
Research, 19 ANN. INT’L COMM. ASS’N 319, 327–44 (1996) (reviewing research finding that
argumentativeness is associated with higher credibility, but verbal aggression is associated with lower
credibility). For recent research in a different context, see Popan et al., supra note 14, at 123.
49
See Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of
Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37, 43 (2010) (describing the difficulty of simultaneously
enacting multiple roles).
50
Susan P. Sturm, Lawyering Paradoxes: Making Meaning of the Contradictions 7 (Columbia
Pub. L. Research, Working Paper No. 14-642, 2019).
51
Id.
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When engaging in negotiation—whether the negotiation of a contract,
the settlement of a lawsuit, or any other negotiation—lawyers often find
themselves with multiple, and conflicting, goals. In identifying the
“Negotiator’s Dilemma,” scholars have recognized that negotiations
involve “two separate but complementary negotiation tasks—claiming or
distributing value, often described as ‘dividing the pie,’ and potentially
creating new value from the opportunities that the negotiation presents,
often described as ‘enlarging the pie.’”52 The best lawyers draw on skills—
some cooperative, some competitive—that allow them to be successful in
both of these tasks.53
All of this suggests a few possible directions for reform. First, law
schools can strive to provide (1) an even better grounding in establishing
and critically evaluating facts54 and a deeper understanding of empirical
evidence;55 (2) an understanding of the habits of mind that influence policy
debate;56 (3) more training in a wide range of approaches to dispute
resolution and the relevant toolbox of skills;57 (4) facility in navigating the
multiplicity of roles and making the nuanced distinctions required of

52
RISKIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 149–66. See also DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE
MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–45 (1986) (“There is a central, inescapable tension between cooperative
moves to create value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage.”). See Keith G.
Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for Managing the Dilemma Between
Claiming and Creating Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387 (2000) (discussing best practices and strategies to
manage this tension).
53
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 147–49 (2002); Tinsley et al., supra
note 33, at 621–22, 624, 637.
54
See Beryl Blaustone & Lisa Radtke Bliss, The Role of the Lawyer and the Essential Skills to
Teach Law Students in an Era of Fake News, “Alternative Facts,” and Governing by Disruption, 19
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 139, 154–55 (2018) (discussing lawyers’ role in investigating, identifying, and
establishing facts; challenging assumptions; looking behind alleged facts; and thinking about
permissible inferences). Also important is the ability to distinguish the less than helpful concepts of
“alternative facts” or “nonexistent truth” from the more useful notion of “constructive ambiguity” in
dispute resolution. Noam Ebner, Begun, The Trust War Has: Teaching Negotiation When Truth Isn’t
Truth, 35 NEGOT. J. 207, 208 (2019).
55
See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 1–2 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining
the importance for lawyers of understanding research design and statistics).
56
See, e.g., JOHN COOK & STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY, THE DEBUNKING HANDBOOK 1 (2011)
(examining how attempts to debunk myths can reinforce those myths); ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 38, at 1 (describing psychological phenomena that influence conflict and its resolution); Jiin
Jung et al., A Multidisciplinary Understanding of Polarization, 74 AM. PSYCHOL. 301, 307–10 (2019)
(discussing a multidisciplinary approach to understanding polarization); Sami R. Yousif et al., The
Illusion of Consensus: A Failure to Distinguish Between True and False Consensus, 30 PSYCHOL. SCI.
1195, 1195 (2019) (discussing how false consensus can influence what information we trust); supra
notes 5–18 and accompanying text (discussing how preferences and prior beliefs can lead to biases
when evaluating arguments).
57
See generally RISKIN ET AL., supra note 39 (surveying a range of skills and approaches relevant
to dispute resolution).
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lawyers; and (5) a foundation of essential skills for making good
decisions and working effectively with other people, including
adversaries. 59
Second, at the very least, a lawyer who is trained in civil advocacy
could present to her client the choice between a no-holds barred approach
that might yield a somewhat better financial outcome and a more
enlightened strategy that may leave the client with a bit less money in her
pocket but serve other interests the client may have, leaving her feeling
better about herself, the opposing party (with whom the client may have an
ongoing business or personal relationship), and the legal system in
general.60 Even more broadly, lawyers can work to distinguish the
professional and the personal, to distinguish necessary and unnecessary
conflict, to distinguish instances in which litigation is necessary from those
in which a consensual solution is attainable, to distinguish their roles of
advocate and advisor, and to distinguish the ways in which they present
arguments to different audiences.61 Educating clients and opponents about
these nuances can open the door to more problem-solving and less needless
conflict.
Third, law schools should—in the short and long term—look to
educate would-be decision makers (current and future judges and the
citizenry at large) about how the adversarial system can generate the most
accurate and fair results in individual cases and for society at large.62 Just
58

See Sturm, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing the importance of “making sense of, and being able
to forge constructive tension between [the] oppositional aspects of lawyering”).
59
See KISER, supra note 38, at 4–5, 9–11 (describing the increasing importance of intrapersonal
and personal competencies to the success of lawyers and other professionals); ROBBENNOLT &
STERNLIGHT, supra note 38, at 5 (noting the most important skills for lawyers); John M. Lande & Jean
R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law
Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247, 251 (2010) (highlighting the
importance for lawyers of understanding emotion, communication skills, and creativity); Jean R.
Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal
Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 365–73 (2015) (discussing the connection between psychology and
the core competencies of working with other people and making good decisions).
60
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
61
Sturm, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that these sorts of tensions “lie at the heart of what makes
lawyers distinctive, necessary, and effective. The most successful and impactful lawyers live in these
tensions. This capacity to hold paradox may be what equips lawyers to exercise truly effective
leadership”); Symposium, ADR’s Place in Navigating a Polarized Era, supra note 38 (considering
“whether and how we can teach our students to be discerning in making appropriate use of these
approaches and skills, both in their future representation of clients and in their future roles as leaders
within their local, professional, religious, and political communities”).
62
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct notes that “a lawyer should further
the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). See Justin Sevier, A
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as with democracy, there is no guarantee that America’s distinctive
contribution to formal dispute resolution (an adversarial system with robust
lawyer ethical obligations and information protection, combined with
mechanisms to help all kinds of clients secure competent and zealous
representation) will be maintained in the next century as it has over the last
two. We are at an historical moment in which sharp disagreements and
seeming inability to appreciate the other side’s points is causing policy
leaders in Washington and on the campaign trail to threaten major reform
of the country’s highest legal institutions, so nothing can or should be
taken for granted.
At the same time, we are not suggesting a world in which lawyers are
trained to facilitate consensual resolution of all controversies. Indeed, one
increasingly prominent critique of the nation’s dispute-resolution system is
that certain kinds of cases are settled too frequently, such that institutions
that represent the public, like appellate courts and legislatures, are starved
of fodder to reflect on and weigh in on major policy issues that should,
because of their external and symbolic effects, not be left entirely to
private ordering.63 But even here, disputes that are best resolved by our
government leaders among the three branches can be clarified, streamlined,
and facilitated—not hindered—when lawyers better understand how to
present arguments in a less histrionic and more balanced and data-informed
way. Our adversarial system is most worth preserving when we keep
firmly in mind that adversarial is not the same thing as belligerent, and
certainly not the same thing as bellicose.

[Relational] Theory of Procedure, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1987, 1996–98 (2020) (describing establishing
truth and providing justice as key objectives of dispute resolution). For empirical work on how U.S.
laypeople view adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Justin Sevier, The Trust-Justice Tradeoff:
Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal
Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212, 213 (2014).
63
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 47, at 1075 (describing the potential costs of settlement); MenkelMeadow, supra note 47, at 2663–67 (discussing “when, how, and under what circumstances” disputes
should be settled); Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, supra note 47
(presenting a range of views on settlement).
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Political Polarization and Moral Outrage on Social
Media
JORDAN CARPENTER, WILLIAM BRADY, MOLLY CROCKETT, RENÉ
WEBER & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG
Many theorists claim that social media contribute to political polarization,
but it is not clear how these effects occur. We propose and explain a theoretical
model of this process that focuses on moral outrage. This combination of anger
and disgust can emerge from a mismatch between evolved human nature and
certain features of political discussions on the internet. We identify three specific
types of socially negative behavior that moral outrage facilitates: aggression
(behavior intended to harm others), sophistry (poor argumentation), and
withdrawal (avoiding discussions of politics). We describe psychological
mechanisms through which moral outrage can lead to these outcomes, specifically
focusing on dehumanization and group antagonism. We discuss research justifying
our proposed model and suggest new ways to empirically test its links. Our model
should be useful for researchers exploring the question of when and how political
discussions on social media go wrong as well as what to do about these problems.
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Political Polarization and Moral Outrage on Social
Media
JORDAN CARPENTER, WILLIAM BRADY, MOLLY CROCKETT, RENÉ WEBER
& WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG *
BACKGROUND
Decades ago, experts hailed the internet as a grand, new opportunity
for political enlightenment. It was thought that the web would provide a
convenient and widely available way to remove limitations imposed by
geography and resources, expanding access to information, increasing
understanding and empathy among people, and making the world better.
Today, this optimistic view is tempered by fears that certain aspects of
internet use—most notably social media—have the potential to exacerbate
threats to democracy, including political polarization.1
Political polarization is sometimes understood merely as ideological
distance between political parties or homogeneity within parties.2
However, group coherence and disagreement by themselves are not the
main problems here. The more threatening kind of polarization, which is
often described as affective group polarization, involves intense, negative
attitudes toward the political outgroup.3 According to Pew Research
*
William Brady is an NSF postdoctoral fellow in the psychology department at Yale University.
Jordan Carpenter is a postdoctoral fellow in the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. Molly
Crockett is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Yale University and a Distinguished Research
Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is the
Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics at Duke University in the Philosophy Department, the
Kenan Institute for Ethics, the Psychology and Neuroscience Department, and the Law School. René
Weber (M.D., University of Aachen, Germany; Ph.D. University of Technology Berlin, Germany) is a
professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California in Santa Barbara,
director of UCSB’s Media Neuroscience Lab (https://medianeuroscience.org), and a Fellow of the
International Communication Association.
1
William J. Brady & M.J. Crockett, How Effective Is Online Outrage?, 23 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCI. 79, 79–80 (2019). See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA 5–6 (2017) (advocating for “an architecture of serendipity” as the ultimate way to
salvage democracy, as “[t]o the extent that social media allow us to create our very own feeds, and
essentially live in them, they create serious problems. . . . Self-insulation and personalization . . . spread
falsehoods, and promote polarization and fragmentation”); ANAMITRA DEB ET AL., IS SOCIAL MEDIA A
THREAT
TO
DEMOCRACY?
3–4
(2017),
https://www.omidyargroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Social-Media-and-Democracy-October-5-2017.pdf (reporting the six key
features of social media that challenge democratic principles).
2
Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46
POLITY 411, 412 (2014).
3
Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on
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surveys in 2014, deep antipathy toward one’s political outgroup grew by
24% in the preceding decade among the American public, and nearly 32%
of Americans saw the opposing party’s policies as threats to the nation or
its well-being.4 These strong feelings have contributed to violent clashes,
such as those between far-right political groups and liberals in New
Orleans and Charlottesville.5 More generally, increasing affective group
polarization has led to a decline in the kind of civil discourse that many
hold to be a cornerstone of democracy.6
While social media use is widely believed to contribute to growing
polarization,7 data directly addressing this claim are scarce and in part lead
to controversial interpretations and conclusions. As a result, the processes
through which social media might exacerbate polarization are not well
understood. We need to figure out the processes behind polarization in
order to figure out what to do about it. Solutions require understanding.
I. THESIS
We propose here that moral outrage is central to understanding how
social media use is related to affective group polarization. Moral outrage is
an intense negative emotion combining anger and disgust triggered by a
perception that someone violated a moral norm.8 Messages that describe or
evoke moral outrage are increasingly prevalent in contemporary political
contexts, especially those accusing political opponents of moral norm
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI . 690, 690 (2015); Matt Motyl, Liberals and Conservatives Are
(Geographically) Dividing, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 7, 21 (Piercarlo
Valdesolo & Jesse Graham eds., 2016).
4
Political Polarization in the American Public: Section 2: Growing Partisan Antipathy, PEW
RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-2-growing-partisanantipathy/.
5
See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What Is Antifa? Explaining the Movement to Confront the Far
Right, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/what-is-antifa.html
(reporting on the movements of “antifa,” a contraction of the word “anti-fascist,” including protests in
Charlottesville that turned violent); Alan Feuer & Jeremy W. Peters, Fringe Groups Revel as Protests
Turn Violent, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/us/politics/whitenationalists-alt-knights-protests-colleges.html (describing various groups’ attempts to mobilize,
including that of the Proud Boys—a clan of conservative nationalists—in New Orleans over the
removal of Confederate monuments).
6
Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 7 (1994);
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN: HOW TO REASON AND ARGUE 2–4 (2018) [hereinafter,
SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN].
7
Levi Boxell et al., Greater Internet Use Is Not Associated with Faster Growth in Political
Polarization Among US Demographic Groups, 114 PNAS 10,612, 10,612–16 (2017); JOSHUA A.
TUCKER ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICAL POLARIZATION, AND POLITICAL DISINFORMATION: A
REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 3–5 (2018), https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
Social-Media-Political-Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-Literature-Review.pdf.
8
Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, The Interactive Effect of Anger and Disgust on
Moral Outrage and Judgments, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2069, 2074 (2013).
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violations. The moral nature of such messages makes them more likely to
capture audiences’ attention10 and intensifies receivers’ emotional
involvement.11 The resulting moral outrage is associated with especially
stubborn political views12 and can even facilitate political violence.13
Recent theorizing suggests that the design of social media platforms
amplifies moral outrage by lowering the social costs associated with
outrage and increasing its personal benefits,14 especially when moral
content interacts with moral sensitivities to shape exposure to social media
and subsequent behavior.15 Thus, moral outrage sparked by messages on
social media and the internet more broadly is likely a crucial factor in
explaining recent alarming trends in societal discourse and their
consequences for increasing polarization and the decay of democratic
norms.
II. MODEL
To understand affective group polarization, we propose a model
describing how a mismatch between our evolutionary past and current
social media amplifies moral outrage in online contexts. This, among other
factors, leads to affective group polarization, involving group antagonism
and dehumanization, which subsequently motivates social behaviors that
directly threaten democracy.

9

Spassena P. Koleva et al., Tracing the Threads: How Five Moral Concerns (Especially Purity)
Help Explain Culture War Attitudes, 46 J. RES. PERSONALITY 184, 191–93 (2012).
10
William J. Brady et al., Attentional Capture Helps Explain Why Moral and Emotional Content
Go Viral, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1, 4 (2019); Ana P. Gantman & Jay J. Van Bavel, The
Moral Pop-Out Effect: Enhanced Perceptual Awareness of Morally Relevant Stimuli, 132 COGNITION
22, 28 (2014).
11
William J. Brady et al., Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks,
114 PNAS 7313, 7316 (2017).
12
Linda J. Skitka et al., Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something
More?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 895, 903 (2005) (testing “the degree that moral
conviction was correlated” with political orientation).
13
ALAN PAGE FISKE & TAGE SHAKTI RAI, VIRTUOUS VIOLENCE: HURTING AND KILLING TO
CREATE, SUSTAIN, END, AND HONOR SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 1–2 (2015) (discussing virtuous violence
theory); Marlon Mooijman et al., Moralization in Social Networks and the Emergence of Violence
During Protests, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 389, 389 (2018).
14
M. J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 769, 769–71
(2017).
15
Richard Huskey et al., Things We Know About Media and Morality, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV.
315, 315 (2018).
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Figure 1: Proposed model of online moral outrage.

Our model begins with some fundamental sources of online moral
outrage. Human psychology developed over evolutionary time in small
communities, where observing egregious acts was a rare and noteworthy
event. By contrast, the modern world, particularly with the development of
social media, supplies a near-constant barrage of material that evokes
moral outrage when political discussions occur. Other features of online
contexts that exacerbate moral outrage include the psychological distance
between conversation partners and the rarity of punitive consequences for
bad behavior,16 as well as the predominantly written nature of online
communication, which can intensify the emotional impact of messages.17 It
was also much harder and more dangerous to leave one’s small community
in evolutionary times than it is to drop out of online exchanges. This
mismatch between the circumstances in which our ancestors evolved and
the online worlds that many of us inhabit today plays a large role in
instigating the problem of moral outrage online.
In the next stage of our model, online moral outrage leads to two
psychological states that characterize affective group polarization: group
antagonism (antipathy toward groups of political opponents)18 and
dehumanization (failure to recognize others’ human mental attributes).19
These psychological states then lead to three distinct social behaviors:
aggression (behavior intended to harm another individual),20 sophistry
16

Crockett, supra note 14, at 769–71.
Huskey et al., supra note 15, at 315; Joseph B. Walther, Computer-Mediated Communication:
Impersonal, Interpersonal, and Hyperpersonal Interaction, 23 COMM. RES. 3, 3–5, 7–8 (1996).
18
Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690, 704 (2015).
19
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 847–48, 850 (2006); Nick Haslam,
Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 252, 252–53 (2006).
20
ROBERT A. BARON & DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HUMAN AGGRESSION (PERSPECTIVES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY) 7 (2d ed. 1994).
17
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21

(using empty, misleading, or irrelevant arguments), and withdrawal
(deliberately avoiding political participation, including voting,
contribution, discussion, or even learning about political issues). These
behaviors can threaten democracy by restricting communication,
cooperation, civic participation, and the ability to react appropriately to
political events.
III. LINKS
In order to test each link in this model, we need to pose a variety of
research questions. We cannot answer any of these questions yet, but
asking them will illuminate the central claims in our model and will show
why we think our model is at least plausible.
A. Does moral content increase moral outrage?
Because moral outrage is triggered when a perceiver of a message
believes an important moral norm has been violated, messages (e.g.,
tweets) without moral information are less likely to elicit moral outrage
than messages that contain information about moral wrongdoing or moral
conflict. In addition, the model of intuitive morality and exemplars
(MIME)22 has shown that effects of social media messages are intensified
when their content addresses violations or upholdings of moral norms that
the audience endorses and sees as important.23 Furthermore, evidence from
communication diffusion models repeatedly suggests that media effects are
a function of both stimulus prevalence and stimulus density over a given
time interval (e.g., the number of communicators or the number of message
repetitions).24 Hence, the high prevalence and density of moral information
and moral conflict in social media could help to explain why social media
trigger such strong emotions.

21
See SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN, supra note 6, at 183–84 (discussing the sophistical
fallacy of misleading others by jumping topics and avoiding the question asked).
22
Ron Tamborini, Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars, in MEDIA AND THE MORAL MIND
43, 43 (Ron Tamborini ed., 2015); Ron Tamborini & René Weber, Advancing the Model of Intuitive
Morality and Exemplars, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION SCIENCE AND BIOLOGY 456, 456
(Kory Floyd & René Weber eds., 2020).
23
Tamborini, Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars, supra note 22, at 50–51; see also
Graham J. Haidt et al., Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, in 47
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 55, 82, 83 (James Olson ed., 2013) (discussing a
study that showed individuals “were more likely . . . to favor those who personified virtues related to”
ideals that are stereotypically valued by the side of the political spectrum with which the individual
identified).
24
See Ronald E. Rice, Intermediality and the Diffusion of Innovations, 43 HUM. COMM. RES. 531,
531 (2017) (discussing the communication diffusion perspective of innovation).
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B. Do social media amplify moral outrage?
Moral outrage has been singled out as especially likely to occur in
online political discourse.25 Although moral outrage can also occur in
face-to-face interactions, several factors exacerbate its effects online.
Offline, people rarely encounter egregious moral violations, but social
media and other technologies allow people to become aware of others’
worst behaviors much more easily. People are highly motivated to express
outrage about immoral actions, which makes such information especially
likely to go viral.26 In addition, expressing outrage is easy online, because
the target of the outrage need not be present, the potential for retaliation is
minimal, and distant targets inspire less empathic concern.27 It is also easy
to express outrage and leave the website without waiting for any response
and, hence, without knowledge of how harmful one’s expression might
have been.
Data from previous studies using experience sampling28 suggest that
people experience more intense outrage in response to immoral events that
they encounter online compared to events that they encounter in person or
via traditional media (e.g., TV, radio, newspaper).29 Spending time on
social media would therefore seem to increase the likelihood of
experiencing strong moral outrage.
These effects might be moderated by other factors, including age and
political ideology. Age is of particular interest in light of recent evidence
that older Americans have shown the greatest increases in group
antagonism in recent years, despite using the internet and social media the
least;30 however, other evidence suggests that older adults who do use
social media are the most polarized.31 Certain demographic groups, such as
older people, may be more vulnerable to the exacerbation of online moral
outrage than others, which may help to explain demographic asymmetries
in polarization. Just as not everyone exposed to a virus will fall ill, not
everyone exposed to partisan content online will be influenced in the same
25

See Crockett, supra note 14, at 769 (explaining how the internet facilitates the spread of moral
outrage).
26
Brady et al., supra note 11, at 7316.
27
Crockett, supra note 14, at 770.
28
MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 21
(2014) (“The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is a research procedure for studying what people do,
feel, and think during their daily lives.”). For examples of studies using experience sampling, see
Crockett, supra note 14, at 770 and Wilhelm Hofmann et al., Morality in Everyday Life, 345 SCIENCE
1340, 1340–41 (2014).
29
Crockett, supra note 14, at 770.
30
Boxell et al., supra note 7, at 10,612.
31
Id.; see also National Politics on Twitter: Small Share of U.S. Adults Produce Majority of
Tweets, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/10/23/national-politics-ontwitter-small-share-of-u-s-adults-produce-majority-of-tweets/ (concluding that older Americans are
tweeting the most about national politics).
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way. Because older adults show changes in brain systems related to
processing social feedback,32 older adults could be differentially
susceptible to online amplification of moral outrage.
The specific mechanisms by which internet usage combines with
evolved characteristics can be further specified. For instance, it is well
documented in the literature that repeated exposure to media, including
social media, influences emotions and behaviors by altering the salience of
moral and political content.33 In a 2010 study by Leidner, Castano, Zaiser,
and Giner-Sorolla, content that emphasized in-group glorification reduced
the demands for justice when a violent perpetrator was an in-group
member.34 Moreover, this effect was mediated by moral disengagement
(de-emphasizing suffering by victims’ families and dehumanizing victims),
which in turn is linked to violence and terrorism.35
The MIME mentioned above suggests that, over time, exposure to a
consistent communication diet emphasizing the superiority of one moral
intuition over another will either increase the salience of the emphasized
intuitions or maintain their salience in the face of opposing influences.
According to the MIME, polarization is expected in relatively closed
systems, where outside influence is limited or blocked (such as in
fundamentalist religious or political groups); whereas self-regulation is
more likely in relatively open systems where external factors exert
opposing forces (as in social media networks with fast and inexpensive
information). The MIME holds that more isolated communicative
networks with insulation from value-inconsistent messages should foster
polarized values within such groups, intensify responses to moral conflicts
between groups, and reduce openness to divergent views. Several studies
have found these predicted effects in media content produced for and
consumed by sub-groups that differ by age, political interest and
orientation, moral intuition salience, culture, location, and dosage of
exposure.36
32

See Lars Bäckman et al., The Correlative Triad Among Aging, Dopamine, and Cognition:
Current Status and Future Prospects, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 791, 797 (2006);
Jean-Claude Dreher et al., Age-Related Changes in Midbrain Dopaminergic Regulation of the Human
Reward System, 105 PNAS 15,106, 15,109 (2008); Ben Eppinger et al., Reduced Striatal Responses to
Reward Prediction Errors in Older Compared with Younger Adults, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9905, 9908
(2013); Shu-Chen Li et al., Dopaminergic Modulation of Cognition Across the Life Span, 34
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 625, 628 (2010).
33
William J. Brady, Killian McLoughlin & Molly J. Crockett, Theory-Driven Measurement of
Emotion (Expressions) in Social Media Text, in THE ATLAS OF LANGUAGE ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY
(Morteza Dehghani & Ryan Boyd eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17).
34
Bernhard Leidner et al., Ingroup Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice in the
Context of Collective Violence, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1115, 1116 (2010).
35
E.g., Alfred L. McAlister et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military
Force: The Impact of September 11, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 141, 162–63 (2006).
36
For an overview, see Tamborini & Weber, supra note 22, at 457–58.
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C. Does digital outrage increase group antagonism?
Antagonism is not mere partisan disagreement. It involves hatred of
political opponents in contrast to civil, substantive disputes about values
and policies.37 Our model concerns antagonism rather than civil
disagreement.
Antagonism is related to moral outrage in that they both involve
intensely negative emotions. However, whereas moral outrage is usually a
response to an individual person or behavior, political antagonism is often
directed against groups. Such political group antagonism is characterized
by feelings of hostility towards the other political party and by beliefs that
the other party is dangerous or evil. What began as a negative feeling
towards an individual person or act grows into antagonism to their entire
group.
D. Does digital outrage lead to dehumanization?
Dehumanization is a process of denying a person abilities and
tendencies that are typical of human mental life.38 It is distinct from
antagonism in that it is possible to hate someone without dehumanizing
them and vice versa.39 However, we hypothesize that antagonism and
dehumanization can feed one another and co-occur in the context of
contentious political discourse online.
Dehumanization takes two distinct forms: a target can be denied
agency (the ability to make reasonable decisions) or feeling (the ability to
suffer). 40 People see the other side as “less than human”41 either in their
ability to reason or in their ability to feel pain. Both kinds of
dehumanization can be a consequence of moral outrage, largely because of
its emotional element of disgust, which is associated with
37
Shanto Iyengar et al., Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76
PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 405, 408, 421 (2012).
38
Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 252, 252, 254 (2006); see also Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of
the Low: Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 847 (2006) (“[W]e
present new social neuroscience data indicating that extreme forms of prejudice may deny their targets
even full humanity.”).
39
Tage S. Rai et al., Dehumanization Increases Instrumental Violence, but Not Moral
Violence, 114 PNAS 8511, 8514–15 (2017).
40
See Mengyao Li, Bernhard Leidner & Emanuele Castano, Toward a Comprehensive Taxonomy
of Dehumanization: Integrating Two Senses of Humanness, Mind Perception Theory, and Stereotype
Content Model, 21 TPM 285, 287 (2014) (defining “agency” as “the capacity for planning and acting”
and defining “experience” as “the capacity for desires and feelings”). For further discussion of
experience and agency, see Heather M. Gray et al., Dimensions of Mind Perception, 315 SCIENCE 619,
619 (2007).
41
Madeleine Dalsklev & Jonas Rønningsdalen Kunst, The Effect of Disgust-Eliciting Media
Portrayals on Outgroup Dehumanization and Support of Deportation in a Norwegian Sample, 47 INT’L
J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 28, 29 (2015).
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42

dehumanization. Studies have also found that communication by text as
opposed to voice leads to greater dehumanization,43 so the fact that most
online communication takes the form of writing might increase its
contribution to dehumanization.
On the other hand, recent evidence suggests that people do not
dehumanize the victims of violence when those victims are perceived as
immoral, which is likely to be the case in the context of political conflict.44
Perceiving someone as immoral in fact usually requires perceiving them as
having nefarious or malicious intentions, which are human mental states.
Merely humanizing opponents by ascribing some mental states to them is
then not enough to forestall antagonism and aggression towards them.45
Beliefs that they have bad intentions can instead make their suffering seem
less aversive and increase antagonism and aggression towards them.46 In
this way, inaccurate perceptions of others’ mental states can sometimes be
just as pernicious as dehumanization.
The sources of group antagonism and dehumanization need to be
determined in order to design remedies. Many proposed interventions on
affective group polarization (such as those designed to increase empathy
for political opponents) are predicated on the assumption that affective
polarization leads people to spontaneously generate limited, simplistic
theories about their opponents’ motivations or emotions. These
interventions are unlikely to succeed if their assumptions are inaccurate.47
E. How can we test these links?
To verify or falsify these assumptions, we need to measure
relationships among outrage, group antagonism, and dehumanization
among social media users. This task can now be approached with tools that
have become available only recently, such as natural language processing48
42

Id. at 29, 37–38; Katrina M. Fincher & Philip E. Tetlock, Perceptual Dehumanization of Faces
Is Activated by Norm Violations and Facilitates Norm Enforcement, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
131, 132 (2016); Harris & Fiske, supra note 38, at 852.
43
Juliana Schroeder et al., The Humanizing Voice: Speech Reveals, and Text Conceals, a More
Thoughtful Mind in the Midst of Disagreement, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1745, 1746, 1760 (2017).
44
Rai et al., supra note 39, at 8513–14.
45
Id. at 8512.
46
Id. at 8511–12.
47
See Scott Barry Kaufman, Can Empathic Concern Actually Increase Political Polarization?,
SCI. AM . (Nov. 6, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/beautiful-minds/can-empathic-concernactually-increase-political-polarization/ (discussing how biases are likely to increase hostility toward
the “outgroup”).
48
Frederic R. Hopp et al., The Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD): Development
and Applications of a Crowd-Sourced Approach to Extracting Moral Intuitions from Text, BEHAV. RES.
METHODS 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-020-01433-0; CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING &
HINRICH SCHÜTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 4 (1999); Eyal
Sagi & Morteza Dehghani, Measuring Moral Rhetoric in Text, 32 SOC. SCI . COMPUTER REV. 132, 142
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49

and supervised learning classification. We predict that these tools can be
used to uncover a positive relationship between expressions of moral
outrage online and language that expresses antagonism towards groups and
that dehumanizes opponents, such as by referring to them as animals.50 We
also predict that social reinforcement of expressions of moral outrage (in
the form of “likes” and “retweets”) will increase subsequent use of
antagonistic and dehumanizing language in online discourse so that
participants who receive the greatest amount of positive social feedback
when they express moral outrage in their social media posts will show the
highest levels of antagonism and dehumanization. Evidence for these
predictions would support the corresponding links in our model between
online moral outrage and the two psychological mediators: group
antagonism and dehumanization.
F. Does online moral outrage lead to aggression?
Our model’s next set of research questions asks whether moral outrage,
through the mediators of both group antagonism and dehumanization, will
lead to certain behaviors. Our model focuses on three actions: aggression,
sophistry, and withdrawal.
To understand online aggression, recall that moral outrage begins as a
negative emotional reaction to a single individual’s act,51 whereas
antagonism is directed towards a group.52 The transition from moral
outrage to antagonism thus involves the spreading of negative feeling from
one person to their entire group.
Anger at outgroups is associated with prejudice53 and has been shown
to be related specifically to disliking political outgroups more and
tolerating them less.54 Therefore, higher levels of moral outrage tend to
lead to higher levels of prejudice and intolerance towards groups

(2013); René Weber et al., Extracting Latent Moral Information from Text Narratives: Relevance,
Challenges, and Solutions, 12 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES 119, 124, 137 (2018).
49
Brady, McLoughlin & Crockett, supra note 33 (manuscript at 6–9).
50
See, e.g., Florian Arendt & Narin Karadas, Content Analysis of Mediated Associations: An
Automated Text-Analytic Approach, 11 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES 105, 112 (2017) (analyzing the
use of animal-related terms over a four-month period to demonstrate the dehumanization of Muslims in
German news coverage of Islam).
51
See Salerno & Peter-Hagene, supra note 8, at 2069 (closely linking moral outrage with anger).
52
See Giulia Evolvi, #Islamexit: Inter-Group Antagonism on Twitter, 22 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y
386, 397 (2019) (studying group antagonism through anti-Muslim tweets during the Brexit debate in
the United Kingdom).
53
Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence of Specific
Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585, 589 (2009).
54
Linda J. Skitka et al., Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 743, 754 (2004).
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associated with the particular source of the moral outrage and then to
representatives of those groups.
As a result, it seems likely that increased group antagonism will make
people more willing to act aggressively to individual members of opposing
groups based on group membership. Similarly, previous research has found
that dehumanization is strongly associated with aggression, such that when
a person perceives opponents as lacking feeling, they become more willing
to inflict harm against opponents through bullying or harassment.55
Therefore, dehumanization, particularly a lack of concern for the feelings
of the target, would also seem to lead to aggression, at least in some cases.
G. Does online moral outrage increase sophistry?
Moral outrage also seems to lead people to engage in sophistry, or bad
arguments, partly because one component of outrage is anger, which
impairs judgment and decision making.56 Ideally, the purpose of presenting
arguments is to increase understanding of opposing points of view
(including why others hold those positions) as well as to influence beliefs
and attitudes on both sides of a controversy.57 However, for many people
talking about politics in social media, the focus is instead on competition
and provocation (beating opponents by embarrassing, exhausting, or
bewildering them) or theater (appearing more intelligent to observers who
are allies or potential allies).58 Even when people intend to create good
arguments against opposing positions (or for their own), they often miss
their targets because of a simplistic understanding of their opponents. This
tendency seems to be exacerbated by higher levels of antagonism and
dehumanization, which leads people to adopt a competitive or theatrical
mindset during political discussions online, resulting in sophistry.
H. Does online moral outrage motivate withdrawal?
For the same reasons that moral outrage is galvanizing for some
people, it leads others to withdraw from politics.59 Intense animus can be
overwhelming and unpleasant and will motivate many people to withdraw
55
Albert Bandura et al., Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and
Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. RES. PERSONALITY 253, 266 (1975); Brock Bastian et al., The Roles of
Dehumanization and Moral Outrage in Retributive Justice, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 9 (2013).
56
Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal
Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115, 132 (2006).
57
SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN, supra note 6, at 56.
58
See, e.g., Ashley A. Anderson & Heidi E. Huntington, Social Media, Science, and Attack
Discourse: How Twitter Discussions of Climate Change Use Sarcasm and Incivility, 39 SCI. COMM.
598, 600 (2017) (analyzing the use of sarcastic or uncivilized rhetoric in online discourse surrounding
climate change).
59
Elizabeth A. Bennett et al., Disavowing Politics: Civic Engagement in an Era of Political
Skepticism, 119 AM. J. SOC. 518, 518–19 (2013).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1120

[Vol. 52:3
60

in order to avoid or reduce associated negative emotions. It is not clear
what leads one person to become aggressive and another person to
withdraw, but various individual differences might moderate these effects,
such as the degree to which people experience moral outrage as unpleasant.
In any case, antagonism and dehumanization by politically active people
seem to lead some people into cynicism or apathy about politics. Just as
many people effortfully avoid feeling sympathy for widespread suffering
out of a desire to avoid emotional exhaustion,61 so many people are
motivated to avoid engaging with politics in order to keep from
experiencing the hostility that characterizes contemporary partisan politics.
They see politics as unpleasant, difficult, and exhausting; they foresee few
compensating benefits for engaging in political activity, especially because
of the sophistry and vicious attacks that characterize so much of political
discourse online. For such reasons, both antagonism and dehumanization
seem to lead many people to withdraw from politics—and understandably
so.
IV. IMPACT
Many claims in our model remain speculations in need of further
empirical support, but it could prove important and useful. If even
approximately correct, our proposed model and its further specifications
could illuminate the sources of many unpleasant psychological states and
politically harmful behaviors on social media and elsewhere. It could help
us understand an important social problem by providing a greater sense of
the emotional and cognitive factors that lead people to behave badly when
engaging in politics online. Because we need to understand a problem
before we can solve it, our model could also potentially guide interventions
that reduce political polarization and ensuing social problems.
All of this remains to be seen, because our model so far is only that: a
hypothesized model—an educated guess. We would never claim to have
established it as accurate. Much more research needs to be done to test it.
All we can claim for now is that we find it plausible, promising, and
potentially useful. We hope that others do, too.

60

Id.
C. Daryl Cameron & B. Keith Payne, Escaping Affect: How Motivated Emotion Regulation
Creates Insensitivity to Mass Suffering, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 2–3 (2011).
61
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Institutional corruption refers to actions that are legal yet carry negative
consequences for the greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been
observed among politicians and donors who establish quid-pro-quo relationships
in exchange for money and among doctors who receive gifts from pharmaceutical
companies in return for recommending the companies’ drugs. How does the
general public reconcile the tension between the legal status of an action and its
impact on the greater good and judge the action’s moral acceptability? We
explored this question empirically by comparing the relative weight people give to
the legal status of actions and to the impact of actions when judging moral
acceptability. Results show that people unequivocally rely on legal status and
ignore the impact of the actions. We conclude that people outsource their moral
judgments to the law. The law does not simply reflect people’s sense of corruption
but determines it. Together, our research suggests a surprising and ironic role for
the law: that it diminishes independent, critical thinking.
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How People Judge Institutional Corruption
ELINOR AMIT *, EUGY HAN **, ANN-CHRISTIN POSTEN ***
& STEVEN SLOMAN ****
Former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, Martin Shkreli, gained a high
profile in 2015 when he purchased the rights to a lifesaving HIV drug,
Daraprim, and hiked up its price by more than 5000%.1 While such acts of
price gouging can often be observed in business, Shkreli’s act created
controversy because Daraprim is on the World Health Organization’s List
of Essential Medicines.2 Though Shkreli was heavily criticized, he justified
his actions with the response: “[E]verything we’ve done is legal.”3 Shkreli
was right. His actions, potentially ruining the lives of a large number of
people, were legal. And he was not alone. Legal actions that result in
terrible consequences are, in fact, quite common, from pharmaceutical
companies partnering with doctors to prescribe their more expensive
drugs,4 to politicians who establish quid-pro-quo relationships with donors
who anonymously give them unlimited amounts of money,5 to the
*

Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Israel.
Brown University.
***
University of Cologne; University of Limerick.
****
Brown University.
1
Robert Mclean, Turing Cuts Hospital Price for Drug It Hiked 5,000%, CNNMONEY (Nov. 25,
2015,
8:17
AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/companies/turing-pharmaceuticalsdaraprim-price-drop/.
2
Id.
3
See ROBERT B. REICH, THE COMMON GOOD 10 (2018) (describing Shkreli’s response to
criticism of the Daraprim price hike); Richard Mark Kirkner, Drug Pricing Regulation Pushed from
Many Sides, MANAGED CARE, Jan. 2016, at 14, 15 (noting criticism of Shkreli and Turing by 2016
presidential candidates and Merck CEO).
4
See Lisa Cosgrove & Robert Whitaker, Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption: Lessons
from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 16–19 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 9,
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261375 (explaining how relationships
between doctors and pharmaceutical companies create conflicts of interest and worsen quality of care);
BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS 316
(2012) (describing how senior doctors were paid by pharmaceutical companies to promote their drugs,
changing the prescribing behavior of other doctors).
5
See Elinor Amit et al., Institutional Corruption Revisited: Exploring Open Questions Within the
Institutional Corruption Literature, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 447, 453 (2017) (explaining how the
current United States campaign finance system results in the “donor class” exerting a disproportionate
political influence); Girish J. Gulati, Super PACs and Financing the 2012 Presidential Election, 49
SOCIETY 409, 409 (2012) (explaining that the relationship between candidates and donors threatens
democratic governance and creates opportunities for corruption); Jonathan Mendilow & Michael
Brogan, Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in Government in the United States, in CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 59, 62 (Jonathan Mendilow
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President of the United States who does not shy away from conflicts of
interest by maintaining control over his private business while in office.6
All of these examples have one thing in common: the action is legal yet
carries negative consequences for the greater good.
Tension between the legal status of an action and its impact on the
greater good poses a particular type of challenge when judging its moral
acceptability. In a democratic society, laws are expected to represent the
interests of its people, protect the greater good from individual
misconducts, or at the very least not harm the society. While this is usually
true, lawmakers cannot foresee each and every incident in which the law
will be relevant. As a result, some legal behaviors may end up harming the
greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been observed in
research, design, manufacturing, and marketing processes of new products
and policies released by various institutions.7 For instance, gaming
companies use legal yet socially irresponsible marketing strategies and
tactics to target vulnerable populations and encourage gambling.8
In the farming industry, hog, poultry, and cattle farms often use legal
antibiotics as a feed additive to stimulate artificial growth in their
livestock.9 Through overuse, these antibiotics eventually become
ineffective for bacterial infections, which people often contract through
meat consumption and drinking infected water.10 As more and more
antibiotics are becoming ineffective, new, usually more expensive, drugs
have to be developed, leaving many individuals with no viable methods of
treatment.11 This is one of many deadly but legal12 practices exercised by
the farming industry. Big factory farming industries often lobby for
& Ilan Peleg eds., 2016) (noting that a quid pro quo between donors and politicians is the “most
flagrant form of political corruption”).
6
Steve Reilly et al., Did Trump Keep His 19 Promises to Insulate Himself from His Business?
Only
He
Knows.,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/politics/2019/03/18/president-donald-trumps-promises-didnt-end-businessentanglements/3030377002/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2019, 9:08 PM).
7
See Nikos Passas, Lawful but Awful: ‘Legal corporate crimes’, 34 J. SOCIO-ECON. 771, 777
(2005) (noting that the activities of several industries generate “hidden costs” that are mainly borne by
the least privileged); John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Legalized Gambling: An Economic Approach, in
IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 115, 124
(Nikos Passas & Neva Goodwin eds., 2004) (explaining how the gambling industry targets lower
income individuals and encourages excessive gambling by “consistent gamblers”).
8
June Buchanan et al., The Marketing of Legal but Potentially Harmful Products and Corporate
Social Responsibility: The Gaming Industry View, 4 INT’L J. INTERDISC. SOC. SCI. 81, 84 (2009).
9
Mallory Russo, Food for Thought: Analyzing the Impacts of Livestock Factory Farming in the
United States 40 (May 15, 2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Fordham University) (on file with Fordham
University Libraries); Mark Ritchie, The High Price of Cheap Food, in IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T
RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 178, 180 (Nikos Passas & Neva
Goodwin eds., 2010).
10
Ritchie, supra note 9, at 185.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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government regulations and laws that can profit their operations, allowing
them to sustain inadequate facilities and exploit environmental resources.13
These actions lead to irreversible consequences such as extinction of
species, deadly working conditions for workers (e.g., farm workers are
exposed to harmful chemicals and may die from asphyxiation), land and
soil degradation, water contamination, and exacerbation or climate
change.14 While such practices adhere to legal requirements, they bring
harm of various degrees to society.
How do people resolve this conflict and judge the moral acceptability
of legal yet harmful actions? This question is important, because people’s
moral judgments determine a wide variety of behaviors, from purchasing
products,15 to protesting against companies,16 to voting for or against
politicians in public elections.17
In recent years there has been a growing interest in behaviors which
are legal yet harm the greater good, collectively labeled as “institutional
corruption.”18 According to the classic definition by Lessig (2013):
Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic
and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently
ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by
diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to
achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution
or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.19
A surge of research on institutional corruption in the past decade has
examined its manifestations in various domains, including: the
pharmaceutical industry,20 psychiatry,21 food production and distribution
13

Russo, supra note 9, at 35.
Id. at 16, 43.
15
See Johannes Brinkmann, Looking at Consumer Behavior in a Moral Perspective, 51 J. BUS.
ETHICS 129, 129 (2004) (claiming that “business ethics and consumer behavior could profit from
further development of their overlap”); Oliver M. Freestone & Peter J. McGoldrick, Motivations of the
Ethical Consumer, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 445, 445 (2008) (discussing the rise of consumer action “in the
form of boycott activity, pressure groups and other forms of consumer activism”).
16
Norman E. Bowie & Thomas W. Dunfee, Confronting Morality in Markets, 38 J. BUS. ETHICS
381, 385, 389 (2002).
17
See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 1–2 (2011) (arguing the moral significance and
ethical implications of voting).
18
See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 448 (describing the increased scholarly attention to institutional
corruption). Lessig provides a definition for institutional corruption in Lawrence Lessig, Foreword:
“Institutional Corruption” Defined, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 2, 2 (2013).
19
Lessig, supra note 18, at 553 (emphasis added).
20
See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over
doctors); see also Garry C. Gray, The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Research Funding: A Social
Organization Approach, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 629, 629 (2013) (illustrating the subtle ways
pharmaceutical industry funding influences medical research); Donald W. Light, From Institutional
14
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23

companies, and political campaigns. For example, research on the
pharmaceutical industry has revealed that funding from drug companies
influences medical researchers to produce favorable reviews of the
company’s products, thus enabling a significant number of harmful drugs
to reach the market.24 This undermines pharmaceutical companies’ mission
of improving patient care and public health and promoting drug safety.25
Similarly, in the field of psychiatry, financial conflicts of interest have
compromised biomedical research, teaching, and practice.26 Organizations
such as the American Psychiatric Association (APA) receive substantial
funding from the drug industry, and many of the individuals who serve as
diagnostic panel members have ties with the drug industry.27 “Industry
financial relationships can . . . affect researchers’ and clinicians’ behavior
in subtle ways” potentially influencing “decisions about the criteria for and
measurement of diagnoses.”28
Institutional corruption has also been observed in political
campaigns.29 For instance, the creation of super political action committees
(super PACs) in 2010 sparked significant controversy, as committees were
allowed to receive and spend unlimited sums of money on independent
Corruption to Pharmageddon?, 1 LAB DISPATCHES 69, 69–70 (2013) (reviewing David Healy’s
observation that the FDA and pharmaceutical companies have major influence over the medical
industry); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for
Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012) (“Physician relations with pharmaceutical firms are a
source of conflicts of interest that can bias their prescriptions and advice.”).
21
See ROBERT WHITAKER & LISA COSGROVE, PSYCHIATRY UNDER THE INFLUENCE:
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION, SOCIAL INJURY, AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORM 4 (2015) (examining
the societal impacts of the psychiatry field); Lisa Cosgrove & Emily E. Wheeler, Industry’s
Colonization of Psychiatry: Ethical and Practical Implications of Financial Conflicts of Interest in the
DSM-5, 23 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 93, 93 (2013) (arguing that modern psychiatry has been captured by
the pharmaceutical industry); Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets:
Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571,
574 (2013) (highlighting how new anti-psychotic drugs dominate the market despite being more
expensive and less effective than older drugs).
22
See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 450 (discussing the case of Del Monte Foods); see also Sylvia
Rowe et al., Funding Food Science and Nutrition Research: Financial Conflicts and Scientific
Integrity, 67 NUTRITION REVIEWS 264, 264–65 (2009) (describing issues of conflict and scientific bias
in the food industry); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science:
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. &
MED. 119, 142 (2004) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration’s conflict policy).
23
See sources cited supra note 5; see also Malcolm S. Salter, Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and
the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector 2, 24 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
11-060, 2010) (describing the scope and size of private money influencing Congress).
24
See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over
doctors).
25
See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing institutional corruption).
26
Cosgrove & Wheeler, supra note 21, at 94.
27
Id. at 102.
28
Id. at 97.
29
Gulati, supra note 5, at 409.
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campaigning in support of or in opposition to political candidates.30
Politicians receiving unlimited anonymous donations from super PACs
suggested that there could be a disproportionate influence on policy and
electoral outcomes.31
Despite its importance, determining which behaviors fall under the
category of institutional corruption is challenging. Even amongst experts
there is disagreement over what counts as institutional corruption. In a
survey we conducted, a set of ten scenarios that represent different facets
of institutional corruption was presented to members of the Edmond J.
Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University—all of whom were experts
on the topic of institutional corruption research. These scenarios covered
topics that are relevant for the concept of institutional corruption in various
settings and were selected based on the research of the fellows of the
center. In this survey, the experts were asked to judge whether the
scenarios represent institutional corruption. For half of the scenarios we
presented, 30% of the subjects or more thought that they do not represent
instances of institutional corruption. The results illustrate the challenge in
clearly identifying instances of institutional corruption, even by experts.
The current paper is concerned with how the public morally judge
instances of institutional corruption. We bring evidence that institutional
corruption is perceived as more morally acceptable than criminal behavior,
even when the portrayed action is identical except for its legal status.
Moreover, although people’s moral judgments are sensitive to information
about the legal status of the action—what we henceforth deem the
distinguishing characteristic between institutional corruption and criminal
action—people are not sensitive to information about the magnitude of the
harm caused by the action. Thus, cases of institutional corruption with
horrible consequences are judged as more morally acceptable than criminal
actions with benign consequences. Together, our research suggests a
surprising and ironic role for the law: that it diminishes independent,
critical thinking. While criminal actions that have mildly negative
consequences can be construed as immoral, institutional corruption will be
seen as moral despite having terrible consequences.
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The following experiments were designed to investigate how people
judge institutional corruption versus criminal actions. Moral scenarios
were presented, and people judged the moral acceptability of the action of
a protagonist. We varied whether an action was institutional corruption or
criminal by manipulating the legal status of the action: for the “institutional
30
31

Id. at 410.
Id. at 409.
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corruption” group the action was presented as legal, and for the “criminal
behavior” group the action was presented as illegal. All the presented
actions had a negative impact on the greater good. Additionally, we varied
the severity of the direct consequences of the actions. Research shows that
actions with bad consequences are judged as less morally acceptable than
those with less bad consequences.32 We therefore wanted to rule out the
possibility that people’s judgments are contingent on a particular outcome.
A. Experiment 1A
1. Participants and Design
Participants were 131 MTurkers (75 females; Mage = 34.06, SD =
11.15) who participated in exchange for payment. The participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs.
Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Large) between-subjects design. In this and
all subsequent studies: (A) we set a sample size based on previous research
that had used similar methods and stimuli33; (B) our only a-priori selection
criteria was recruiting subjects residing in the United States; and (C) we
did not exclude any subject from the analysis. Any gap between the
number of subjects recruited and reported in the “Participants” section and
the final analysis are due to incompletion of the questionnaire by subjects
(less than 0.5% of the recruited subjects in each experiment).
2. Procedure
Subjects were asked to read three scenarios that described actions of a
protagonist. Half of the subjects were informed that this action is legal, and
the other half that it is illegal. In each of these groups, half of the subjects
were informed that the action is slightly harmful and the other half that it is
significantly harmful. After reading each scenario, the subjects were asked
whether the actions of the protagonist are morally permissible on a scale
that ranged between 1 (completely impermissible) to 7 (completely
permissible). The subjects were subsequently asked whether the action of
the protagonist is legal on a scale that ranged from 1 (completely legal) to
7 (completely illegal) and how would they rate the impact of the action on
a scale that ranged from 1 (negligible impact) to 7 (strong impact). Finally,
in this and all subsequent experiments, subjects were asked several
demographic questions, including gender, age, whether they live in the
32
See, e.g., Elinor Amit & Joshua D. Greene, You See, the Ends Don’t Justify the Means: Visual
Imagery and Moral Judgment, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 861, 861 (2012) (discussing how a consequentialist
judgment that “favor[s] the greater good” is often deemed to be more morally salient); Jonathan Baron,
Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 3 (1994).
33
Elinor Amit, Jonathan Koralnik & Ann-Christin Posten, Mental Imagery of Institutional
Corruption (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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United States, what is their native language, level of education, income
(range), whether they support federal regulation, how liberal versus
conservative they are with regards to economic and social issues, and who
they voted for in the last election.
The three scenarios are presented below. In the following scenarios,
legal actions appear in the text; illegal in parentheses. Big impact appears
in the text; small impact in parentheses.
i.

Scenario 1 (hospital)

Suppose there is a head of a hospital network who receives money
from a pharmaceutical company to give a talk. The head of the network
then contemplates changing the hospital network’s electronic drug
prescribing system from prescribing generic drugs as the default to
prescribing brand name drugs as the default. Changing the default option
from generic to brand name drugs has been shown to increase the
percentage of brand name drugs prescribed. While the brand name drug is
effectively identical to the generic, the brand name costs patients and
insurance companies more, and earns the drug company more. The hospital
director decides to change the electronic drug prescribing system to make
brand name drugs the default. The increase in the percentage of brand
name drugs prescribed causes patients and insurance companies to pay
significantly (slightly) more for medications. According to the State
Medical Board, it is legal for doctors to accept payments from
pharmaceutical companies of up to $10,000 ($4000). The pharmaceutical
company paid the doctor $7000.
ii.

Scenario 2 (coal)

Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) sets limits on certain pollutants. State governments can choose to
make the state laws stricter than those of the EPA, though no state can
have more lenient laws than those of the EPA. Suppose there is a CEO of a
coal factory who is deciding whether to increase the energy produced by
the plant. In order to produce energy, the factory burns fossil fuels, which
emit air pollution into the surrounding towns. Notably, the percentage of
residents in the closest town that have asthma is significantly (slightly)
greater than the national average. According to the state law, it is legal for
the coal factory to emit up to 40,000 (20,000) tons per year. The CEO
decides to increase the factory’s air pollution emission to approximately
30,000 tons per year to meet his energy goals.
iii.

Scenario 3 (army)

Suppose there is a retired army general who serves as a director at a
defense contractor and also advises the Department of Defense (DoD). As
a director of a defense contractor, his job is to advocate for the weapons his
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company produces. However, as an advisor, his job is to help find and
purchase the most effective weaponry for the United States Army. The
American military relies on the Department of Defense to choose top
quality weapons. The general advises the DoD in favor of choosing his
company’s products and the Department decides to follow his advice.
Notably, some of the weapons sold by his company may not be the most
cost-effective choices. Because of the cost of these weapons, the Army will
have to significantly (slightly) decrease the budgets of other agencies.
According to federal law, it is legal for DoD advisors to withhold
information about conflicts of interest on purchases under $30 ($20)
billion. The general advises the DoD to purchase his weapons from his
defense contractor for $25 billion.
3. Analyses and Results
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with
legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as factors, and moral
judgment, legality judgment and impact judgment as dependent measures.
The results show that the legal status of the action affected moral
judgments such that actions that were legal were judged to be more
morally permissible than actions that are illegal (Ms = 3.5 and 2.08,
respectively); F (1, 127) = 35.38, p < .001, η² = .22. In contrast, the
severity of the consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment
(Ms = 2.8 and 2.8, respectively); F (1, 127) = 0.02, p = .877. There was no
interaction between legality and consequences F (1, 127) = 0.19, p = .663.
Legal actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.2
and 6.02, respectively); F (1, 127) = 87.23, p < .001, η² = .4. Legality also
affected perceived impact: legal actions were perceived to have smaller
impact than illegal actions (Ms = 5.09 and 4.6, respectively); F (1, 127) =
3.94, p < .049, η² = .03.
In order to further explore the results, we investigated whether political
orientation affects the relative weight people give to legality versus
morality. Among our 131 subjects, 48 mentioned that in the 2016
presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 33 for Donald
Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other names). For the ease
of interpretation of the effect of political orientation on moral judgments,
we analyzed only subjects who endorsed Clinton or Trump. The results
show that legal actions were judged as more morally acceptable than
illegal actions (Ms = 3.43 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73) = 22.98, p <
.0001, η² = .23. The rest of the effects were not significant. Thus, political
orientation did not affect moral judgments nor interact with legality or
impact.
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B. Experiment 1B
1. Overview
In Experiment 1B, we replicated the procedure of Experiment 1A
using a different set of scenarios.
2. Participants and Design
Participants were 130 MTurkers (79 females; Mage = 36.98, SD =
11.90) who participated for a payment in the experiment. The participants
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality:
Legal vs. Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design.
3. Procedure
The method of Experiment 1B was identical to that of 1A, with a
different set of scenarios. The scenarios used in this experiment appear
below. In the following scenarios legal actions appear in the text; illegal in
parentheses. Big impact appears in the text; small impact in parentheses.
i.

Scenario 1 (CEO)

Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide
whether to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is
often used in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is
cost-effective; using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The
CEO decides to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA
consumption is significantly (slightly) correlated with an increased health
risk of headaches and nausea. According to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), it is legal to sell foods containing up to 2 mg (1.5
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg
of ABA.
ii.

Scenario 2 (scientist)

Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine.
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also
reveal a significant (slight) correlation between using this drug and
experiencing various side effects, such as increased blood pressure. The
scientist decides to re-run the studies that had the best results. These results
confirm the positive findings from before. The scientist only publishes the
positive results in the medical literature. The FDA approves the drug.
According to the FDA, it is legal for scientists investigating the safety of
prescription drugs to exclude up to 30% (20%) of their results. The
scientist excluded 25% of their results.
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Scenario 3 (prison)

Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison.
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support
system of family and friends leads to a significant (slight) increase in their
rates of recidivism. According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons
to transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to
send some to prisons up to 150 miles away.
4. Analyses and Results
As in Experiment 1A, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as
dependent measures. The results show that the legal status of the action
affected moral judgments such that legal actions were perceived as more
morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.48 and 1.76, respectively);
F (1, 126) = 50.91, p < .001, η² = .29. In contrast, the severity of the
consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment (Ms = 2.53 and
2.71, respectively); F (1, 126) = 0.60, p = .44. There was no interaction
between legality and consequences F (1, 126) = 0.38, p = .54. Legality
affected perceived legality, such that legal actions were perceived as more
legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.19 and 6.22, respectively); F (1, 126) =
93.2, p < .0001, η² = .42. No other effect was significant.
As in Experiment 1A, in order to further explore the results, we
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people
give to legality versus morality. Among our 130 subjects, 58 mentioned
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and
29 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other
names). As in Experiment 1A, we analyzed only subjects who endorsed
Clinton or Trump. The results show that legal actions were judged as more
morally acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 4.02 and 1.79, respectively);
F (1, 79) = 57.14, p < .0001, η² = .42. Subjects who endorsed Clinton
judged the behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed
Trump (Ms = 2.54 and 3.28, respectively); F (1, 79) = 6.36, p < .014, η²
=.075. We also found a significant interaction between voting and
outcomes. For Clinton voters, when the outcome was small, the behavior
was judged as more morally acceptable than when the outcome was large
(Ms = 3.09 and 1.98, respectively, p < .001). For Trump voters, there was
no significant difference between small and large outcomes (Ms = 1.18 and
3.38, respectively, p < .68). The rest of the effects were not significant.
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C. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we used the same basic design of Experiment 1, and
manipulated legality (legal, illegal) and impact (big, small). The main
difference was that in Experiment 2 we described impacts as distinct
outcomes (e.g., diabetes versus skin rash).
1. Participants and Design
Participants were 132 MTurkers (85 females; Mage = 36.75, SD =
12.10) who were paid for participation. The participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs. Illegal) x
2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design.
2. Procedure
The method of Experiment 2 was identical to that of 1B, except that
impact was described as distinct outcomes. In the following scenarios legal
actions appear in the text; illegal actions appear in parentheses. Big impact
appears in the text; small impact appears in parentheses.
i.

Scenario 1 (CEO)

Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide whether
to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is often used
in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is cost-effective;
using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The CEO decides
to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA consumption is
correlated with an increased health risk of diabetes (skin rashes).
According to the FDA, it is legal to sell food containing up to 2 mg (1.5
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg
of ABA.
ii.

Scenario 2 (scientist)

Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine.
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also
reveal a correlation between using this drug and experiencing side effects
such as irregular heart rhythms (headaches). The scientist decides to re-run
the studies that had the best results. These results confirm the positive
findings from before. The scientist only publishes the positive results in the
medical literature. The FDA approves the drug. According to the FDA, it is
legal for scientists investigating the safety of prescription drugs to exclude
up to 30% (20%) of their results. The scientist excluded 25% of their
results.
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Scenario 3 (prison)

Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison.
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support
system of family and friends leads to an increase in the rate of prisoners
returning to committing felonies such as burglaries (misdemeanors such as
shoplifting). According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons to
transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to send
some to prisons up to 150 miles away.
3. Analyses and Results
As in Experiment 1, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as
dependent measures. The results show that subjects used only legality to
determine the moral permissibility of the actions, such that they judged
legal actions to be more morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.1
and 1.69, respectively); F (1, 128) = 44.04, p < .001, η² = .26. There was
no effect of consequences (Ms = 2.39 and 2.48), F (1, 128) = 0.13, p =
.715, and impact did not interact with legality, F (1, 128) = 0.07, p = .932.
Legality affected the perceived legality of the action, such that legal
actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.08 and
6.23, respectively); F (1, 128) = 98.42, p < .001, η² = .43. Finally, when
asked about the severity of consequences, subjects estimated illegal actions
to be more severe than legal actions (Ms = 5.58 and 4.82, respectively); F
(1, 128) = 8.76, p = .004, η² = .06. Unlike the pretest, here, where subjects
were given information about legality, the consequences did not affect the
judged severity of 10 consequences, F (1, 128) = 0.32, p = .58, nor was
there an interaction, F (1, 128) = 0.44, p = .51.
As in Experiment 1, in order to further explore the results, we
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people
give to legality versus morality. Among our 132 subjects, 45 mentioned
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and
36 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other
names). The results show that legal actions were judged as more morally
acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 3.41 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73)
= 26.16, p < .0001, η² = .26. Subjects who endorsed Clinton judged the
behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed Trump (Ms
= 3.01 and 2.29, respectively); F (1, 73) = 5.91, p < .018, η² = .075. The
remaining effects were not significant.
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Figure 1. People rely on legality when judging moral permissibility of
actions. Subjects judged the moral permissibility of actions that are either
legal or illegal. In Experiment 1a (Fig 1A) and 1b (Fig 1B), the impact of
the action was defined as having “slightly” or “significantly” negative
consequences. In Experiment 2 (Fig 1C) the impact was manipulated as
different outcomes that a pretest showed were considered severe or not
(e.g., diabetes vs. skin rashes). In all experiments, subjects judged the legal
actions as more morally permissible than the illegal actions, suggesting
outsourcing of moral judgment to the Community of Knowledge.
II. GENERAL DISCUSSION: THE LAW AS A SHORTCUT FOR MORAL
JUDGMENT
The current research shows that people judge institutional corruption
as more morally acceptable than criminal actions, even when the portrayed
events are identical. Moreover, our data suggest that the severity of
outcomes of the portrayed action does not play a role in people’s
judgments. Thus, institutionally corrupt actions were judged as more
acceptable than criminal actions, regardless of whether the action had
severe or benign consequences. Finally, we observed that political
orientation (operationalized as voting for Trump or Clinton in the 2016
presidential elections) did not affect the relative weight of legality and
outcomes, nor did it diminish any of those effects.
Why is institutional corruption judged as more morally acceptable than
criminal actions? One explanation for our findings is that people use the
law as a shortcut to judge whether an action is morally right or wrong.
Evaluating the morality of actions is not easy. Moral judgments of real-life
events involve numerous considerations, including the intentions and
beliefs of actors, outcomes of actions,34 protected values,35 and one’s
emotional reactions.36
34

Amit & Greene, supra note 32, at 861; see Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton,
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Research from cognitive science and psychology suggest that, when
faced with complex assessment tasks, people use simplifying strategies to
make decisions.37 It is therefore possible that when it comes to moral
judgments, one simplifying strategy that people adopt is to not consider the
moral dilemma at all. Instead, they outsource the question to the law.38
According to this logic, the law does not simply reflect people’s sense of
corruption, but actually determines it. This means that framing actions in
terms of their legality is more than just a signal of the actions’ morality; the
framing shapes their morality.
An appeal to the law is an appeal to the moral reasoning of a
community of thought leaders (such as legislators and policy makers) who
have determined the legality of a class of actions that includes the one
under consideration. Outsourcing cognitive tasks to the community is
necessary when problems are too complex for individual reasoning alone.
The many factors that are taken into account when judging moral
dilemmas, including inferences about intentions, outcomes,39 the need to
Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives, 167 COGNITION 1, 3 (2017)
(discussing the role empathy plays in moral responses to outcomes of actions); Liane Young &
Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding and Integration in Moral Judgment, 40
NEUROIMAGE 1912, 1913 (2008) (discussing how children base their moral judgments primarily on an
action’s consequence).
35
See Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1 (1997) (defining protected values as those that resist trade-offs with other
values, particularly economic values); Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320–21 (2003) (discussing how moral outrage may
be triggered by discovering that community members have compromised sacred values).
36
See Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001) (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional processing
to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect people’s
judgments.”); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (discussing how, under a social intuitionist
model, “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”).
37
See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 81
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (“The substitution of one question for another, the representation of
categories by prototypes, the view of erroneous intuitions are easy to override but almost impossible to
eradicate . . . . We show here that the same ideas apply to a diverse class of difficult judgments . . . .”);
JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (“When faced with more complex
choice problems involving many alternatives, people often adopt simplifying (heuristic) strategies that
are much more selective in the use of information.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability:
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973) (“We
propose that when faced with the difficult task of judging probability or frequency, people employ a
limited number of heuristics which reduce these judgments to simpler ones.”).
38
See MASS. INST. TECH., HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE (Thomas W. Malone &
Michael S. Bernstein eds., 2015).
39
See Cushman et al., supra note 34, at 3 (discussing the ways in which learning the outcomes of
their actions affects children’s future decisions); Young & Saxe, supra note 34, at 1913 (“Even though
they can represent beliefs, these children continue to base their moral judgments primarily on the
action’s consequences. . . .”).
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protect sacred values, and the need to integrate emotional reactions to
events,41 make them complex enough to be strong candidates for
outsourcing. For example, an assessment of big pharma’s culpability for
aggressively selling opioids requires an analysis of the various companies’
prior knowledge and goals when selling opioids, the extent of their
responsibility for the multiple traumatic consequences of the opioid crisis,
as well as the amount of suffering that was reduced by the administration
of opioids, and this must be weighed against each of one’s basic moral
values while controlling one’s sense of outrage.
There are alternative explanations for our results. One is that people
hold the law in such high esteem that breaking the law is itself morally
wrong and hence illegal actions are by definition immoral. To the extent
the law is a set of rules that serves to protect people and their rights, it
should play a substantial role in maintaining an ordered society, and an act
that breaks the law should be viewed as inherently immoral. This may be,
but it does not explain why consequences had no influence on judgment.
Presumably consequences should be an additional contributor to our
assessments of an act’s morality. Another alternative explanation is that
legality is easier to evaluate than consequences42 because it is binary (legal
versus illegal) whereas consequences are complex. This is possible
although the consequences in our scenarios were not really complex and
the differences between the bad and very bad consequences were actually
quite stark. It is also possible that legality is more salient than
consequences. This seems unlikely and does not explain why consequences
had no effect whatsoever. If it is a matter of salience, one would expect a
less salient dimension to have a smaller effect, but not no effect.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Overall, these data show that people judge institutional corruption as
more morally acceptable than criminal actions. Two otherwise identical
actions were given different moral appraisals by virtue of their legal status.
Actions that carry severely negative consequences may pass in the public
40
See Baron & Spranca, supra note 35, at 1 (defining protected values as those that resist
trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values); Tetlock, supra note 35, at 320–21
(discussing how moral outrage may be triggered by discovering that community members have
compromised sacred values).
41
See Greene et al., supra note 36, at 2106 (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional
processing to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect
people’s judgments.”); Haidt, supra note 36, at 814 (discussing how, under a social intuitionist model,
“moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”).
42
See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 249 (1996) (discussing the way in which individuals will choose one
decision-making process over another because it is easier).
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as morally acceptable if they are legal, while criminal actions with
relatively minor consequences may be perceived as morally unacceptable.
Regardless of the explanation for the effect of legality and the neglect
of consequences for judgments of morality, the results suggest that people
rely on the law not only to prescribe and prohibit actions, but to actually
determine their sense of what is moral. In other words, the law not only
shapes how people act, but it also shapes what they believe. These findings
have implications for both legislation and how we assess our society and
institutions.
With regard to legislation, lawmakers can take advantage of our
findings by using them as justification to use the law to nudge people in
socially beneficial ways, such as discouraging people from smoking in
public spaces, protecting endangered species, and pushing people to avoid
sugary drinks. As makers of the law—and consequently, shapers of
morality—lawmakers have the power to redefine the relationship between
institutions and people who are affected both directly and indirectly by
those institutions. Through legislative measures, institutional behavior can
be restructured, both internally (e.g., eliminating conflicts of interest,
restructuring guidelines followed by the institution) and externally (e.g.,
evaluating the impact on the greater good).
But the findings also suggest that we should be aware that our
evaluations of existing institutional actions may be influenced in ways that
we are not entirely aware of. Laws may carry information about whether
actions are morally acceptable or not, but laws may reflect values that are
out-of-date, they may have been inspired by technology or other facts that
are no longer relevant, and they may be influenced by political and
economic interests. In other words, there are a variety of reasons to be
skeptical of the information carried by current law. Thus, it is important to
have an independent means to judge the morality of action, not to rely only
on the law as it is written. The foreseen consequences of an action seem a
worthwhile basis for such judgment. Without considering such
consequences, the legal status quo will sustain itself without adequate
rationale. Pharmaceutical companies will continue to gouge innocent
victims and politicians will continue to bend the law in favor of themselves
and their supporters.
Our findings thus provide additional reason to critically evaluate both
the law and the morality of our institutions. We need to evaluate the
consequences of the products we purchase and the policies and politicians
we support. Society cannot rely only on existing law to make moral
assessments; it needs to constantly refresh its justifications for the actions
it considers right and wrong.
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neuroscience research included in this symposium edition.
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Minimizing the Impact of Cognitive Bias in
Transactional Legal Education
ALINA BALL *
The partisan divide that evolved over appropriate measures to prevent
the spread of COVID-19 has provided yet another public display of
political tribalism, populace polarization, and epistemic authority.1 During
a presidential term pledged with brazen politics and mutual disdain for the
other side,2 even the global crisis of the pandemic has not been sufficient to
close the chasm.3 There seems to be no better moment than the present to
take seriously the themes raised in this symposium volume and reflect on
the role law schools can have in making law students sensitive to the
complexity of human decision making. Society relies on lawyers to
reconcile conflicting interests, ensure flow of reliable information,
minimize opportunism that might otherwise exist between opposing
parties, and marshal evidence that facilitates problem solving in the midst
of ambiguity. But lawyers, judges, and politicians are all themselves
susceptible to the same cognitive vulnerabilities that breed the current
political polarization and, more generally, exacerbate conflict. This Article
explores methods law professors can employ to align these inconsistencies
between the role of the lawyer and the humanity of lawyers. Clearly, law
professors can make an impact on the lawyers their students become. This
*

Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law.
See Cary Funk & Alec Tyson, Partisan Differences Over the Pandemic Response Are Growing,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/03/partisan-differencesover-the-pandemic-response-are-growing/; Marc J. Hetherington & Isaac D. Mehlhaff, American
Attitudes Toward Covid-19 Are Divided by Party. The Pandemic Itself Might Undo That., WASH. POST
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/18/american-attitudes-towardcovid-19-are-divided-by-party-pandemic-itself-might-undo-that/.
2
Emma Green, Americans Hate One Another. Impeachment Isn’t Helping, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/impeachment-democrats-republicanspolarization/601264/; Ryan Warner, What Impeachment Says About Tribalism; Pushback on Polis,
CPR NEWS (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.cpr.org/show-episode/jan-17-2020-what-impeachment-saysabout-tribalism-pushback-on-polis/ (recording at 24:10); Joel Rose, Americans Increasingly Polarized
When It Comes To Racial Justice Protests, Poll Finds, NPR (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/03/908878610/americans-increasingly-polarized-when-it-comes-toracial-justice-protests-poll-f; and Grace Sparks, CNN Poll: Americans Are Divided Over Amy Coney
Barrett, CNN (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/07/politics/cnn-poll-scotus-acaoctober/index.html.
3
See Alex Fitzpatrick, Why the U.S. Is Losing the War on COVID-19, TIME (Aug. 13 2020),
https://time.com/5879086/us-covid-19/ (describing a “disturbing partisan trend” regarding views on the
pandemic).
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Article provides some concrete thoughts on how transactional law clinics
can utilize the social, political, and neuroscience research included in this
symposium edition.
In her article, Winning Isn’t Everything, Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow argues that even though it is often rare that everyone in a
legal matter will “win,” lawyers must recognize that they could do better
for their clients by practicing problem-solving lawyering.4 She goes on to
present problem-solving lawyering in opposition to conventional,
adversarial lawyering.5 Problem solving, she argues, produces better
solutions not by simply compromising6 or seeking to avoid conflict.
Instead, problem solving requires collaboration and coordination between
counterparties and adversaries.7 It also requires the lawyer to exercise
creativity8 and engage in robust fact investigation to better understand
context and consequences.
The narrative example of problem-solving negotiation is a story
Professor Menkel-Meadow shares about her and her brother regularly
fighting over a piece of chocolate cake.9 Their mom would let their
fighting go on for a while and then eventually intervene by cutting the
piece of cake down the middle.10 While this would stop the argument, it
didn’t resolve the issue between the siblings.11 Both the young Professor
Menkel-Meadow and her brother would walk away aggrieved12 because
she wanted the icing while her brother preferred the cake.13 If her mom had
asked her and her brother what their underlying motives and goals were,
her mom could have uncovered this difference in interests.14 Professor
Menkel-Meadow uses this narrative as a tangible example of how, with
problem-solving negotiation, even with finite resources, it is possible for
opposing parties to get 100 percent of what they want if the lawyers
understand each party’s underlying interests.15 It is the role of the
problem-solving lawyer to conceive the multiple possibilities that even a
single piece of cake presents. Even when “the pie” cannot be expanded, it

4

Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 906 (2000).
5
Id. at 907.
6
Id. at 906, 911.
7
Id. at 910–11.
8
Id. at 912, 915.
9
Id. at 911.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 911–12.
12
Id. at 912.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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can be possible for the lawyer to creatively divide it to optimize client
objectives.16
All lawyers have an ethical obligation to act in the best interest of their
client.17 If problem-solving lawyering is in the best interest of the client, it
is surprising that it is not the conventional form of lawyering. Far from the
norm, Professor Menkel-Meadow explains that conventional lawyering is
centered around a culture of adversarialism.18 As she explains, the
hallmarks of the legal profession are argument, selective marshaling of
facts, debate, competition, and performance of toughness, all of which
often escalate conflict and lead to a stalemate.19 Conventional lawyering
adopts the zero-sum mentality,20 described by Professor Daniel Shapiro in
Overcoming Political Polarization,21 which animates the dominant legal
culture and performance of lawyers. Ultimately, Professor
Menkel-Meadow argues it is a lack of creativity leading many lawyers to
view scarcity or limited resources as zero-sum. “[A]dversarialism . . . leads
us to argue in oppositional modes, to see black or white, to resist nuance
and complexity . . . .”22 In other words, adversarialism fosters cognitive
biases that impede a lawyer’s ability to represent their client. Too often,
lawyers are failing to reach their minimum goals for their represented
cases.23 This phenomenon of dominant lawyering culture has serious
consequences in the legal profession—consequences that attorneys have an
ethical obligation to be mindful of—because this affects their clients. In
light of this, law professors should attempt to mitigate dominant lawyering
culture in their classrooms.
Professor
Menkel-Meadow
provides
steps
to
becoming
problem-solving lawyers. First, she advises that there are several questions
problem-solving lawyers must ask: (1) what are the client’s needs and
goals; (2) what are the motivations of the counterparty; (3) what are the
underlying interests of the counterparty; (4) what is at stake in this dispute;

16

Id. at 916.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer should
act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”); id. r. 1.7 cmt. (stating that a lawyer’s duty is to prioritize the client’s interest above
the lawyer’s own).
18
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 907.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 906.
21
See Daniel L. Shapiro, Overcoming Political Polarization: The Power of the Civic Mindset, 52
CONN. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2020) (describing the tribal mindset and its emotional dynamics that
foster political polarization).
22
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 909.
23
James H. Stark & Maxim Milyavsky, Towards a Better Understanding of Lawyers’ Judgmental
Biases in Client Representation: The Role of Need for Cognitive Closure, 59 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
173, 176–78 (2019).
17
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and (5) what are the outcomes produced by a given process. In the
conventional model of lawyering, the lawyer is likely to stop their inquiry
after contemplating the motivations of the counterparty. Professor
Menkel-Meadow explains that moving beyond motivation to
understanding the underlying interests of the counterparty, can provide
meaningful information for the lawyer. The example of Ann Atwater and
C.P. Ellis’s relationship demonstrates why this can be a powerful tactic in
moving towards problem solving.25 Research demonstrates that lawyers
should be skeptical of their ability to effectively ascertain the
counterparty’s underlying interests in an adversarial context.26 Given that
lawyers may not be readily adept at obtaining or understanding a
counterparty’s underlying interests, there is even more justification for why
law schools should prioritize teaching and allowing students to cultivate
this skill. Law school should be an opportunity for budding attorneys to
develop this metacognitive awareness and development. Practice utilizing
the problem-solving questions Professor Menkel-Meadow proposes, would
better prepare law students to achieve the goals of their future clients and
make them more likely to resolve what might otherwise lead to a stalemate
in a negotiation.
Dominant lawyering culture is not the only hurdle that prevents
lawyers from effective problem solving. Poor problem solving is also a
result of cognitive biases, which impede one’s ability to effectively
problem solve for their clients. Professor Menkel-Meadow addresses this
in her analysis of problem-solving lawyering. Reactive devaluation, where
one cannot hear something because it is coming from the other side, is
a cognitive bias that occurs when a proposal is devalued if it appears to
originate from an antagonist.27
Lawyers must acknowledge and overcome cognitive biases to
effectively represent clients and for the legitimacy of the legal profession.
Well-developed psychological evidence demonstrates that implicit bias is a
strong cognitive bias that impedes human ability to effectively problem
solve in social situations.28 In the last decade, implicit bias has become the
primary frame for contemporary discussion on social injustice, with
24

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 916.
An Unlikely Friendship (PBS television broadcast Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/video/anunlikely-friendship-tbnri0/.
26
See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 448–73 (2008)
(describing research from social and cognitive psychology that explores how people perceive and
interpret information and make judgments).
27
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 914.
28
See, e.g., CHERYL STAATS ET AL., KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY,
STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 19–20 (2017) (noting the effects of implicit bias on
police encounters).
25
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implicit bias on one end of the spectrum and deliberate, explicit racism,
sexism, homophobia on the other end.29 The idea of implicit bias has
become ingrained in popular culture.30 As Secretary Clinton mentioned
during the 2016 presidential election, “[i]mplicit bias is a problem for
everyone.”31 When invoked in popular conversation, implicit bias is often
used to describe the attitudes that are beyond conscious awareness or
control. As the narrative goes, individuals manifest implicit bias without
necessarily knowing it. In other words, implicit biases reflect the
unconscious biases that individuals are unaware of32 and, thus, do not
control.
While the developing neuroscience does not support this popular
concept of implicit or unconscious biases,33 it is helpful to recognize that
individuals possess unacknowledged biases. These biases are pervasive,
deep seeded, and contrary to purported notions of fairness and justice. But
if everyone is responsible, the old saying goes, then no one is responsible.
Implicit bias can become the way that individuals absolve themselves of
the consequences of their actions. Individuals can easily find themselves
feeling comfortable because these biases are so pervasive there is little they
can do about them. How does a law professor access what occurs beyond
the conscious reach of the decision maker, which their introspection is not
likely to reveal? Can a law professor do anything to bridge the gap
between the dissociation of what students believe about themselves and
what their biases reflect? These are the questions I continue to wrestle with
because there are no easy answers or universal remedies.
I teach a corporate law clinic at UC Hastings College of the Law. My
course prepares upper division law students to be corporate lawyers by
having them represent social enterprise clients, businesses that use
market-based strategies to achieve a social mission. For example, the clinic
may represent a for-profit LLC marketing and design firm with the social
29
Jonathan Kahn, The 911 Covenant: Policing Black Bodies in White Spaces and the Limits of
Implicit Bias as a Tool of Racial Justice, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 2 (2019).
30
See Shankar Vedantam et al., Radio Replay: The Mind of the Village, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN
(Mar. 9, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/09/591895426/the-mind-of-the-villageunderstanding-our-implicit-biases (discussing research about implicit bias and how it affects people’s
perceptions).
31
John A. Powell, Implicit Bias in the Presidential Debate, OTHER & BELONGING INST.,
https://belonging.berkeley.edu/implicit-bias-presidential-debate (last visited Jan. 26, 2020); Clinton on
Implicit Bias in Policing, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016, 9:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
video/politics/clinton-on-implicit-bias-inpolicing/2016/09/26/46e1e88c-8441-11e6-b57d-dd49277af02f
_video.html.
32
See Implicit Bias Module Series, KIRWAN INST. FOR STUDY RACE & ETHNICITY,
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/implicit-bias-training/ (defining implicit bias as “the attitudes or
stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner”).
33
LASANA T. HARRIS, INVISIBLE MIND: FLEXIBLE SOCIAL COGNITION AND DEHUMANIZATION
159–60 (2017).
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mission to hire and promote nontraditionally trained graphic designers who
have criminal records. The company mission serves as a means for not
only providing living wage employment to individuals often excluded in
the formal economy but also elevating the voices and perspectives of their
employees. The legal matters the clinic might take on for this client could
range from drafting and analyzing business-to-business contracts, to
renegotiating its commercial lease agreement, to amending and restating its
operating agreement over the course of the representation. Law students in
my course gain and refine their substantive corporate law knowledge in a
context where they are applying their technical lawyering skills and critical
thinking to pressing social and environmental issues central to their client’s
corporate purpose. The course provides a rare opportunity to future
corporate lawyers to meaningfully engage in issues of social and economic
justice.
Moreover, this is a class that affords me the bandwidth to help students
recognize and confront their biases in the process of becoming better
problem solvers.34 In early iterations of my course, I began by asking
students early in the semester (as part of a due diligence memo) to identify
any biases that they may have going into this representation. But what I
found is that students—like most of us—often do not have the tools to
self-assess and be meaningfully reflective regarding cognitive biases,
especially those that are contrary to their ideas of fairness, justice, and
equity. I maintained the question as a part of the assignment for years, but
was rarely satisfied with the responses it elicited from students. Regularly a
student would write that they had no biases going into the representation.
Once that response was provided, it would effectively end the conversation
on their biases and provide me no basis to help them dig deeper. It
occurred to me the assignment may be more harmful than productive in
regards to bias reduction.
Recently, I adopted another method to the assignment with promising
results. In my new iteration of the same due diligence memo, I have
removed the explicit question about biases altogether. Instead, I now ask
students to map out the client and its counterparty, or other key parties in
the transaction, preferably in a sketch or diagram.35 The prompt asks them
to draw the relational dimensions of the client and other parties involved.
Lastly, the prompt asks the student to identify the role of the lawyer and
opportunities for the lawyer to influence the outcome of the transaction

34

See generally Mark Neal Aaronson & Stefan H. Krieger, Teaching Problem-Solving
Lawyering: An Exchange of Ideas, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 485 (2004) (discussing the interaction between
substantive legal knowledge and critical thinking skills in legal education).
35
See JAY A. MITCHELL, SKETCH PAD AS LEGAL PAD: PICTURING CORPORATE PRACTICE 3
(2015) (discussing the benefit and practice of transactional lawyers sketching clients and deals).
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consistent with the client’s goals. Transactional lawyers commonly
sketch transactions and client matters. In the context of the due diligence
memo assignment, the benefit of this diagramming and sketching is that it
invites law students to memorialize their assumptions about distributions
of power within the transaction or legal matter. Completing this
assignment often requires the law students to make assumptions and draw
conclusions outside of the facts of the client file.
When I debrief with the student teams, I then ask them to identify
where their assumptions and cognitive biases are at play in the depiction.
This is an attempt to not only identify, but begin to disrupt their cognitive
biases.37 During our conversation, I also invite the law students to think
about the biases of the other actors in the representation. Some of the
questions I ask them are, “What assumptions are other parties likely to
have about your client? About you?” In this way, I am helping students
become more aware and self-reflective of their cognitive biases and how
biases impact their ability to represent their clients. This exercise is one
concrete example of an attempt to debias my law students during their time
in my course.
Professor Menkel-Meadow’s model of problem-solving lawyering asks
lawyers to answer a series of questions before attempting to problem
solve.38 This slowing down of the problem-solving process is intended to
help the lawyers better identify the underlying interests of the counterparty,
what is at stake in this dispute, and the outcomes produced by a given
process.39 These questions are also a useful debiasing technique. Her
model of problem-solving lawyering allows law students to reflect on their
own biases towards their clients, and how those might be contributing to
the marginalization of their client in the representation. Lawyers have an
opportunity to be architects and engineers of justice.40 Lawyers have the
capability to leave the world a better place. I believe that wholeheartedly
and try to instill this notion in my students each semester.
As future transactional lawyers, I want my law students to understand
they have the ability and the ethical responsibility to think outside the box,
be creative, and engineer solutions that are structured around justice. By
helping them acknowledge their cognitive biases early in the client
representation, I believe I am facilitating them in becoming the better
36

See Alicia Plerhoples, Risks, Goals, and Pictographs: Lawyering to the Social Entrepreneur, 19
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 301, 313 (2015) (explaining the utility of pictographs to memorialize client
goals).
37
See Joan C. Williams & Sky Mihaylo, How the Best Bosses Interrupt Bias on Their Teams,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.-Dec. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/how-the-best-bosses-interrupt-bias-ontheir-teams.
38
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 909–10.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 910.
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problem-solving lawyers that society desperately needs. More importantly,
I am heartened by the experiences in my clinical course that there is even
more transactional courses can do to make law students sensitive to the
complexity of decision making and better prepared to defuse conflicts. If
law professors are willing to engage with their students in the struggle of
their ideological becoming, I believe the next generation of lawyers will be
the change-makers this moment requires.
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Civility is widely regarded as a duty of democratic citizenship. This Article
identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of developing an adequate
conception of civility. Challenging the idea civility is the requirement to remain
calm, peaceable, or dispassionate in political debate, it is argued that that civility
is instead the requirement to address one’s political arguments to one’s
interlocutors. In this way, civility is a second-order requirement, a norm
governing our conduct in political disagreement. From there, a conceptual
problem for civility so understood is raised, the problem of semantic descent. It is
argued that any plausible conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,”
transformed into a partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as
important as civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a
diagnostic tool for repairing political dysfunctions is limited.
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Semantic Descent: More Trouble for Civility
ROBERT B. TALISSE *
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly observed by commentators from across the political
spectrum in the United States that the past decade has seen a marked
intensification of political antagonism.1 Office holders and party officials
seem to have lost the capacity to cooperate with those who do not share
their political affiliation, resulting in political deadlock and stagnation.2 In
fact, the trouble runs deeper than that. Whereas partisan animosity has long
prevailed among politicians, it only recently has trickled down to, and
intensified among, the U.S. citizenry.3 Citizens struggle these days to
communicate productively across partisan divides. Thus, in addition to the
intransigence within government, popular political discourse is beset by a
range of dysfunctions that are commonly referred to collectively as
incivility.4 A common thought is that we can begin to repair our democracy
only by first restoring a commitment to civility.
That incivility poses trouble for democracy is acknowledged by the
American citizenry. A 2019 Pew study finds that most Americans believe
that political debate has become dangerously toxic and disrespectful in
recent years. 5 A prior study finds that Americans disapprove of the
incivility that has taken hold of democracy and want greater comity and
cooperation among politicians.6 These findings offer some hope that the
remedy for current political dysfunctions is not beyond reach. If citizens
*
W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt
University. Thanks to Scott Aikin, Jody Azzouni, and Lisa Madura for comments on an earlier version
of this Article.
1
Shanto Iyengar & Sean J Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 692 (2014).
2
The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider: Sharp Shifts Among Democrats on
Aid to Needy, Race, Immigration, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.peoplepress.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/.
3
Id.
4
Kathleen Hall Jamieson et al., The Political Uses and Abuses of Civility and Incivility, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 205, 205–19 (Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall
Jamieson eds., 2017).
5
Bruce Drake & Jocelyn Kiley, Americans Say the Nation’s Political Debate Has Grown More
Toxic and ‘Heated’ Rhetoric Could Lead to Violence, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-hasgrown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-to-violence/.
6
See supra note 2.
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dislike over-the-top political rancor and want a more civil mode of politics,
then the challenge is simply that of incentivizing politicians and citizens to
turn down the heat.
Alas, this optimism fades in light of a further finding of the same
study.7 Many who disapprove of the uncivil streak in contemporary U.S.
politics also believe that the blame for incivility lies squarely with their
political opponents; moreover, they think the solution is to force
capitulation from the other side.8 In calling for more civility, many citizens
seek submission or acquiescence from their political rivals. Surely civility
cannot require capitulation from one’s political opposition. Something is
amiss.
The problem rests with the concept of civility itself. We all identify it
as a political good, and incivility a political bad, yet we do not share a
sufficiently nuanced understanding of what civility is. Similarly, we agree
that democratic citizens and office holders have a duty to be civil and are
therefore blameworthy when they behave uncivilly; nonetheless, in the
absence of a clearer account of what civility requires, the duty of civility
lacks definite content. Finally, as it is popularly understood, civility is
closely related to politeness, courtesy, and generosity; while satisfying
these norms may be admirable, the duty of civility arguably involves
something else, as it is not clear that citizens have a duty to be polite,
courteous, or generous. In short, there is the conceptual work to be done. If
incivility is to play a central diagnostic and prescriptive role in our analysis
of current political dysfunctions, and if, as is commonly held, civility is to
be understood as a duty of democratic citizenship, then we need to work
from a suitably detailed conception of what civility is and why it is
valuable.
To anticipate a point that will feature in a later part of this Article, in
pursuing this conceptual task, it is crucial that we develop a conception of
civility that is itself nonpartisan. That is, in order to perform its prescriptive
and diagnostic job, our understanding of civility must not be rigged in
favor of our own favored political stances. Whatever civility is, it must be
satisfiable by citizens from across the full spectrum of democratically valid
political opinion.9 In other words, a conception of civility that renders out
of bounds all advocacy for political positions that we oppose is no
7

Id.
Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and
Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014),
https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
9
This formulation leaves open the possibility that some political viewpoints are intrinsically
uncivil, such that their expression is necessarily a violation of the duty of civility. Certain overtly racist,
sexist, and nationalistic views can be plausibly regarded as uncivil. The point, which will be discussed
further below, is that our conception of civility must allow for civil expressions of political viewpoints
that we find erroneous, perhaps severely so.
8
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conception of civility at all. We might say, then, that a proper conception
of civility must itself be endorsable across the spectrum of democratically
acceptable political perspectives. It must be in this sense public.
This Article identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of
developing a public conception of civility. I begin by raising a puzzle
about civility as popularly understood, which in turn reveals that the duty
of civility cannot be the requirement to remain calm, peaceable, or
dispassionate in political debate. In fact, the initial puzzle suggests that
civility cannot be a norm governing one’s tone or demeanor in political
disputation at all. It will be proposed in Section Two that civility rather is a
norm of discursive engagement that requires one to address one’s
contributions to political argument to one’s interlocutors; civility is a norm
of engagement, pertaining to how well one’s contributions to debate track
the contributions of one’s interlocutors. It will then be argued, in Section
Three, that whatever the more precise details of civility might be, the duty
to be civil is a reciprocal requirement; that is, we are bound by the norm of
civility only when there is sufficient reason to expect that one’s
interlocutors will abide by it as well. In Section Four, I further specify
conditions that a viable conception of civility must meet. In particular, I
draw upon some terminology introduced by Willard Van Orman Quine to
show that civility must be understood as a second-order norm, a norm
governing our conduct in contexts of disagreement. In Section Five, I spell
out a conceptual problem for civility so understood, what will be called the
problem of semantic descent. It will be argued that any plausible
conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,” transformed into a
partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as important as
civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a diagnostic
tool for repairing political dysfunctions is limited.
I. THE PUZZLE OF CIVILITY
Begin by assuming a popular conception of civility. According to it,
civility involves remaining calm, reserved, cooperative, courteous, and
dispassionate in political debate. This conception of civility has many
merits, and perhaps chief among them is that it comports well with
common usage of the term, including use in contexts outside of politics.
Thus, in assuming the popular conception of civility, one is claiming that
in politics one ought to abide by norms that govern other familiar
discursive contexts where disputation might arise, from the family dinner
table to the workplace, classroom, and queue at the supermarket. In short,
the popular conception of civility in politics has the virtue of making
civility a unitary concept, a set of norms applicable to interpersonal affairs
across the board, as it were.
Of course, the nastiness of politics may be regrettable without thereby
being democratically pathological. Therefore, laments over the incivility of
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contemporary politics are often accompanied by an additional (though
often tacit) claim, namely that democratic citizens have a duty to be civil.
This additional contention is needed if incivility is to be regarded as a
democratic failure or political pathology. That is, in order for incivility to
register as a democratic dysfunction, we need to make a case for thinking
that democratic citizens and office holders have a duty to be civil.
The case for the duty of civility runs roughly as follows: If it is to
flourish, a democracy needs to get things done; this means that political
rivals—especially office holders, but citizens too—must cooperate and
sometimes even compromise. When discourse is overly antagonistic,
participants are incentivized to dig in their heels and adopt a stance of
intransigence. This not only leads to deadlock, it also encourages a mode
of politics that abandons the democratic ideal of self-government among
equals, replacing it with a strictly strategic conception that values only
winning and so regards political opponents as merely obstacles to be
neutralized. Yet democracy is a partnership among political equals; thus,
democratic citizens, including office holders, have a duty of civility.10
Consequently, when they fail to be civil, citizens have fallen short of
proper citizenship; and when incivility is rampant within a polity,
democracy is failing.
This reasoning is solid, but it occasions a puzzle. Understood as
self-government among political equals, democracy calls upon citizens to
take responsibility for their collective political life; they must in some
sense take ownership of their political order. This means that citizens must
be participants in the tasks of democracy. Accordingly, they have duties to
be informed, competent, and reflective as citizens.11 In addition, they have
a duty to exercise their judgment about public affairs. They are expected to
think through the political issues of the day and to form their own political
opinions. What is more, as citizens are one another’s equals, the style of
judgment required by citizenship involves a kind of perspective-taking;
democratic citizens are expected to reason from a collective point of view,
10
See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE 131–34 (2006) (detailing the “partnership” view of democracy).
11
There is a massive literature focusing on whether citizens are up to the tasks of democratic
citizenship. Though this question is important, it is not my focus here. For a range of views, see
generally CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT (2017) (detailing how the idea of thoughtful
citizens guiding a democratic state from the voting booth is fundamentally misguided); ROBERT
GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY (2003) (offering a solution when political disputes in a democracy
invariably mix facts with values); HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS,
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY (2013) (arguing that democracy is
legitimate, just, and smart because the decision by the many will be more accurate than decision by the
few); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS
SMARTER (2016) (revealing how the depths of political ignorance in America cause a major challenge
for democracy).
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rather than from a narrowly first-personal perspective. That is, in thinking
through political issues, each citizen must look beyond their individual
interests and attempt to discern the collective or public good.12 Many
democratic theorists claim that participating in public political discussion
is an indispensable step in adopting the collective point of view; hence
these theorists hold that democratic citizens are also obligated to engage in
forms of public deliberation and discussion.13
The puzzle emerges from the fact that under conditions of intellectual
freedom and equality, citizens’ judgments over normative matters are
unlikely to converge. As John Rawls observed, the freedoms secured in a
constitutional democracy give rise to a “reasonable pluralism” of political
ideas, doctrines, perspectives, and opinions.14 Accordingly, the aim of
public participation and deliberation is not consensus but, as indicated
above, the achievement of a properly public perspective from which to
form one’s political judgements and conduct political debate. Rawls’s
insight, well-confirmed in democratic practice, is that properly public
judgments about complex political issues nonetheless diverge.15 Hence,
political disagreement and disputation are inexorable from democracy.
The task of much of democratic theory is to envision and design
processes and institutions that can manage our political divides. One might
go as far as to say that constitutions simply are rulebooks for containing
our divisions within the navigable boundaries of fair rules and procedures.
But when it comes to interactions among the disputants, this managerial
function is fraught. Although some political disagreements concern
relatively nominal matters, many invoke citizens’ sense of justice. Though
the familiar debates over healthcare, poverty, taxation, immigration, and
the environment are sometimes articulated as the strictly managerial
disputes of what the country can afford, they are ultimately disputes over
justice, and disagreements about what a morally acceptable society is
required to do. Hence, heat frequently accompanies these disputes. When
arguing about matters invoking our sense of justice, we tend to see our
interlocutors as being not merely on the incorrect side of the question, but
on the unjust side. And when their side prevails politically, we are bound

12
See Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95, 95–96 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)
(explaining the importance of decisions being made collectively within a democracy, even when there
are no shared comprehensive moral or religious views); Seyla Benhabib, Deliberative Rationality and
Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 26, 28–29 (1994) (distinguishing between
collective good and individual interests in the democratic process).
13
The deliberative democrats are perhaps the most obvious proponents for this kind of view. But
the idea that citizens have a duty to discuss politics is not limited to deliberativists.
14
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (2005).
15
GERALD GAUS, THE TYRANNY OF THE IDEAL: JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY ch. 1 (2016).
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to regard that outcome as not merely suboptimal or regrettable, but morally
unacceptable.
Here, then, is the puzzle occasioned by the popular conception of
civility and its corresponding duty. Heated tones and antagonistic
demeanors are precisely what one should expect in disputes where the
interlocutors take themselves to be defending against injustice. Moreover,
as was noted above, democratic citizens have a duty to take responsibility
for their collective political life. Accordingly, when matters of justice are
at stake, they are thus likely to bring to political disagreements the
emotional and normative investments that tend to manifest in heat and
hostility. In short, antagonism, animosity, resentment, and indignation are
what we should expect from democratically engaged citizens when arguing
sincerely over important public matters. The features of political discourse
that are commonly cited as constitutive of incivility appear to be the
natural byproducts of responsible citizenship. The duty of civility, taken in
its popular conception, looks inconsistent with proper democratic
citizenship.
A defender of the popular view might retort that the reasoning above
shows not that civility is incompatible with proper citizenship, but only
that it is difficult. She may contend that the duty of civility is the
requirement to contain or suppress the tendency, natural though it may be,
to be exercised in political discussions when matters of justice are at stake.
The duty of civility, it may be claimed, is the requirement to not allow our
passions to get the better of us in political disputation.
This line of defense prompts a formidable critique of the idea that the
duty of civility involves the requirement to be soft-spoken, collected, and
reserved in political debate. Theorists working in various feminist idioms
have argued––correctly, in my view––that, when civility is understood
broadly as politeness, the duty of civility gives unwarranted advantage to
the status quo and the existing balance of political power.16 One of the
ways in which the duty of civility so understood accomplishes this is by
creating opportunities for the politically powerful to defuse criticisms and
objections by fixing on the manner in which they are expressed. Those for
whom the status quo is most objectionable tend also to be those who are
most passionate and indignant. Consequently, the duty of civility, again
16

See, e.g., Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, 13 CAN. J. PHIL.
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 111–37 (1987), reprinted in SCIENCE, MORALITY & FEMINIST THEORY 209,
213–14 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen eds., 1987) (noting that women were not “expected to demand
equal rights”); Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 120, 122–24 (Seyla
Benhabib ed., 1996) (arguing that “differences of speech privilege correlate with other differences of
social privilege”); Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 348–49 (1997)
(arguing that “appeals to deliberation do nothing to challenge an undesirable status quo” and ultimately
disadvantage individuals “who are already underrepresented in formal political institutions”).
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assuming the popular understanding of civility that we have been
exploring, is in effect an instrument by which democratic responsibility is
deflected and democratic judgment disabled. Once again, given the popular
understanding of civility, the duty of civility seems incompatible with
responsible democratic citizenship.
This provides a clue as to what civility and its corresponding duty
cannot be. Whatever value there might be in remaining calm and collected
in the midst of political disagreement, it cannot be a requirement of
democratic citizenship to do so. It may be an effective strategy to manifest
a reserved and dispassionate demeanor in political discussion, but it is not
a democratic duty to do so. The heat, tone, and animosity of contemporary
political discourse might be regrettable for a variety of reasons, but it does
not itself constitute a failure of citizenship. Consequently, the duty of
civility requires something else of us.
To be clear, civility in the popular sense that we have thus far adopted
nonetheless captures a common collection of pro tanto norms which I do
not take the arguments above to impugn. Moreover, I take it that there is a
pro tanto duty that applies to persons to be civil in their interactions, and
perhaps especially their disputes. The argument thus far has fixed only on
the idea that civility, as it is popularly construed, is the core of a duty of
citizenship. Accordingly, the upshot thus far may be formulated as follows:
Civility is not a unitary concept. Rather, there is a distinct sense of civility
that applies strictly to contexts of democratic politics, and consequently, a
duty of civility that applies to persons specifically in their role as
democratic citizens.
II. CIVILITY AS CIVIC ADDRESS
What, then, does this distinctively democratic concept of civility and
its corresponding duty amount to? In pursuing this, we can draw further a
lesson from the feminist line of criticism introduced above. Recall that the
target of that critique was a conception of the duty of civility that too easily
enabled powerholders and advocates of the status quo to deflect objections
from those who find the status quo unacceptable. Widening the focus
slightly, we can see the feminist critique as emphasizing a crucial feature
of democratic responsibility: in order to realize the ideal of
self-government among equals who take ownership of their collective
political order, citizens must be accountable to one another. When it comes
to citizens who are also holders of public office, this means that they must
render themselves vulnerable to the criticisms of their fellow citizens.
Broadly, democratic citizens owe to one another actual engagement; in
conducting their political disputes, they must address one another in a way
that is consistent with their standing as democratic citizens, that is, as
political equals.
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Addressing another person in a way that is consistent with their
standing as an equal citizen is not easy, especially when matters of justice
are at stake. Just as it is easy to manifest hostility towards those who one
perceives to be advocating injustice, it is easy to dismiss one’s political
opponents as political inferiors. However, unlike expressions of political
hostility, attitudes of political superiority are obviously at odds with the
core democratic ideal of self-government among equals. In other words,
the political disputation that is inexorable from––because it is constitutive
of–– democracy is always disputation among equals. I want to propose,
then, that the core of civility (now taken in its distinctive democratic sense)
is the norm of addressing political interlocutors as one’s fellow citizens,
and thus as equal partners in self-government. In short, I propose that we
think of civility as a norm of civic address, and the corresponding duty as
requiring that we address our fellow citizens in a way that is consistent
with their standing as our equals.
Central to civility as civic address are three broad requirements. First,
there is responsiveness. In political discourse, including of course
argumentation, citizens must strive to be responsive to their interlocutors’
actually stated views and reasons, rather than with strawmen or other
opportunistically constructed fabrications. Second, is the requirement of
connection. That is, in political discourse, citizens must strive to address
their contributions to one another, rather than to onlooking audiences or a
choir of sympathetic partisans; in argumentative contexts, interlocutors
must not use one another as mere props, foils against which to mug to their
allies in the audience. Third, citizens must endeavor to conduct their
political discourse by means of reasons and considerations that they
sincerely believe that their interlocutors will appreciate the force of. Call
this the mutuality requirement for civic address. In short, in communicative
and argumentative exchanges, we manifest a due recognition for our
interlocutor’s status as an equal when we strive to address them in a way
that responds to their actual views, connects with them directly, and
attempts sincerely to offer reasons and considerations that they will accept
as such. Insofar as democratic citizenship involves a standing requirement
to acknowledge our fellow citizens as our political equals, there is a duty of
civility.
Readers will have noticed that the requirements of civic address have
been formulated as requirements to strive and endeavor to engage with
one’s fellow citizens in a particular way. The formulation as requirements
to try is necessary if we are to take due account of the fact that
argumentative discourse is one of the ways in which citizens come to learn
about their oppositions’ perspectives and arguments. Consequently, civility
must be consistent with a certain degree of sincere misunderstanding of
others’ views. Consider that it should not count as uncivil when a citizen
fails to offer her interlocutors reasons that they could accept due to her

2021]

SEMANTIC DESCENT

1159

being honestly mistaken about the substance of their position. Borrowing a
term proposed in a different context by Christopher Eberle, we can say that
the resulting duty of civility is a duty of “conscientious engagement.”17
It is not difficult to discern some of the leading merits of this approach
to conceptualizing civility and its corresponding duty. For example, on the
civic address account, the mark of incivility does not lie in tone, heat, or
demeanor, but rather in opportunistic refusals to take one’s critics or
opponents as nonetheless one’s equal citizens. And this view enables us to
identify popular modes of political discourse as especially uncivil. Note
how often political argumentation involves strategic mischaracterization of
the oppositions’ actual views, the mere pantomime of answering objections
while simply restating one’s views for the sake of rallying one’s allies, and
the tactic of offering as decisive reasons in favor of one’s views claims that
are the very ones being called into question by one’s critics.18 That these
tactics are compatible with maintaining a soft, concessive tone and polite
demeanor indicates the limitations of the popular conception of political
civility.
The conception of civility as civic address is also able to accommodate
the thought that hostility and animosity are generally regrettable features
of our politics. After all, heat and attitude are tactics for escalating conflict,
and when they are employed by those who are already unduly advantaged,
they serve to diminish critics and smother criticisms. One could go so far
as to say that the marks of incivility as popularly understood (aggression,
name-calling, shouting, impoliteness, and the like) are reliable signals that
civility in the sense of civic address is being breached. What matters in
assessing a mode of discourse with respect to civility, then, is how well the
interlocutors succeed in actually addressing one another in the relevant
ways. Heat, animosity, and tone are consistent with civic address, even
though they are frequently manifestations of its violation. Consequently,
democratic citizens have a pro tanto duty to be civil in the popular sense,
but this is parasitic on the duty to civically address their fellow citizens.
This means that a failure to be civil in the popular sense does not itself
constitute a failure of citizenship.
I realize that I have barely sketched my conception of civility as civic
address. A complete view of civility would need to include far more detail
than can be provided here. But recall that my objective in this Article is not
to develop a conception of civility, but rather to identify a problem that any
viable conception of civility will confront. My contention at this juncture is
simply that the conception of civility as civil address, along with its
17

CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 104 (2002).
See SCOTT F. AIKIN & ROBERT B. TALISSE, WHY WE ARGUE (AND HOW WE SHOULD): A
GUIDE TO POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNREASON 10–12 (2d ed. 2019) (offering detailed
analyses of these pathologies).
18
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corresponding duty, is both commonsensical and noncontroversial enough
to serve as a template from which more detailed articulations of civility
would proceed. Spelling out the details of civility as civic address is
undertaken in other work.19
III. CIVILITY AS A RECIPROCAL DUTY
Any conception of civility that takes something like civic address as its
foundation will conceive of civility as a norm of engagement with one’s
fellow citizens, and this will naturally entail that the duty of civility is what
may be called a reciprocal duty.20
To explain, some duties are first-personal while others are
reciprocal.21 An analogy with garden-variety moral virtue will be helpful.
Consider a virtue like moderation. This virtue establishes a standard of
conduct that requires an individual’s temperance in the pursuit of
enjoyment. This standard is first-personal.22 What it requires is not
contingent on the presence of other temperate people; the virtue of
temperance applies to individuals as individuals, and demands of them
individual moderation, even in the presence of immoderate company.
Another example of a first-personal virtue is courage. The courageous
person must stand firm in fearful situations, even when surrounded by
cowards. To be sure, precisely what course of action courage requires
might depend on one’s company and what they are currently doing;
nonetheless, that others are cowards does not license anything less than
courage from the courageous person. Again, courage, as a first-personal
virtue, applies to the individual.
Now contrast these first-personal virtues with requirements of a
different kind. These do not primarily attach to individuals, but instead
govern groups of individuals or are exhibited in relations between them.
That is, they establish a standard of conduct for us rather than simply for
me and you. For example, we teach our children the policy “keep your
hands to yourself.” But notice that the policy of keeping one’s hands to
oneself establishes a standard of conduct for those on the playground;
more importantly, it is in virtue of its collective application that individuals
are bound to comply with its requirements. Consequently, when Billy
violates the norm by grabbing Danny, and Danny retaliates, it would be
absurd to criticize Danny for failing to keep his hands to himself. With
Billy’s violation, the collective norm is suspended, and in extricating
himself by pushing Billy away, Danny does not himself break the rule. To
19

SCOTT F. AIKIN & ROBERT B. TALISSE, POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN A POLARIZED AGE 53–56
(forthcoming 2020).
20
The discussion that follows draws heavily from AIKIN & TALISSE, supra note 18, ch. 9.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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better capture this, notice that the norm “keep your hands to yourself” is an
abbreviated version of the more complex norm “keep your hands to
yourself on the condition that others are keeping their hands to
themselves.” We see, then, that the norm and its corresponding duty are
reciprocal; they establish a standard of conduct that applies to groups, and
individuals are required to abide by the norm, as long as others generally
do so as well.23
Notice that in this playground case, the norm does not indicate what
one is permitted to do in response to its violation. Surely there are certain
retaliatory acts that Danny could perform against Billy that would be
inappropriate or even impermissible. That Billy’s violation suspends the
collective norm does not afford to Danny moral carte blanche to respond
however he wishes. Though his retaliatory response does not itself
constitute a violation of the “keep your hands to yourself” norm, Danny
may still retaliate in ways that render him worthy of criticism, perhaps
even punishment.
Return now to politics. It is clear that some political duties are
first-personal. As a citizen, one’s engagements with others must manifest
the requirements of honesty and evenhandedness. That one’s fellow
citizens are inveterate dissemblers does not license one to be dishonest or
biased. In fact, when dishonesty is widespread, honesty and
evenhandedness are all the more important. However, other political duties
are reciprocal. They prescribe modes of conduct to us—collectively, so to
speak. Accordingly, individuals are required to abide by these
requirements only when they are embraced and generally practiced by the
group. Where the norm corresponding to a reciprocal duty is commonly
disregarded within a group, the duty itself is rendered inactive, as it
establishes a standard of behavior only under the conditions where the
norm is collectively embraced.
Given that the duty of civility follows from the democratic aspiration
of maintaining responsibility for the citizens’ shared political order, it
looks clearly reciprocal. We are required to hold ourselves politically
accountable to our fellow citizens, and hence to render ourselves
vulnerable to their criticisms, as a way of manifesting our recognition of
their status as equal partners in democratic self-government. When others
are disposed to incivility, they decline to hold themselves politically
accountable to us; under such conditions, it would be perverse to take
ourselves to nonetheless be bound by the duty of civility. Indeed, abiding
by the duty of civility when it is generally flouted is tantamount to abetting
our own political subordination, as it places constraints on our political
activity and puts our views and objectives at a relative disadvantage. One
23

Id.
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might say, then, that abiding by the duty of civility under conditions where
it is not reciprocally practiced helps to empower and entrench incivility,
which in turn serves to further deteriorate democratic conditions. In
abiding by the duty of civility when dealing with the uncivil, we contribute
to the strategic effectiveness of incivility. Under certain extreme
circumstances, there may be a duty of incivility.24
IV. CIVILITY AS A SECOND-ORDER NORM
The next stage of the argument begins from a brief digression into
what might seem to be exceedingly distant territory—the views of the
twentieth century American empiricist philosopher Willard Van Orman
Quine, who wrote nothing in political philosophy and only one curious
essay in moral philosophy.25 Our present interest in Quine is limited to a
particular bit of nomenclature—specifically, the term semantic ascent26—
that he introduced as he was theorizing the structure of philosophical
disagreements over what might be called ontology, or disagreements over
what exists.27 I suspect readers are familiar with certain longstanding
philosophical disputes that belong to the subfield of metaphysics. In
particular, there is a debate going back to at least the Presocratics about
whether everything that exists is physical.28 This is closely related to a
debate over whether everything that exists has causal properties. Typically,
these debates focus on the seemingly indispensable nature of certain
abstracta (that is, nonphysical items), such as numbers, sets, classes, and
kinds, whose role in the causal order is on anyone’s view mysterious.29
Quine was concerned with whether disputes over the existence of such
(purported) items could be well-ordered. It would seem that between the
physicalist (who denies that there are abstracta) and the nonphysicalist
(who affirms that some abstracta exist), there could be no proper
24

See generally CANDICE DELMAS, A DUTY TO RESIST: WHEN DISOBEDIENCE SHOULD BE
UNCIVIL (2018) for a similar discussion in the context of the duty to obey the law. Delmas argues that
in cases where the political order is significantly unjust, there is not only no duty to obey the law, but
possibly a duty to disobey, perhaps even in ways that overtly violate norms of civil disobedience. Id. at
224–25.
25
For a reliable overview of Quine’s philosophy, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY,
QUINE: LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE AND REALITY 50–53 (1988) (describing Quine’s views on
pragmatism, relativism, and realism).
26
WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 270–74 (1960) [hereinafter QUINE, WORD
AND OBJECT].
27
See HOOKWAY, supra note 25, at 20 (“Quine speaks of the set of objects which a speaker takes
to exist as his ‘ontology’: an assertion ‘ontologically commits’ its author to objects of a certain kind if
the assertion would only be true if objects of that kind existed.”).
28
See JONATHAN BARNES, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS (1979) (describing various ideas of
the Presocratics).
29
For an example, see generally, Kathrin Koslicki, On the Substantive Nature of Disagreements
in Ontology, 71 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 85 (2007).
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engagement, as the argumentative maneuvers from the one side seem
destined to appear question-begging to the other.30 Indeed, it seems that
among these interlocutors, their disagreement is likely to extend to the
question over what should count even as a relevant consideration with
respect to the dispute.
Quine gave the name semantic ascent to the strategy of dealing with
disputes of this kind by shifting the site of the dispute, at least
momentarily, towards the terms each side employs in formulating their
position; interlocutors should try ascending from talking about the matter
in dispute to talking about the way they talk about the matter in dispute.
Quine writes that semantic ascent “is the shift from talking in certain terms
to talking about them.”31 He reasons that “[w]ords . . . unlike [e.g.] classes .
. . are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men
of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best.”32
The strategy of semantic ascent, then, is that of looking for relatively
uncontested common ground, in the hope that disputants might find some
foothold from which to more productively conduct their more fundamental
disagreements. Importantly, the strategy involves not simply a change in
the topic of the disputants’ conversation, but a shift in the level of the topic
of the conversation. They are to shift from arguing about, e.g., whether
classes exist to talking about how they talk about whether classes exist.
This second-order conversation will focus on hopefully more tractable
questions such as what each takes to be adequate definitions or
conceptualizations of the disputed items, what renders those definitions
and conceptualizations adequate, and so on.
Again, the hope is that by ascending to semantic level, interlocutors
might discover that there is enough difference in their nomenclature as to
render their dispute over classes merely verbal. (In that case, they may
nonetheless have to confront a prolonged debate at the semantic level.) Or
they could discover that they are largely in agreement over the semantics,
which itself might constitute a kind of progress in their first-order dispute
about classes. Semantic ascent, then, is not a way to resolve disputes, but
rather a means for making disputes more orderly.
Semantic ascent is of course a commonsense strategy that we
intuitively employ in disputes of all kinds. What is of particular interest at
present is that the strategy calls attention to a general fact of
disagreements, namely that they run simultaneously along two evaluative
tracks that may be distinguished by referring to first-order and
second-order levels of evaluation. In this way, argumentation functions a
30
See generally Jody Azzouni, On “On What There Is”, 79 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 1 (1998) (discussing
“debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis”).
31
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT, supra note 26, at 271.
32
Id. at 272.
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lot like communication more generally. More specifically, in order to carry
on a conversation, communicators must simultaneously track two distinct
levels of language use, namely the meanings of the words being used (the
semantics, the first order) and the grammatical structure in which they are
used (the syntax, the second order). Missteps in tracking either distinct
level typically result in communicative failure.33 What is more,
communicators need a common second-order idiom in order to diagnose
and correct certain kinds of communicative failure.
Similarly, in order to successfully engage in argumentation, disputants
must track and evaluate each other’s claims (the first order) as well as what
might be called their argumentative performance (the second order). For
example, when engaged in argumentation about, say, gun ownership laws,
disputants must be able to track one another’s first-order claims about
guns, ownership, and the law, while also attending to the ways in which
those claims figure into the evolving dialectic among them. Minimally, in
order to engage in argumentation, each interlocutor’s contribution must:
take account of the relevant prior statements introduced into the discussion;
avoid contradicting their own prior statements; refrain from needlessly
repeating claims that are already manifestly agreed upon; decline to
repeatedly assert as a premise that which is disputed among them; and so
on. In other words, interlocutors must perpetually be “keeping score” of
the state of play in their disagreement.34 This is a second-order evaluative
site that is accordingly distinct from the first-order assessment of the
reasons offered about gun ownership laws. Accordingly, just as an unsound
argument can have a true conclusion, an impeccable first-order case for
stricter gun laws can be a dialectical failure.
We are now able to tie the hanging threads together. As a collection of
norms governing our engagement with fellow citizens in political
disagreements, civility as civic address has largely to do with what has just
been called our argumentative performance. We fail to be civil not simply
33

This is not intended as a complete analysis of communication, but only as identifying two
necessary conditions for communicative success. Command of the relevant semantics and syntax does
not suffice for successful communication; according to many views, one must also develop an adequate
conception of the interlocutor’s communicative intention in talking as she does. See PAUL GRICE,
STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989) (formulating “the Cooperative Principle” for participants in
conversation: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”).
34
David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339, 344–46 (1979). See
also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE
COMMITMENT 6 (1994) (explaining an aim of the work is “to address the question, How should the
relation between representation . . . and the discursive concepts of reason and truth be understood?”);
MARY KATE MCGOWAN, JUST WORDS: ON SPEECH AND HIDDEN HARM 2 (2019) (identifying “a
previously overlooked mechanism by which ordinary speech by ordinary speakers under ordinary
circumstances enacts harmful norms and thus constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. Harm is
constituted when the harm is brought about via adherence to norms enacted”).
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in virtue of the position we hold, nor simply in virtue of the heat or tone
with which we express our position, but centrally in virtue of the ways in
which our presentation of our position fails to properly address our
interlocutor. In this sense, civility is a second-order norm, and the
corresponding duty is similarly second order—it is a duty to engage
political disagreement in a particular way. In short, the duty of civility has
to do with our dialectal conduct.
The second-order nature of civility may seem so obvious as to not
require extended comment. However, it is worth emphasizing this feature
of the duty in order to properly understand its role in democratic life. The
concept of civility is needed to articulate a feasible understanding of what
citizens owe to one another, given that political disagreement is an
inevitable product of democracy itself. That is, democratic citizens need to
be able to evaluate one another’s dialectical conduct as a way of managing
their first-order disputes. As with the ontological debates that concerned
Quine, citizens need to be able to talk about the way they talk about the
issues that divide them, as this second-order talk can help them to arrive at
mutually agreeable understandings of where their disagreements lie and the
precise shape they take. Perhaps the ability to ascend to talk in the second
order about how well one’s arguments address one’s interlocutors can
sometimes assist in making progress with first-order disputes over policy.
At the very least, the ability to avail ourselves of a second-order idiom for
evaluating discursive conduct may be able to help prevent undue escalation
in contexts of disagreement.
And here is where a point made at the beginning of this Article comes
into its own. Note that the idiom of civility can perform these democratic
tasks only if it is second order. That is, a conception of civility can play its
proper role in democracy only if it specifies requirements that can be met
by those who hold erroneous political views, and also violated by those
who hold correct political views. We might say that the requirements
specified by the duty of civility must be nonpartisan, that is, impartial with
respect to political error and correctness. Or, put another way, a viable
conception of civility and its corresponding duty must enable us to
countenance cases where those with whom we agree at the first order are
nonetheless failing at civility, and those with whom we disagree at the first
order are nonetheless civil.
V. THE PROBLEM OF SEMANTIC DESCENT
My hope is that nearly everything that has been said thus far strikes the
reader as unobjectionable, perhaps even commonsensical. Still, the
elements are in place for formulating what I see as a serious difficulty
confronting any plausible conception of civility. When it comes to political
disagreement, there are no analogues to Quine’s “tangible objects” that
allow people “of unlike conceptual schemes” to “communicate at their
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best.” To put the point bluntly, what goes up can come down, too. And
our second-order idiom for evaluating each other’s discursive conduct is
subject to what can be called semantic descent—the shift by which our
second-order evaluative terms are conscripted into playing a combat role in
first-order skirmishes.
To get the flavor of what I have in mind, consider a term used in
talking about online discourse: “troll.” This term entered into our
vernacular as a way to identify a mode of online conduct that is
objectionable in virtue of being provocative and haranguing simply for the
sake of disrupting discussion threads.36 In this original usage, being a
“troll” has little to do with one’s substantive commitments; “trolling” is the
second-order phenomenon of engaging in a way designed to derail
conversation. Once the term gained currency, however, it quickly became
vulnerable to semantic descent: the term is now widely deployed as a term
of abuse to characterize those with whom one disagrees over issues at the
first order. “Trolls” are simply one’s political opponents, and “trolling” is
what trolls (so understood) do in articulating their views.
Another example of the phenomenon of semantic descent is the term
“fake news.” The term was introduced to describe a source that poses as
journalistic, but in fact is not.37 The term thus initially denoted a
second-order feature of various web sites, television programs, and print
media. However, “fake news” is now widely used as a term to deride the
content that is reported by a journalist.38 At its worst, “fake news” is
simply what one calls reportage that is favorable to one’s political rivals.39
In this way, the term has descended from its second-order function to our
first-order debates. In other words, it initially served an umpiring function,
but is now just another player in the political game.
Finally, consider the verb to “politicize.” This term entered the
vernacular as a way of identifying cases where political actors attempt to
gain politically from a high-profile event (typically a tragedy) that arguably
ought to stand above the fray of politics. But now the term is itself
35

QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT, supra note 26, at 272.
ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST., MEDIA MANIPULATION AND
DISINFORMATION
ONLINE
4–5
(2017),
https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf.
37
JULIE POSETTI ET AL., JOURNALISM, ‘FAKE NEWS’ & DISINFORMATION: HANDBOOK FOR
JOURNALISM EDUCATION AND TRAINING 14 (2018). This book references the “growing international
concern about a ‘disinformation war’ in which journalism and journalists are prime targets,” and offers
as evidence the joint statement issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Representative on
Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. Id.
38
Id. at 66.
39
Id. at 14–15.
36
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deployed as a means for gaining politically under circumstances of that
kind. More specifically, the term functions as an accusation that one wields
against one’s opposition as a way to claim for oneself the political high
ground by disparaging one’s rivals. But, of course, vying for the political
high ground is itself an attempt to gain politically.
The trouble is that any conceptualization of civility, and indeed the
very concept of civility itself, is subject to semantic descent. That is,
although civility is useful to us as a way of thinking about how we conduct
ourselves in political argumentation, it can always be opportunistically
wielded as just another way of carrying out our first-order debates. When
civility has descended, it functions as a term of approval for those who
express positions that we find favorable, and incivility serves as a term for
expressing disapprobation at the first-order positions that we find
objectionable.
The matter grows bleaker still once we recall that civility norms are
best understood as requirements to try to engage in ways that successfully
address one’s fellow citizens. This means that the question of whether a
citizen is being civil in a particular dispute is largely a matter of judgment:
we must assess whether our interlocutor is endeavoring adequately to
address us as an equal and communicating in good faith. A significant
body of empirical literature demonstrates that evaluations of this kind are
highly responsive to exogeneous factors. In short, we are very likely to
regard those with whom we disagree politically as ill-motivated,
untrustworthy, and unreliable. Accordingly, our assessments of their
dialectical conduct will be responsive to our evaluations of their first-order
views in ways that will lead us to assess our opponents as uncivil.
Recall the argument from Section Three that the duty of civility is a
reciprocal requirement. This means that individual citizens are bound by
the requirement only provided that their interlocutors seem prepared to
reciprocate. Once civility has descended from its second-order function,
we grow increasingly unable to regard our political rivals as capable of
reciprocating. We therefore take ourselves to not be bound by civility’s
norms. Crucially, our opposition reasons similarly. The result is
democratically degenerative—a condition where citizens are able to
interact civilly only with those who are politically just like themselves,
and, with some justification, see those who are politically different as
undeserving of civility (because unwilling or unable to reciprocate).
CONCLUSION
Return to the Pew results mentioned at the beginning of this Article.
Citizens say they want a more civil mode of politics, but they also see their
political opposition as the source of incivility, and accordingly want their
rivals simply to stand down and acquiesce. This collection of attitudes is
precisely what we should expect when civility has semantically descended,
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when its second-order content has been degraded to the point where it can
no longer serve as a basis for impartial evaluation of discursive conduct.
The upshot, I think, is that the concept of civility is at this point probably
unable to play a useful role in diagnosing and repairing our democracy. To
put the point in a different way, no suitably detailed conception of civility
will be sufficiently public and impartial to serve as a tool for addressing
our political dysfunctions.
Where does that leave us? Although I cannot develop the thought here,
my sense is that the partisanship, animosity, polarization, and distrust that
have taken hold of our democracy cannot be remedied with prescriptions
for better politics. Any such prescription is likely to be received by a large
portion of those to whom it is addressed as yet another partisan maneuver.
What is needed instead is the recognition that these dysfunctions are
possibly the natural result of allowing politics to play too great a role in our
collective life. As other scholars have noted, the intensification of partisan
animosity and polarization has occurred alongside sociological shifts in the
country that have served to place individuals’ partisan affiliations at the
center of their social identity. In short, we now tend to see ourselves as
fundamentally defined by our political loyalties.40 Along with this shift in
our self-understanding has come a transformation of the social spaces we
inhabit in our day-to-day lives: they have become increasingly segregated
along partisan divides.41 Perhaps the right response, then, is to devise
channels by which citizens can come to see in one another something
beyond partisan identities. As paradoxical as it might sound, the way to
repair our democracy is to keep ourselves mindful of the fact that, as
important as democracy is, we cannot live well together as equals solely by
means of politics.42

40
See LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 5–6
(2018) (“Parties simplify the voting decision. . . . [M]ost voters have a sense of party loyalty. They
know, either through a lifetime of learning, from parental socialization, from news media, or through
some combination thereof, that one party is better suited to them.”).
41
See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS
TEARING US APART 5 (2009) (“As Americans have moved over the past three decades, they have
clustered in communities of sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the end,
politics. . . . When people move, they also make choices about who their neighbors will be and who
will share their new lives. Those are now political decisions, and they are having a profound effect on
the nation’s public life.”).
42
See ROBERT B. TALISSE, OVERDOING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE MUST PUT POLITICS IN ITS
PLACE 4–5 (2019) (discussing “the ubiquity of democratic politics, the saturation of social life with
activities and projects that are overtly organized around the categories and divisions of current
politics”).
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The Long Con of Civility
LYNN MIE ITAGAKI
Civility has been much on the minds of pundits in local and national political
discussions since the 1990s. Periods of civil unrest or irreconcilable divisions in
governance intensify concerns about civility. While its more archaic definitions
refer to citizenry and civilization, civility is often promoted as the foundation or
goal of deliberative democracies. However, less acknowledged is its disciplinary,
repressive effects in maintaining or deepening racial, gendered, heteronormative,
and ableist hierarchies that distinguish some populations for full citizenship and
others for partial rights and protections.
In Part I, I examine a recent series of civility polls, their contradictory results,
and how these contradictions can importantly expose the fissures of our
contemporary moment and our body politic. In Part II, I describe the historical
background of civility around race, gender, and sexuality and the unacknowledged
difficulty in defining civility and incivility. In Part III, I extend this discussion to
address the recent cases before the Supreme Court concerning LGBTQ+
employment discrimination and lack of accessibility. In conclusion, I identify what
it would mean to analyze civility in terms of dignity on the basis of these cases
about the equal rights and protections of their LGBTQ+ and disabled plaintiffs.
We should be deeply suspicious with demands for civility that are often deployed
to quell dissent from marginalized populations and to dampen democratic
practices.
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The Long Con of Civility
LYNN MIE ITAGAKI *
INTRODUCTION
Civility, now more than ever, is a concern of our everyday
conversations and political debates. Civility is a flexible concept which has
referred to everything from polite conversation to an entire civilization,
and its very expansiveness undermines its effectivity. Most often, civility
denotes orderly turn-taking or polite manners exhibited by a “civilized”
citizenry. It also includes internal contradictions, depending on the
situation and its practitioners. Civility is the way in which we should talk
about important things; civility is also the way in which we do not talk
about important things. One person’s civility is another’s incivility. From
the smallest rude remark to the institutionalized exclusion of groups, the
flexibility of the term “civility” encompasses a tremendous range of
customs, behaviors, practices, and traditions. Moreover, when people
advocate for civility, they often neglect to disclose their implicit
assumptions about to whom they owe civility, which may not include those
with whom they disagree or disparage. Civility is often understood as the
foundation or goal of deliberative democracies; however, it also has
disciplinary, repressive effects in maintaining or exacerbating racial,
gendered, heteronormative, and ableist hierarchies that distinguish some
populations for full citizenship and others for partial rights and protections.
In Part I, I examine a recent series of civility polls, their contradictory
results, and how these contradictions can importantly expose the fissures of
our contemporary moment and our body politic. In Part II, I describe the
historical background of civility around race, gender, and sexuality and the
unacknowledged difficulty in defining civility and incivility. In Part III, I
extend this discussion to address the recent cases before the Supreme Court
concerning LGBTQ+ employment discrimination and lack of accessibility.
In conclusion, I identify what it would mean to analyze civility in terms of
dignity on the basis of these cases about the equal rights and protections of
their LGBTQ+ and disabled plaintiffs. We should be deeply suspicious
*
Associate Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies, University of Missouri,
Columbia. I sincerely thank Richard Wilson, the Law Review organizers, and editors of the 2019
symposium “How We Argue Now: The Moral Foundations of Politics and Law.” Thank you to Devin
Fergus, Jennifer M. Gülly, Srirupa Prasad, Linda Reeder, Leslie Wingard, and my colleagues at the
University of Missouri for their invaluable feedback.
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with demands for civility that are often deployed to quell dissent from
marginalized populations and to dampen democratic practices.
I. THE PARADOX OF THE POLLS
The consensus among Americans is that incivility seems to have gotten
worse. Poll after poll appears to represent respondents’ increasing
frustration with incivility in our media and political debates. A late October
2019 poll1 about civility in politics seemed to affirm with numbers the
political polarization and profound partisanship that most people felt. In
response to the statement “[t]he political, racial, and class divisions in this
country are getting worse and our national dialogue is breaking down,”
seventy-seven percent agreed, a six point swing from April 2019’s
eighty-three percent (albeit within the ±3.1 margin of error).2 Other similar
overwhelming majorities agreed with variations of these statements such as
“I am frustrated by the uncivil and rude behavior of many politicians”
(eighty-seven percent) and “[b]ehavior that used to be seen as unacceptable
is now accepted as normal behavior” (eighty-four percent).3
However, polling data for this Civility Poll revealed an apparent
contradiction expressed by a majority of respondents: while eighty-seven
percent (with sixty-four percent strongly agreeing) agreed that
“compromise and common ground should be the goal for political leaders,”
eighty-four percent (with sixty-three percent strongly agreeing) also agreed
with the statement, “I’m tired of leaders compromising my values and
ideals. I want leaders who will stand up to the other side.”4 Taking cues
from the press release, media coverage repeated and amplified this
apparent contradiction between respondents simultaneously wanting

1
October 2019 Civility Poll, GEO. U. INST. POL. & PUB. SERV. (Oct. 2019),
http://politics.georgetown.edu/october-2019-civility-poll-2/. This poll is run semi-annually by the
Institute of Politics at Georgetown University with Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning polling
outfits.
2
Compare THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 65 FINAL
STUDY #16440, at 1, 3 (2019), http://politics.georgetown.edu/full-cross-tabs-and-questionnaire-october2019-2/, with THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 64 STUDY #
16354, at 1, 3 (2020), http://politics.georgetown.edu/civility-poll-tables-cross-tabs-questionnaire-april2019/.
3
THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 65 FINAL STUDY #16440,
at 1, 3 (2019), http://politics.georgetown.edu/full-cross-tabs-and-questionnaire-october-2019-2/. The
Georgetown Institute of Politics and Public Service Battleground Civility Poll from April 4, 2019
showed a three percent decrease and one percent increase, respectively, again within the margin of
error. See THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 64 STUDY # 16354, at
1, 3 (2020), http://politics.georgetown.edu/civility-poll-tables-cross-tabs-questionnaire-april-2019/
(displaying results of the April 2019 poll).
4
GU Politics, New Poll: Voters Find Political Divisions So Bad, Believe U.S. Is Two-Thirds of
the Way to “Edge of a Civil War”, GEO. U. INST. POL. & PUB. SERV. (Oct. 23, 2019),
http://politics.georgetown.edu/press-releases/civility-press-release-oct-2019/.
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compromise and not wanting one’s political leaders to compromise. Mo
Elleithee, Executive Director of the Georgetown Institute of Politics and
Public Service, says that this contradiction “creates mixed messages for
even the most skilled political leader trying to decide whether to be a
fighter or a dealmaker.”6 But how could at least two-thirds, if not as many
as three-quarters, of the same respondents say that they wanted these two
contradictory things?7
This contradiction points to the benefits and drawbacks of civility,
especially in terms of the promise of civil discourse and respectful debate it
offers to many. The ostensible inconsistency with these two statements
reflects one of the fundamental problems of civility and its “meaning
clusters”8 that go far beyond mere politeness, but rather activate its more
obscure definitions of the citizenry and civilization. Assertions of civility
rely on certain assumptions about to whom one owes civility.9 For
example, whether one should be civil to another individual or member of
another group can depend on if one perceives these individuals or group
members to share values and commitments to the nation.10 The practices,
tactics, and strategies for how we might achieve civility can require strong
advocacy in and of themselves, as opposed to the most common demand to
just be polite.
However, the increasing polarization of the U.S. electorate can lead to
a more restrictive notion of civility, summoning the interrelated force of its
archaic definitions of citizenry and civilization by limiting those to whom
one should show civility. Consolidating this in-group and excluding others
determine who is valued or disdained, a full citizen or second-class one,
patriot or enemy.11 Under these conditions, civility’s flexible and
wide-ranging definition may stretch to mean even its opposite. For
example, Civility Poll respondents who wanted compromise and common
ground might actually imply for respondents that those on the other side of
the issue are responsible for reaching a compromise and finding common
ground with their stated position. In other words, those on the other side of
the debate should listen to me and to views like mine, expressed by my
5
Paul Bedard, Battleground: 7 in 10 Say US ‘On the edge of Civil War’, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct.
23, 2019, 1:27 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/battleground-7-in-10say-us-on-the-edge-of-civil-war; Victor Westerkamp, Americans Believe We’re Two-Thirds of the Way
to a Civil War, NTD (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ntd.com/americans-believe-were-two-thirds-of-theway-to-a-civil-war_396411.html.
6
GU Politics, supra note 4 (alteration in original).
7
Id. Given the margin of error, the number of respondents who agreed with both statements could
be as high as seventy-seven, and as low as sixty-five, albeit the range clearly signals a distinct majority.
8
Virginia Sapiro, Considering Political Civility Historically: A Case Study of the United States 2
(1999) (unpublished manuscript), http://blogs.bu.edu/vsapiro/files/2018/06/Considering-Civility.pdf.
9
Id. at 5–6.
10
Id. at 7.
11
Id. at 9.
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elected representative, but I and people who agree with me shouldn’t have
to. Compromise describes what others do, therefore I may listen to those
other perspectives but I will not change my position, as that would
compromise my own values. I could justify this redefinition of
compromise to mean not compromising by identifying the other side as not
worthy of compromise by labeling these antagonists as criminal,
unpatriotic, evil, subhuman—i.e., not worthy of civility. Thus, I only need
to find compromise and common ground among those I consider citizens,
patriots, voters, humans—essentially people who think like me. Moreover,
I categorize as “humans” only those who think like me, or those with
whom I would not have to compromise my values.
Respondents could be reflecting a social desirability bias as “shy”
anti-compromise and anti-common-ground citizens and voters who might
not admit certain opinions to pollsters. Whites might be especially fearful
of appearing racist in ways that might parallel women’s and racial
minorities’ fears of being stereotyped,12 and Moss-Racusin et al. posit a
“compensatory egalitarianism” in which “individuals may reassure
themselves that although they did not select a minority candidate, they
‘repaid’ this candidate with implicit antiprejudice attitudes on their
behalf.”13 I posit that respondents might be sensitive to being perceived as
not supporting democratic values or egalitarianism by being unwilling to
find a compromise or common ground
This bias skews polls by small amounts that can alter expectations of
close runs and flip anticipated results, as occurred in the 2016 presidential
election outcome.14 Known as the “Bradley effect,”15 scholars and pundits
named this phenomenon after the 1982 gubernatorial race of California in
which African American mayor Tom Bradley led by a comfortable margin
in the pre-election polls but eventually lost by fewer than 100,000 votes, or
1.2%.16 Researchers identified respondents’ concerns that they would be
perceived as racist for not voting for Bradley, a candidate who could have
12
Phillip Atiba Goff, Claude M. Steele & Paul G. Davies, The Space Between Us: Stereotype
Threat and Distance in Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 92 (2008).
13
Corinne Moss-Racusin, Julie Phelan & Laurie Rudman, “I’m Not Prejudiced, but . . .”:
Compensatory Egalitarianism in the 2008 Democratic Presidential Primary, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 543,
546 (2010).
14
Andrew Mercer et al., Why 2016 Election Polls Missed Their Mark, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT
TANK (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/why-2016-election-pollsmissed-their-mark/; Joseph P. Williams, The Trump Effect, U.S. NEWS: REP. (July 1, 2016, 3:30 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-01/are-voters-too-embarrassed-to-say-they-supporttrump.
15
Ronald J. Vogel & Phillip Ardoin, Ask Me No Questions, I’ll Tell You No Lies: Does the
Bradley Effect Still Exist?, 15 RACE GENDER & CLASS 65, 66 (2008).
16
Id.; John Canalis, Is the Bradley Effect Real? Deukmejian Says No, LONG BEACH PRESS
TELEGRAM (Oct. 28, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.presstelegram.com/2008/10/28/is-the-bradleyeffect-real-deukmejian-says-no/.
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been the first Black governor of California. This statistical issue of how
researchers and pollsters should most accurately factor in bias to avoid
tipping the scales results from the phenomena of “covering,” as Kenji
Yoshino calls what he takes up from Erving Goffman’s notion of hiding or
downplaying a disfavored, stigmatized identity, in this case, an anti-Black
racist one.18 The generally unanticipated election of Donald J. Trump in
2016 and the 2015 surprising majority vote of the British to withdraw from
the European Union are only the most recent spectacular examples of
covering: the Shy Trump voter or the Shy Brexit voter whose answers
reflected this bias, and for whom pollsters did not adequately account.19
Pollsters and jury selection consultants, among other experts, can
attempt to ascertain more accurate opinions with indirect, rather than
direct, questions. For example, in 2008 pollsters were confronted with the
unprecedented question of whether registered Democrats would have a
problem voting for a Black or female candidate, as was likely with Barack
Obama and Hillary Clinton as the presidential nominee frontrunners.
Pollsters had to ask indirect questions that more accurately predicted
voting preferences. They knew they would get skewed results by asking
participants directly if they were racist or sexist or even if they would
support a qualified Black or female candidate, so instead pollsters had to
develop versions of these questions that asked if “most of my neighbors”20
or “most people they knew” would support these presidential candidates
and if “America was ready” for them.”21 Pollsters need to work around a
perceived norm, or what respondents might see as the more socially
desirable or civil answer, because respondents are covering (hiding or
toning down) what they think are disfavored political views and identities
and ones that might generate hostility and conflict.
II. THE CULTURE WARS WERE CIVILITY WARS
I posit civility as not only a confidence trick played on the U.S. public
for decades, but also as referencing the general confidence in civility as a
universal solution for many contemporary political ills. This use of civility
usually appears as a default strategy and non-legal remedy for leveling
hierarchies and inequalities.22 In this context, interpreting the above polls
17

Vogel & Ardoin, supra note 15, at 67.
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2007).
19
Nick O’Malley, Donald Trump, Brexit, and the Shy Voter Theory, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Oct. 26, 2016, 8:57 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/donald-trump-brexit-and-theshy-voter-theory-20161026-gsao0a.html.
20
Susan Page, Call Her Madame President, USA TODAY, Oct.10, 2005, at C1.
21
Kathy Frankovic, Race, Gender and Bias in the Electorate, CBS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2008, 3:00
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/race-gender-and-bias-in-the-electorate/.
22
LYNN MIE ITAGAKI, CIVIL RACISM: THE 1992 LOS ANGELES REBELLION AND THE CRISIS OF
RACIAL BURNOUT 19–22 (2016).
18
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assumes that voters’ frustrations with decreasing civility might change how
they are voting or will vote.
Civility has multiple purposes evoked by its range of definitions—in
short: citizenry, civil society, and civilization.23 Political scientist Virginia
Sapiro notes that “civility has been traditionally defined as civic virtues,
community-building, and deliberative practices of good citizens.”24 Civility
is often considered to be the foundation of deliberative democracies.25 It is
thus “a concept, political goal, and measure.”26 Civility is a strategy and
may also be an obstacle to maintaining a vibrant democracy as it can be a
tool of exclusion used against those who are not deemed “civil.”27
All these definitions of civility are at play or are in crisis in the
all-capitals topline of the GU Politics Civility Poll press release:
“VOTERS FIND POLITICAL DIVISIONS SO BAD, BELIEVE U.S. IS
TWO-THIRDS OF THE WAY TO ‘EDGE OF A CIVIL WAR.’”28 While
polarization deepened during the Obama and Trump Administrations, the
concern of an imminent civil war alludes to the cultural and historical
backdrop of another era, of another allegedly impending race war.
Following the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and 1991 collapse of the Soviet
Union, “political upheavals and civil wars . . . instigated an anxious
outpouring of U.S. research on civil society and its contribution to the
durability and integrity of democratic states.”29 The post-cold war era saw
that “new social and political forces were at play, both domestically and
internationally” and largely superseded what legal scholar Derrick Bell and
historian Mary Dudziak have argued is “the ‘interest convergence’ of cold
war politics and the modern civil rights movement [that] contributed to
more democratic racial practices.”30 And although capitalism had
ostensibly triumphed over communism,31 the 1992 violence in Los Angeles
“punctured the illusion of [U.S.] exceptionalism”32 and its invincibility
from civil unrest—in this case, over police brutality and racial inequalities.
Paleoconservative Pat Buchanan referenced the 1992 Los Angeles
“riots” as he concluded his serious challenge to the Republican presidential
23

Id. at 15.
Id. at 28–29.
25
Sapiro, supra note 8, at 3.
26
ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at xv.
27
Id. at 19–20.
28
GU Politics, supra note 4.
29
ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 14.
30
ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 14. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518–33 (1980) (outlining
the scholar’s interest convergence argument). See also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 14, 258 (2000) (supporting Bell’s interest
convergence argument).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 15.
24
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incumbent by conceding to President George H.W. Bush at the 1992
Republican National Convention in his famous “Culture War” speech:
My friends, this election is about more than who gets what. It
is about who we are. It is about what we believe, and what
we stand for as Americans. There is a religious war going on
in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of
nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself, for this war is
for the soul of America.33
Buchanan arrayed both Bill and Hillary Clinton against Bush, who “is on
our side.”34 Addressing his primary voters who posed a significant
challenge within the Republican Party to then-President Bush’s re-election
campaign, Buchanan both describes and directs them in martial language:
“And so, to the Buchanan Brigades out there, we have to come home and
stand beside George Bush.”35 Emphasizing that this culture war is a
physical one, and one “for the soul of America,” Buchanan closes his
speech with the martial image of teenaged National Guard troops who have
returned from the 1991 Persian Gulf War to fight against “a mob” during
the 1992 Los Angeles “riots”: “And as those boys took back the streets of
Los Angeles, block by block, my friends, we must take back our cities, and
take back our culture, and take back our country.”36
Civility was fueled by the master narrative of American progress, the
exceptionalist Bildungsroman of the maturing nation adopting increasingly
robust notions of democracy and equality. By calling that dominant
perception of the nation into question, the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion had
a profound, though seldom acknowledged, influence on the way
Americans thought of their country in the post-cold war, post-civil rights
eras. For example, political scientist Robert Putnam’s popular essay and
bestselling book of the same title, Bowling Alone, warned of a civic culture
in this country declining at the very moment when newly democratic
governments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere were looking to the United
States as a model:
Many students of the new democracies that have emerged
over the past decade and a half have emphasized the
importance of a strong and active civil society to the
consolidation of democracy. Especially with regard to the
postcommunist countries, scholars and democratic activists
alike have lamented the absence or obliteration of traditions
33
Patrick Joseph Buchanan, Culture War Speech: Address to the Republican National Convention
(Aug. 17, 1992), https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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of independent civic engagement and a widespread tendency
toward passive reliance on the state. To those concerned with
the weakness of civil societies in the developing or
postcommunist world, the advanced Western democracies
and above all the United States have typically been taken as
models to be emulated. There is striking evidence, however,
that the vibrancy of American civil society has notably
declined over the past several decades.37
In the mid-1990s, the civility debates reached their peak in public
discourse among academics, politicians, journalists, and pundits; these
“unresolved differences of civic values and virtues have been blamed for
fracturing U.S. society, resulting in a so-called civility crisis.”38 The
civility crisis had its roots in the legacy of affirmative action, the promises
of President Johnson’s Great Society policies, and the sociopolitical tumult
of the 1960s anti-war, anti-poverty, decolonial, lesbian and gay, feminist,
and anti-racist movements.39 Historian Daryl Michael Scott identifies a
racial neoconservative perspective that perceived liberals as:
too apologetic for what they viewed as the riotous behavior
of urban blacks, and [neoconservatives] emphasized the need
for law and order. More important here, [neoconservatives]
also tended to have serious reservations about preferential
programs such as affirmative action and efforts to promote
integration such as school busing. They reasserted the
traditional racial liberal call for a color-blind state, which
would protect only the civil rights of individuals.40
Scott notes the perception of uncivil behavior, “riotous behavior,” and
even the “serious reservations” over supporting equal opportunity as
outcomes rather than as processes.41 The title of his study, Contempt and
Pity, taken from W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk in its trenchant
explanation of anti-Black attitudes, identifies how the prevalent notion of
“pity” was Whites’ implicit reason for changing public sentiment during
major civil rights landmarks, such as Brown v. Board, Great Society

37
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65,
65 (1995); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
38
ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 16.
39
Id. at 9.
40
DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF THE
DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880–1996 xiv (1997).
41
Id.
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reforms, and civil rights acts. However, this feeling masked contempt for
Black people, in what I posit was the civil face of hateful, racist feelings.42
Inequality will be more indirectly channeled through ostensibly
race-neutral governmental and institutional practices as historian Carol
Anderson documents.43 The incivility of “white rage” is now diffused
through structural discrimination, indirect rather than direct, hidden instead
of overt:
White rage is not about visible violence, but rather it works
its way through the courts, the legislatures, and a range of
government bureaucracies. It wreaks havoc subtly, almost
imperceptibly. Too imperceptibly, certainly, for a nation
consistently drawn to the spectacular—to what it can see. It’s
not the Klan. White rage doesn’t have to wear sheets, burn
crosses, or take to the streets. Working the halls of power, it
can achieve its ends far more effectively, far more
destructively.44
Anderson identifies the political logics of process and procedure that
perpetuates inequalities more efficiently and pervasively. Critical ethnic
studies scholars Jodi Byrd et al. echo Anderson’s arguments in relation to
economic inequality, exposing the presumed “apolitical” nature of
bureaucratic, procedural, and administrative acts to facilitate
“dispossession”; and this façade of being apolitical flourishes despite these
acts’ origins and maintenance “as the result of law and policy.”45
Moreover, non-enforcement of constitutional rights and legislation and the
selective protections available to some but not all persons create further
inequities. The failure of constitutional amendments such as the Fifth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth exemplifies the failure of enforcement since the
nation’s founding alongside African chattel slavery, Indigenous genocide,
and broken treaties. Civil rights acts of the 1960s have helped to close
employment, educational, and voting gaps, among other things; however, it
was the backlash against the laws that served to curtail their effectiveness
and had a chilling effect on consistent enforcement. The racist destruction
wrought by “halls of power” that Anderson references are not only
political institutions, but also “still suffuse our social and economic system,
42
Id. at xi–xii, xviii. See also W.E.B. DU BOIS, Of Our Spiritual Strivings, in THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK 37, 38 (David W. Blight & Robert Gooding-Williams eds., Bedford Books 1997) (1903)
(“It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through
the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and
pity.” (footnote omitted)).
43
CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL DIVIDE 3–4 (2016).
44
Id. at 3.
45
Jodi A. Byrd et al., Predatory Value: Economies of Dispossession and Disturbed
Relationalities, SOC. TEXT, June 2018, at 10.
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buttressed by the informal modes of social control even more powerful
than the law,” as historian William Chafe diagnoses the ultimately limited
effects of the civil rights acts of the 1960s.46 These informalities are often
just as pernicious: “Although the means of keeping blacks in their place
may now be implicit rather than explicit, they too often are just as effective
as in the past.”47
Philosopher Jonathan Schonsheck identifies a typology that helpfully
disambiguates incivilities among individuals (rudeness) and groups (rasp),
as well as the basic rejection of what Schonsheck posits are the
“metavalues” (repudiation): toleration and mutual respect, the foundation
of a democracy.48
Rasp is the friction of jostling political, moral, religious, and
ethnic groups that is inevitable in any multicultural “liberal
democracy”—a system, or theory, or philosophy of
government that cherishes the values of toleration and mutual
respect. Not everyone, however, subscribes to toleration and
mutual respect; the repudiation of these values generates the
third, and most serious, category of incivility.49
Civility is also an appealing paradigm because of its admonitions of
individual behavior rather than institutional changes that shape behavior
through legal mandates such as affirmative action or antidiscrimination
statutes. Civility can also normalize the violence of “repudiation”: the
“friction” and “jostling” of intolerance and disrespect. In their “Eleven
Theses on Civility,” performance scholars Kyla Wanzana Tompkins and
Tavia Nyong’o expose how this repudiation is hidden: “Civility discourse
enforces a false equation between incivility and violence that works to
mask everyday violence as a civic norm.”50 The problems with promoting
civility as a panacea for political impasses are made more visible through
an often unacknowledged subset of incivility—bullying—its
normalization, and recent critiques of the research on this phenomenon.
In Bully Nation: How the American Establishment Created a Bullying
Society, Charles Derber and Yale Magrass begin their wide-ranging study
of the economic and militaristic institutions that implicitly and explicitly

46
WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE
BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM, at vii (1981).
47
Id.
48
Jonathan Schonsheck, Rudeness, Rasp, and Repudiation, in CIVILITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
ESSAYS ON CIVIC VIRTUE, TOLERATION, AND CULTURAL FRAGMENTATION 169, 169–72 (Christine T.
Sistare ed., 2004).
49
Id. at 169.
50
Tavia Nyong’o & Kyla Wazana Tompkins, Eleven Theses on Civility, SOCIAL TEXT (July 11,
2018), https://socialtextjournal.org/eleven-theses-on-civility/.
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promote bullying behavior among Americans. Derber and Magrass
provide critiques of anti-bullying programs in their emphasis on what they
call the “psychiatric paradigm.”52 I am not only interested in Derber and
Magrass’s research on bullying for its relationship to civility but also as a
means of making civility’s shortcomings also visible. Derber and Magrass
are critical of how the psychiatric paradigm gives rise to the following
popular beliefs: bullies are often misjudged as individuals acting alone and
who are spontaneously maladjusted or troubled rather than organized and
strategic in their harassment; the social ill of bullying is relegated to the
realm of children, juvenile behavior, and immature development; bullying
is not what adults do nor what venerable state apparatuses such as “the
economy, military, culture, family, schools” facilitate which “all help
create and perpetuate the bullying milieu.”53 Incivility is similarly
simplified as performed by individuals who are bad or criminal rather than
strategic in deploying incivility, and incivility is generally condemned
rather than examined for what its manifestation might expose about the
issue or institution affected.
III. INCIVILITIES, INEQUALITIES, INDIGNITIES, INHUMANITIES
I have more fully developed the concept of “civil racism” elsewhere in
the context of the mid-1990s “civility debates” which promoted individual
behaviors as leading to more effective community building, or, on the
extreme other hand, the death of nations.54 Civil racism acknowledges the
growing field of civility studies that assesses the development or decline of
our civil society in terms of social capital.55 I argue that civil racism marks
the cultural and legal shift from the modern civil rights movement to the
post-civil rights era; “the goal of equality is portrayed as an ethical choice
between the formal (legal) processes and empirical evaluations of the[ir]
outcomes,” so equal process versus equal outcomes.56 As a marker that
distinguishes the post-civil rights era from earlier times, racism’s effects
are “minimized” both in terms of its pervasive harm and its institutional
purview: “Civil racism marks the ways in which racial discrimination has
been allowed sanctuary in the private realms of individual, isolated
behaviors.”57 Moreover, “discussions of remedies for racial discrimination
51

CHARLES DERBER & YALE R. MAGRASS, BULLY NATION: HOW THE AMERICAN
ESTABLISHMENT CREATED A BULLYING SOCIETY 2 (2012).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 15–16 (discussing the benefits of civility in dialogue and social
behavior in deterring social anomie).
55
Id. at 6.
56
Id.
57
Id. For “minimization of racism” as a “central frame of color-blind racism,” see EDUARDO
BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 142 (2001).
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58

are marked as impolite and uncivil.” Civil racism emphasizes the racial
character of civility: the hierarchy depends on what is considered
appropriate racial behavior in life, at work, and in leisure.59 Given civil
racism, one’s entitlement to rights and protections are based on one’s
perceived good or bad behaviors rather than inalienable or natural as
inherent to one’s humanity.60
I define “civil racism” as the preservation of civility at the expense of
racial equality.61 As an expression of structural racism, civil racism
exhibits the active—though often unintentional—perpetuation of
discrimination through one’s everyday engagement with the state and
society.62 Thus, I am skeptical of the investment of time and resources in
civility. I posit calls for civility as a heuristic that can often expose an
individual’s or group’s investment in thwarting more equitable processes
and outcomes. Oppressed individuals and groups call for full equality,
dignity, and humanity—rarely civility.
However, civility might entice some resistant stakeholders, possibly
racial conservatives, centrists, and moderates into conversation with others
holding different views. This rationale is often promoted, and marginalized
speakers are often exhorted to behave civilly. Philosopher Hannah Arendt
has famously commented on the need for one’s civil rights to be
recognized before one has human rights, or the paradoxical right to have
rights.63 We can read this in a variety of ways. If one doesn’t have equality,
then there is no true civility (mutual respect or cooperation). In cultivating
or exercising citizenship, civility only functions between and among
equals. Otherwise it is condescension for the powerful and submission for
the less powerful. Being civil has been used as a gatekeeper to equality: if
one isn’t civil then one doesn’t deserve equality.
My concern with a racist civility that is pursued at the personal or even
institutional level was that it did not cost much if anything at all. In other
words, there would be no material redistribution or even worse, a
redistribution that flowed upward, just a friendlier face or personable
interactions whatever one’s racist beliefs or society’s racist inequities. The
emotional labor of civility was more often extracted from vulnerable
populations who had to repeatedly overlook microaggressions or be forced

58

Id.
See id. at 24 (explaining how invisible forms of discrimination influence the structure of civil
society).
60
See id. at 21 (comparing proponents of civility and how they inadequately address existing
social hierarchies).
61
See id. at 6 (providing various definitions of civil racism).
62
Id.
63
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296–97 (1976) (delineating the right
to have rights and the right to belong to an organized community).
59

THE LONG CON OF CIVILITY

2021]

1183

64

to “cover.” Kenji Yoshino interprets mainstream society, and indeed a
number of court rulings, as failing to protect a mutable behavior that is not
a protected civil right such as wearing no makeup, public affection
between same-sex couples, or speaking Spanish at work when one is
bilingual and hired for this fluency but the owners are not.65 And given the
three cases just taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding employment
discrimination against LGBTQ+ workers, these unprotected mutable
behaviors in a number of states would also apply to gender performances
not corresponding to the sex on one’s birth certificate—as in the case of
Aimee Stephens, who lived and dressed as a woman—or in actions such as
joining a gay softball league or loving someone of the same gender and
disclosing that identity or relationship in a conversation with a work
client.66
Returning to Arendt’s important description of cause-and-effect,67 if
one is not seen as having civil rights, then one does not have human
rights.68 If one is not perceived as being equal, then one can never be
perceived as being civil. If one is not valued, then one can never be
recognized or have a full self-expression that is respected and heard.69 This
tension between civility and equality appears in two Supreme Court cases
in attempts to limit the extent to whom civility applies.
In Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, Guillermo Robles has a visual
disability and must use a screen reader for his computer.70 However, he
cannot engage with some parts of Domino’s Pizza’s online interface since
screen readers cannot translate all of its website.71 The case questioned
whether the accessibility of public spaces under the Americans with
Disabilities Act applied to commercial websites.72 To extrapolate this, one
cannot fully participate in online exchanges, whether economic, social, or
political in a cyberspace that is inaccessible because websites and
platforms cannot be translated by a screen reader.73 This structural
inequality devalues Robles and others with disabilities by implying that
Domino’s does not consider this group of customers worth communicating
with despite the relatively low cost of revamping its website to be fully
64

YOSHINO, supra note 18, at 90, 130–31, 191.
Id.
66
Nina Totenberg, Showdown Over LGBTQ Employment Rights Hits Supreme Court, NPR (Oct.
8, 2019, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/766386729/showdown-over-lgbtqemployment-rights-hits-supreme-court.
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ARENDT, supra note 63, at 3, 131, 156.
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See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
69
Id.
70
Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2019).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 904.
73
Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 16–17, 23, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 913 F.3d 898
(9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-55504).
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accessible—tens of thousands of dollars for a multi-billion dollar
company.74
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Harris Funeral Homes was probably quite civil when it
fired Aimee Stephens after she explained she would live and work as a
transgender woman although she had been hired initially as a cisgender
man.75 In fact, the civility and previous rapport between her and her
employer, and the subsequent feelings of her employer betraying their civil
relationship, was what encouraged her to pursue her employment
discrimination case in the first place: “I’d given quite a few years to them,
I had good reviews, we got along good—then all of a sudden it’s ‘We
don’t need you anymore.’ I got mad enough to do something about it.”76 At
trial, the defense for Harris Funeral Homes referred to Stephens’s dead
personal pronouns of “he” and “him.”77 On appeal, the defense insisted that
the owner would have fired a woman for violating the company’s dress
code if she had worn pants instead of a skirt: one of the requirements of
persuading the justices that the sex discrimination clause of Section VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply.78
Trans+ activist and lawyer Richard Juang writes on the importance of
recognition for trans+ individuals: “Being recognized within a liberal
democracy means being valued, having one’s dignity protected, and
possessing some access to public self-expression. The struggle for
recognition’s key components—value, dignity, and self-expression—is a
cornerstone of modern U.S. political, social, and cultural activity.”79
Connecting Juang’s insights on trans+ rights to racial ones, “civil racism”
that preserves civility over racial equality can also preclude dignity. The
preservation of civility is also at the expense of human dignity. Given
74
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.
2019) (No. 17-55504); Kate Cox, Accessibility, the Future, and Why Domino’s Matters, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/10/accessibility-thefuture-and-why-dominos-matters/.
75
EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2018);
Totenberg, supra note 66.
76
Katelyn Burns, The Supreme Court Is Finally Taking on Trans Rights. Here’s the Woman Who
(Oct.
7,
2019,
4:40
PM),
https://www.vox.com/latestStarted
It
All,
VOX
news/2019/10/7/20903503/trans-supreme-court-decision-employment-discrimination-aimee-stephens.
77
See Defendant R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, EEOC v.
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (No. 2:14-cv-13710), 2014
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anatomically and legally, a man. He may assert -- against all objective evidence -- that he is a woman,
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undergo therapy and surgery that might to some extent change his physical appearance to resemble a
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(emphasis added)).
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READER 706, 706 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006).
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recent frustrations with the limited universality and applicability of human
rights and even equality, secular political theories have renewed interest in
the concept of dignity. Through Black freedom struggles as Vincent Lloyd
posits, dignity, in this case Black dignity, is achieved through collective
struggle against White supremacy.80 Thinking civility, humanity, and
dignity together reveals that dignity can be present or absent in contesting
or conforming, respectively, to multiple vectors of oppression (racist,
ableist, gender, cis-heteronormative, economic, religious, colonialist) in
what Patricia Hill Collins constructs as the “matrix of domination.”81 In
conceptualizing dignity, there is dignity through struggle against
oppression, or where there is no struggle, there is no dignity. The presence
or absence of dignity through struggle is unlike the hierarchies of human,
in which even what constitutes the human is questioned from new
materialist critiques, and has been historically hierarchized into what
philosopher Sylvia Wynter terms “genres of being human,”82 or value
which also can be graduated or measured into more or less than.
CONCLUSION
Looking at violence—whether racist, gendered, queer/transphobic, or
ableist—in relation to civility transforms notions of justice and fairness and
compels us to reevaluate the responsibilities of the individual and the state
to protect rights and foster democracy. Examining perceptions of civility in
relation to protest often exposes the limits of inclusion and participation
promised by the Constitution. Analyzing civility can change how we might
try to align our behaviors with our understanding of democratic practices.
The types of occasion in which we promote civility reveal the ways in
which we think society and the state function best, as well as how
individuals and institutions encourage or coerce us to facilitate or thwart
structures that maintain civil society.
Civility is useful, but in a vastly limited sense that is little
acknowledged by its proponents. If acts or people are called out for their
incivility, then the incivilities reference—politely, of course—both the
ugly acts of white supremacy, ableism, misogyny, or compulsory
heterosexuality and the protest against them. Or the term incivility is used
to weaken the claims of those accused of being uncivil. Civility can signal
the demand to quell or ignore protest. Civility can also signal the
obfuscation of an intent to silence or exclude. Thus, as popular terms in
80

Vincent Lloyd, Black Dignity, 68 CROSSCURRENTS 73, 76, 78, 89–90 (2018).
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POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 1, 299 (2d ed. 2000).
82
Sylvia Wynter, Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the
Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument, 3 CR: NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 257, 269,
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wide use, civility and incivility are moreso codewords, tools, or
instruments that mask a political agenda separate from movements towards
full citizenship, equality, dignity, and humanity.
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Note
The Tragedy of Central European University:
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its
Threat to Academic Freedom
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO
The global proliferation of radical right political movements and the decline
of democracy are defining features of our current moment. Authoritarian leaders
ascend to power through the ballot box, but at once, they systematically
consolidate control over the state and civil society. Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party is emblematic of illiberal democracy, a term
originally coined by Fareed Zakaria. This Note applies Zakaria’s illiberal
democracy to Hungary while adjusting the contours of his theory to better account
for the role of anti-intellectualism and nationalism in the illiberal toolkit. This
Note also investigates the Orbán government’s targeting of Central European
University, one of the most notorious struggles between a university and an
illiberal democracy for academic freedom. Central European University’s
situation illuminates the ways in which illiberal régimes attempt to smother spaces
of resistance, using ethno-nationalist rhetoric to characterize universities and
intellectuals as outsider threats to the illiberal nation-state.
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The Tragedy of Central European University:
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its
Threat to Academic Freedom
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO *
Every age has its own Fascism, and we see the warning signs
wherever the concentration of power denies citizens the
possibility and the means of expressing and acting on their
own free will.
Ogni tempo ha il suo fascismo: se ne notano i segni
premonitori dovunque la contrentrazione di potere nega al
cittadino la possibilità e la capacità di esprimere ed attuare
la sua volontà.
—Primo Levi1
INTRODUCTION
Far-right political parties have grown their influence globally by
winning major, divisive elections in both recently democratized states and
states that have long been considered cornerstones of liberal democracy.2
Many of these parties emerged as a reaction to international unrest,
including sweeping recessions and refugee crises. Guided by nationalism
and populism, the far-right has shaken democracy to its core. Political
parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Jobbik, Poland’s Law and Justice,
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, LL.M. Candidate, Human Rights & Social Justice;
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D 2020; Bard College, B.A. 2017. I am incredibly grateful
to my advisor, Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez, without whom I could not have properly theorized
this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Fischl for his invaluable advice throughout the
drafting process. I am forever indebted to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, and like to thank
Jillian Chambers, Hannah Kalichman, Adam Kuegler, Alexandria Madjeric, Carolyn Rennie, and
Mallori Thompson in particular for their meticulous work, extraordinarily helpful feedback, and
friendship. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents (Debra and Robert Zaccagnino),
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their never-ending support.
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and Italy’s Lega Nord have quickly risen to prominence. Likewise,
far-right heads of government—including Donald Trump in the United
States of America, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
in Turkey—have swiftly gained power and begun to curb safeguards to
democracy, like free speech and electoral access.
In many of these cases, the current political climate can be explained
by the proliferation of illiberal democracy. Although illiberal democracies
may at first appear to be a functioning “democracy,” upon closer look, it
quickly becomes apparent that illiberal democracies are shells of their
“liberal” counterparts. 4 Illiberal democracies may retain some democratic
political liberties, like free elections or separation of powers, but they lack
strong protections of the civil liberties provided by constitutional
liberalism in liberal democracies. The rise of illiberal democracy in
Hungary, the focus of this Note, is perfectly illustrated by Fidesz’s ongoing
attempt to push Central European University into exile and other unilateral
attacks on academic freedom. In order to fully understand this complex
situation, one must look not only to democratic theory, but to the history of
Central Europe, Hungarian nationalism, and Fidesz’s manipulation of the
rule of law. This Note situates the Hungarian case as a cautionary tale and
attempts to comprehend how the trend of illiberal democracy can flourish
in the most prosperous age for democracy to date, using academic freedom
as a point of focus. Part I situates this global phenomenon within a
theoretical framework of democratic wave theory and illiberal democracy.
Part II applies Part I to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s rise to power in
Hungary. Finally, Part III analyzes how Hungarian illiberal democracy has
impacted academic freedom in the country.

3
See, e.g., Jens Becker, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary, 13 SEER: J. FOR LAB. &
SOC. AFF. E. EUR. 29, 33 (2010) (“The European elections in 2009 had seen a writing on the wall
regarding the future crash of the left, with FIDESZ obtaining 56.4 per cent of the votes against MSZP’s
17.4 per cent. The elections of 2010 on 11 and 25 [of] April made this definitively clear.”); Michał
Słowikowski & Michał Pierzgalski, The Party System and Voting Behavior in Poland, in CIVIC AND
UNCIVIC VALUES IN POLAND: VALUE TRANSFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND CULTURE 41, 61 (Sabrina
P. Ramet et al. eds., 2019) (“After the elections of 2015, the largest party in the parliament is now Law
and Justice (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in both houses of the Polish parliament.”);
CATHERINE FIESCHI, POPULOCRACY: THE TYRANNY OF AUTHENTICITY AND THE RISE OF POPULISM
101 (2019) (“The year 2008 marks the beginning of populism’s full ideological development in Italy:
[Movimento Cinque Stelle] began to capitalize on the deep transformation of the voters through its use
of the Web, and the promise of a different, transparent and authentic bottom-up movement; while the
Lega began to transcend its geographical limits and move southward with the aim of conquering
Berlusconi strongholds through a discourse of common sense in the face of Italy’s main challenges . . .
.”).
4
Infra Part I.B.
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I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE THIRD REVERSE WAVE, ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, AND THE NATION-STATE
A. Democracy’s Third Reverse Wave
In 1991, Samuel P. Huntington posited that democratization occurs in
the form of waves. Huntington theorized that “[a] wave of democratization
is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that
occur within a specified period of time that significantly outnumber
transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.”5 Under
Huntington’s wave theory, he also identifies the trend of the reverse wave.
After each wave of democratization, there is a reverse wave, under which
nation-states that “had previously made the transition to democracy
reverted to nondemocratic rule.”6 Huntington acknowledges that it would
be arbitrary to prescribe a rigid date range pinpointing each wave, but
nonetheless poses an approximate era for each wave.7 Huntington
subsequently proposes the following structure to describe the modern
situation of democracy:
First, long wave of democratization
First reverse wave
Second, short wave of democratization
Second reverse wave
Third wave of democratization.8
Huntington’s first wave of democratization was indeed long, spanning
between approximately 1828 to 1926.9 This first wave was influenced by
the American and French revolutions that took place nearly a century prior
and was defined by a substantial widening of suffrage, reduced plural
voting, and the secret ballot.10 Under this first wave, twenty-nine
democracies emerged. 11 The first reverse wave arrived in 1922 with
Mussolini’s (democratic) ascension to power and ended with the defeat of
the Axis forces in the Second World War.12 The first reverse wave was
characterized by “the shift away from democracy and either the return to
5
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 15 (1991).
6
Id. at 16.
7
Id. (“It is also arbitrary to attempt to specify precisely the dates of democratization waves and
reverse waves. It is, nonetheless, often useful to be arbitrary . . . .”).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 16–17.
10
Id. at 16.
11
Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy’s First Wave, 2 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 12 (1991).
12
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 17–18.
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traditional forms of authoritarian rule or the introduction of new
mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of totalitarianism,”13 and
tended to occur in countries that had adopted democratic forms of
governance either before the First World War or during the interwar
period.14 Countries that experienced nondemocratic régime change
“reflected the rise of communist, fascist, and militaristic ideologies.”15
Even in countries where democracy remained in place, antidemocratic
movements gained strength.16
Huntington’s second wave of democratization followed the Allied
victory and extended until the early 1960s, where “Allied occupation
promoted inauguration of democratic institutions,”17 and fledgling
democracies emerged during the beginning of the end of colonialism.18
Contrary to Europe’s democracies remerging under Allied occupation, “no
real effort was made to introduce democratic institutions” during
decolonization in Africa and South Asia.19 This led to mixed results: while
some new states, such as Nigeria and India, established democracies that
were maintained for at least a decade, in other states, democracy was
tenuous and the institutions supporting it were shaky at best.20 By the late
1950s and early 1960s, the second wave of democracy had ebbed and
“political development[s] and regime transitions were taking on a heavily
authoritarian cast.”21 Latin America experienced numerous coups d’état,
primarily led by military régimes, which established bureaucratic
authoritarianism22 throughout the region.23 Similar military coups d’état
13

Id. at 17.
Id.
15
Id. at 18.
16
Id. (“In France, Britain, and other countries where democratic regimes remained in place,
antidemocratic movements gained strength from the alienation of the 1920s and the depression of the
1930s.”).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 19.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
The term “bureaucratic authoritarianism” was first coined by Guillermo O’Donnell in 1973 to
explain the novel type of military rule in Latin America.
14

This form of rule has been interpreted as distinctively bureaucratic because national
leadership was dominated by individuals who had risen to prominence not through
political careers but through bureaucratic careers in large public and private
organizations. . . . Decision-making styles among these leaders were commonly
technocratic. This bureaucratic, technocratic orientation was generally accompanied
by intense repression, which in most of the cases reached levels unprecedented in
the region.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 93 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001). The
military-led coups in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976) are all examples of
bureaucratic authoritarian military régimes. See, e.g., Remembering Brazil’s Military Coup 50 Years
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occurred throughout nations in Asia and the Mediterranean region. At the
same time, rapid decolonization caused democratic instability in new
nations: “Thirty-three other African countries that became independent
between 1956 and 1970 became authoritarian with independence or very
shortly after independence.”25 This era of decolonization led to the largest
multiplication of authoritarian régimes in history,26 accompanied by a
worldwide decline in democratic governments. One study estimates that
one third of the thirty-two functioning democracies in the world in 1958
had become authoritarian by the mid 1970s.27 Huntington argues that this
reverse wave was especially notable due to the fact that some nations
undergoing nondemocratic régime changes had sustained democracy for
over a quarter century.28
Huntington’s third and final democratic wave began with the
Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974 and extended through The Third
Wave’s publication in 1991.29 During this time period, approximately thirty
countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America replaced their authoritarian
régimes with democracies.30 The wave began in Southern European
nations—Portugal, Spain, Greece—and spread to the bureaucratic
authoritarian régimes in Latin America and the military dictatorships in
Asia throughout the 1970s and 1980s.31 By the end of the 1980s, “the
democratic wave engulfed the communist world.”32 After forty-five years
of Soviet occupation, Hungary transitioned to a multiparty system in

Later, NACLA (Apr. 1, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/4/1/remembering-brazils-military-coup-50years-later (recounting Brazil’s military dictatorship); Daniel Sheehy, An Eyewitness Account of
Pinochet’s
Coup
45
Years
Ago,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.
(Sept.
10,
2018),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/eyewitness-account-pinochets-coup-45years-ago-180970241/ (discussing a scholar’s daily life under Pinochet’s régime); Uki Goñi, The Long
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2016),
Shadow
of
Argentina’s
Dictatorship,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/opinion/the-long-shadow-of-argentinas-dictatorship.html
(outlining the human rights abuses committed by Argentina’s military dictatorship).
23
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 19.
24
See id. at 19–20 (discussing democratic backsliding and authoritarian régimes in Asian and
Mediterranean countries in the 1950s through the 1980s).
25
Id. at 20.
26
Id. at 20–21.
27
Id. at 21. Another report found that in 1962, thirteen governments were produced via coups
d’état, and by 1975, thirty-eight were. Id. In 1960, nine out of ten South American nations that were
former Iberian colonies had democratically elected governments. Id. But by 1973, only Venezuela and
Colombia were left. Id.
28
See id. (“This wave of transitions away from democracy was even more striking because it
involved several countries, such as Chile, Uruguay (‘the Switzerland of South America’), India, and the
Philippines, that had sustained democratic regimes for a quarter century or more.”).
29
Id. at 21–27.
30
Id. at 21.
31
Id. at 21–23.
32
Id. at 23.
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33

1988. Likewise, Hungary’s Central and Eastern European neighbors
began their own democratic transitions.34 The number of democratic states
rose from thirty in 1973 to fifty-eight by 1990, increasing the percentage of
democratic states from 24.6 percent to 45 percent.35 Soviet occupation was
the principal obstacle to democratization for countries east of the Iron
Curtain, and once removed, the region swiftly adopted democratic
governments.36
By 1990, many of the catalysts for the third wave of democracy had
stalled; “[n]either the White House, the Kremlin, the Vatican, nor the
European Community were in a strong position to promote democracy. . .
.”37 At the same time, at least two of the new third wave democracies had
already shifted back towards authoritarianism.38 While it is difficult to
definitively predict the duration of the third wave and what conditions may
give rise to the next reverse wave, Huntington draws three generalizations
from prior reverse waves to aid in comprehending the possible form of the
third reverse wave. First, Huntington argues that “the causes of shifts from
democratic to authoritarian political systems were at least as varied as and
in part overlap with the causes of shifts from authoritarianism to
democracy.”39 Huntington provides a useful rubric of factors that
contributed to the first and second reverse waves.40 The factors are as
follows:
(1) the weakness of democratic values among key elite
groups and the general public;
(2) economic crisis or collapse that intensified social conflict
and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could only
be imposed by authoritarian governments;
(3) social and political polarization often produced by leftist
governments attempting to introduce or appearing to
introduce too many major socioeconomic reforms too
quickly;
(4) the determination of conservative middle- and
upper-class groups to exclude populist and leftist
movements and lower-class groups from political power;
33

Id.
Id. (noting how such democratic transition included the Baltic republics and Poland).
35
Id. at 26 tbl.1.1. Note that Huntington’s figures exclude nations with populations under one
million. Id.
36
Id. at 288–89.
37
Id. at 289.
38
Id. at 290.
39
Id.
40
Id.
34
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(5) the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism
or insurgency;
(6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign
government;
(7) snowballing in the form of the demonstration effects of
the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other
countries.41
Second, “transitions from democracy to authoritarianism were almost
always produced by those in power or close to power in the democratic
system.”42 The vast majority of these previous transitions away from
democracy occurred as either military coups d’état under which
democratically elected leaders were ousted or through “executive coups,”43
where democratically elected heads of government concentrated power in
the executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law.44
Finally, in each reverse wave, “democratic systems were replaced by
historically new forms of authoritarian rule.”45 Under the first wave,
fascism differed from prior models of authoritarianism due to “its mass
base, ideology, party organization, and efforts to penetrate and control
most of society.”46 Likewise, bureaucratic authoritarianism can be
distinguished from other forms of authoritarian military rule by its
institutional character.47 Therefore, the authoritarianism set to emerge
under the reverse wave theory should be expected to reinvent itself.
Currently, the world is in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse
wave. Democracy has statistically entered an international era of decline.48
Freedom House has documented “global declines in political rights and
civil liberties” from 2005 to 2018 in their annual Freedom in the World
41

Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 291. This claim exempts régime changes that were produced by foreign actors. Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 292.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 3–5
(2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWebcompressed. pdf (“Freedom in the World has recorded global declines in political rights and civil
liberties for an alarming 13 consecutive years, from 2005 to 2018. The global average score has
declined each year, and countries with net score declines have consistently outnumbered those with net
improvements.”); A Global Report on the Decline of Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/press/2018-04-17/global-report-decline-democracy
(summarizing
articles published in the May/June 2018 Foreign Affairs issue on democratic decline); VARIETIES
DEMOCRACY INST., DEMOCRACY FOR ALL?: V-DEM ANNUAL DEMOCRACY REPORT 2018, at 6 (2018),
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/vdem_democracy_report_2018.pdf (finding that autocratization has affected 2.5 billion people, or a third
of the world).
42
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49

rankings. The international rise of the far-right satisfies and builds upon
Huntington’s three generalizations: the factors that may lead to democratic
decline, the modes of régime transition, and the shifting image of
authoritarianism. First, many of the issues contributing to the international
rise of the far-right reflect the factors laid out by Huntington. These factors
will be employed throughout the rest of this Note to analyze the
preconditions for illiberal democracy. Huntington’s second generalization
regarding the mode of transition is the least apt to analyze the rise of the
far-right vis-à-vis illiberal democracy. Under the majority of illiberal
democracies, entire far-right political parties have seized power not
through coups d’état or executive coups, but through the democratic
process. In Hungary, this reverse wave is more party-centric than
executive-centric. And finally, illiberal democracy is the answer to
Huntington’s claim that each reverse wave brings a novel form of
authoritarianism. The following section will theorize illiberal democracy
and the conditions that fomented its development with a focus on Orbán’s
Hungary.
B. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
The term “illiberal democracy” was originally coined by Fareed
Zakaria in 199750 and was then later appropriated by Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán as an ideological image of Fidesz’s Hungary.51 The emergence of
illiberal democracy in the twenty-first century is the modern form of
authoritarianism necessary for the third reverse wave of democracy.52
49

FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 48, at 4.
Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (1997).
51
Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbansspeech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ (“Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple
sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in
this sense, the new state we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny
foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, [et cetera]. But it does not make this ideology a central
element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead.”).
52
Illiberal democracy does have a nomenclatural weakness—its name does not on its face convey
the fascistic tendencies of many illiberal leaders. And, as a result, other terminologies also attempt to
conceptualize this phenomenon. For example, Gáspár Miklós Tamás developed the concept of
post-fascism to describe a “cluster” of behavior:
50

[P]olicies, practices, routines, and ideologies that can be observed everywhere in the
contemporary world; that have little or nothing to do, except in Central Europe, with
the legacy of Nazism; that are not totalitarian; that are not at all revolutionary; and
that are not based on violent mass movements and irrationalist, voluntaristic
philosophies, nor are they toying, even in jest, with anti-capitalism.
G.M. Tamás, On Post-Fascism, BOS. REV. (June 1, 2000), http://bostonreview.net/world/g-m-tamaspost-fascism. Post-fascism in ideology bears resemblance to classical fascism because of its open
hostility to universal citizenship embraced by the Enlightenment, instead believing that some classes of
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Unlike its predecessors, illiberal democracy arises more subtly than
traditional forms of authoritarian rule. As opposed to traditional
authoritarianism53—defined by closed society,54 use of force, and formal
censorship—illiberal democracies feign compliance with the general
principles of democracy. Many of the national parties promoting illiberal
democracy gain power through legitimate democratic means.55 Once
elected, “they use the levers of democratic institutions to consolidate
control, all while claiming popular support from the people to protect the
nation from foreign or domestic threats.”56 While in power, these régimes
parasitically sap the strength out of the democratic institutions through
which they were elected. This Section explores the theoretical contours of
illiberal democracy, contrasted with liberal democracy, to illustrate the
individual case of Hungary.
To properly define illiberal democracy, one must first examine the
characteristics of a liberal democracy. Zakaria’s article and subsequent
book describes a liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only
by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of
powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion,

people do not deserve citizenship to the nation and the civic rights associated with membership. Id.
This is particularly important as Enlightenment citizenship was equated with human dignity and by
recognizing universal citizenship we, in turn, recognize those citizens as human. Id. When classical
fascists and the post-fascists of today reject the citizenship of classes of people within the nation-state,
fascists also reject their humanity. Id. Under classical fascism, “civic death was necessarily followed by
natural death, that is, violent death, or death tout court.” Id. Post-fascism, however, replaces literal
death with figurative death in an anti-Enlightenment illiberal democracy. The sovereign simultaneously
grants citizenship to some residents of the nation-state while also refusing the humanity of others. Also,
unlike classical fascism, “[p]ost-fascism finds its niche easily in the new world of global capitalism
without upsetting the dominant political forms of electoral democracy and representative government.”
Id.
53
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 408–09 (1968) (“As techniques of
government, the totalitarian devices appear simple and ingeniously effective. They assure not only an
absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out; the
multiplicity of the transmission belts, the confusion of the hierarchy, secure the dictator’s complete
independence of all his inferiors and make possible the swift and surprising changes in policy for which
totalitarianism has become famous.”).
54
See K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 49 (1945) (“It is one of the
characteristic features of the magical attitude of a primitive tribal or ‘closed’ society that it lives in a
charmed circle of unchanging taboos, of laws and customs which are felt to be as inevitable as the
rising of the sun, or the cycle of the seasons, or similar obvious regularities of nature.”); cf. HENRI
BERGSON, THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 229 (R. Ashley Audra & Cloudesley
Brereton trans., 1935) (“The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the
rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. . . .
Man was made for this society, as the ant was made for the ant-heap.”).
55
ALINA POLYAKOVA ET AL., BROOKINGS, THE ANATOMY OF ILLIBERAL STATES: ASSESSING
AND RESPONDING TO DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN TURKEY AND CENTRAL EUROPE 2 (2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/illiberal-states-web.pdf.
56
Id.
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and property.” Liberal democracies are also open societies that tend to
value civic nationalism.59 Similarly, Freedom House’s annual Freedom in
the World report splits its criteria for freedom into two separate rankings:
political rights and civil liberties.60 States with the highest political rights
rankings “enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair
elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are
competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power,
and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and
government.”61 In order to attain a full forty-point ranking for political
rights, states must score positively on criteria concerning the electoral
process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of
government.62 In the realm of civil liberties, state treatment of the freedom
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of
law, and personal autonomy and individual rights are considered criteria
for a free state.63 These two indicators, political liberties and civil liberties,
correspond to democracy and constitutional liberalism, respectively.64
Liberal democracy can be divided into two elements: democracy and
constitutional liberalism.65 While democracy primarily governs political
57

Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22.
Henri Bergson first described the concept of open society in 1935 and it was later expanded
upon by Karl Popper’s 1945 critique of totalitarianism, The Open Society and Its Enemies. As opposed
to a closed society, an open society is one in which “individuals are confronted with personal
decisions,” base their decisions on intelligence, and are critical of the taboos readily embraced in closed
societies. POPPER, supra note 54, at 152, 178. Popper argues that totalitarianism is a type of
“reactionary movements which have tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and return to
tribalism.” Id. at 1. Under totalitarianism and closed societies, critical thinking becomes impossible
because these societies rely on “the suppression of reason and truth” and the “brutal and violent
destruction of all that is human.” Id. at 177. For Popper, this is the danger of totalitarianism: a return to
closed societies that threaten humanity. Open societies, therefore, must support freedom of thought and
expression and protect them through the rule of law.
59
Many scholars of nationalism tend to “distinguish[] ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic,’ western and eastern,
liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism.” ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY WITHOUT GROUPS 5
(2004). Like many topics in nationalism, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is
difficult to define and, according to Brubaker, “normatively problematic,” but it is nonetheless worth
discussing in the context of liberal democracy. Id. Under civic nationalism, “nationhood and
nationalism have been linked to democracy, self-determination, political legitimacy, social integration,
civil religion, solidarity, dignity, identity, cultural survival, citizenship, patriotism, and liberation from
alien rule.” Id. at 132.
60
MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: DEMOCRACY IN
CRISIS 2 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22–24.
65
Id. at 22–23; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“Liberal principles—political
ideas that espouse the importance of individual liberties, minority rights, and the separation of power
across levers of government—and democratic institutions—processes that translate popular will into
public policy through legitimate elections . . . .”).
58
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rights, and is thus more process-oriented, constitutional liberalism’s focus
on civil rights is goal-oriented.66 Zakaria explains that the term
“constitutional liberalism” is a marriage between two interrelated concepts:
“It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with
the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberties. It is constitutional because
it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”67
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United
States under thinkers including William Blackstone, Baron de
Montesquieu, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Jefferson.68 The
general concept of constitutional liberalism, despite some variance, boils
down to the argument “that human beings have certain natural (or
‘inalienable’) rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting
its own powers, that secures them.”69 While the existence of constitutional
liberalism in countries has led to the emergence of democracy, democracy
does not necessarily give rise to constitutional liberalism.70 Merely
arranging free elections and protecting other political rights does not
guarantee that those who democratically come to power will protect the
civil liberties enshrined by constitutional liberalism.
Although democracy and constitutional liberalism are often associated
as conjoined, the two are frequently in tension.71 In particular, democracy
and constitutional liberalism tend to conflict on the scope of government
authority: “Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, [and]
democracy about its accumulation and use.”72 Democracy can undermine
liberty without substantial safeguards for minority rights and liberties. John
Stuart Mill warned of “the tyranny of the majority,” under which the
democratically-elected majority could subvert the liberties protected by
constitutional liberalism.73 Illiberal democracy, then, is symptomatic of this
schism between democracy and constitutional liberalism.
66
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 25 (“Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the
procedures for selecting government, but rather government’s goals.”).
67
Id. at 26.
68
Id. (“[Constitutional liberalism’s] canonical figures include the poet John Milton, the jurist
William Blackstone, statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and philosophers such as
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, John Stewart Mill, and Isaiah
Berlin.”).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 28 (“Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to
bring constitutional liberalism.”).
71
Id. at 30; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“The rise of illiberal political parties
and leaders within electoral democratic systems illustrates the schism between the foundational
principles and institutions of liberal democracies.”).
72
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30.
73
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1956) (“[I]n political speculations ‘the tyranny of the
majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its
guard.”); id. at 3 (“By liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers.”); id. at 4
(“To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures,
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Illiberal democracy, as is linguistically implied, is a form of
faux-democracy whereby some legitimate democratic processes are present
but without substantial safeguards of civil liberties as guaranteed by
constitutional liberalism. This modern form of authoritarianism enshrines
majoritarianism74 and absolute sovereignty75 as fundamental political
values, which defy liberal democratic norms. Illiberal governments
centralize authority and usurp power in a way that is “both horizontal
(from other branches of the national government) and vertical (from
regional and local authorities as well as private businesses and other
nongovernmental groups).”76 The claim that “unchecked centralization has
been the enemy of liberal democracy”77 is self-evident—Mussolini, for
example, was a democratically elected fascist who quickly centralized
power into totalitarian control.78 Likewise, “[i]lliberal democracies gain
legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably
democratic. Conversely, the greatest danger that illiberal democracy
poses—other than to its own people—is that it will discredit liberal
democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance.”79 Put
another way, illiberal democracy “is democratic because it respects the will
of the majority; illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”80
Emerging illiberal democracies can be identified by their modus operandi
that enshrines values of nationalism, majoritarianism, dictatorship of law,
absolute sovereignty, and anti-intellectualism.

it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them
down. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be
suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty.”).
74
ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: GOALS, STRATEGIES,
METHODS
OF
MODERN
AUTHORITARIANS
7
(2017),
AND
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf
(“A single idea of many authoritarians is the proposition that elections are winner-take-all affairs in
which the victor has an absolute mandate, with little or no interference, from institutional checks and
balances. . . . The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has instituted a thorough overhaul of the
country’s constitution and national legislation with an eye toward measures that will insulate his party
from future defeat.”).
75
Id. (“A number of governments have invoked the doctrine of absolute sovereignty to rebuff
international criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the persecution of the
political opposition, and the repression of minority groups. They claim that the enforcement of
universal human rights standards or judgments from transnational legal bodies represent undue
interference in their domestic affairs and a violation of national prerogatives.”).
76
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30.
77
Id. at 32.
78
John Foot & Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benito-Mussolini (last updated Jan. 10, 2020).
79
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 42.
80
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING 172 (2018).
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C. The Illiberal Toolkit: Nationalism, Anti-Intellectualism, and Other
Illiberal Values
1. Nationalism
Modern nationalism guides much of the behavior exhibited by illiberal
democracies and deeper exploration is necessary to fully understand its
global rise. Illiberal democratic governments enshrine the needs of the
community over individual rights.81 These governments are wont to
conceive “the community” as not citizens of the polity, but instead appeal
to nationalistic conceptions of “the community” that are demarcated by
bloodline.82 Illiberal democracies differ from their liberal counterparts by
subverting civil liberties traditionally delegated to “the people” by
constitutional liberalism that is inclusive of all citizens, regardless of
ethnic, religious, political, or other identities. Instead, these leaders
narrowly tailor “the people” to mean those supportive of the illiberal
government that belong to certain ethnic groups, while otherizing the
rest.83 This anti-pluralism stokes the flames of ethnic nationalism while
bulldozing the civic nationalism traditionally associated with liberal
democracies. Ethnic nationalism, a manifestation of nationalism in which
the nation-state is defined on the basis of ethnicity,84 is a core feature of
illiberal democracies.
Nationalism as an ideology is a modern phenomenon and is deeply
prevalent throughout contemporary societies. Nationalism is “notoriously
difficult to define.”85 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson’s
magnum opus, “the nation” is defined as “an imagined political
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”86
This definition builds upon Ernest Gellner’s conception of nationalism as
“not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations
where they do not exist.”87 As such, the nation is a socially constructed

81
See id. (“An illiberal democracy is centered on the supposed needs of the community rather
than the inalienable rights of the individual. It is democratic because it respects the will of the majority;
illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”).
82
See id. (“[T]he togetherness [Orbán] envisions is defined by bloodlines, not borderlines.”).
83
See id. (discussing how illiberal democracies disregard the needs and rights of minorities).
84
See, e.g., BRUBAKER, supra note 59, at 132 (“[Ethnic] nationalism has been associated with
militarism, war, irrationalism, chauvinism, intolerance, homogenization, forced assimilation,
authoritarianism, parochialism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, ethnic cleansing, even genocide; it has been
characterized as the ‘starkest political shame of the twentieth century.’”).
85
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM 3 (rev. ed. 2006).
86
Id. at 6.
87
ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964). Gellner later expanded on his theories
of nationalism in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).
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88

community that is imagined by those that identify as members of the
group. The nation is imagined as a limited sovereign community: limited
because its borders are finite,89 sovereign because of the influence of
Enlightenment ideals on political values,90 and a community because of the
deep comradeship prevalent amongst citizens of the nation-state.91
Modernist theorists like Anderson contend that nationalism as an ideology
was able to arise due to technological and socio-economic advances
brought about by the Industrial Revolution.92 Anderson singles out
print-capitalism as a precursor to the development of national
consciousness—a shared sense of national identity.93 Print-capitalism
unified local dialects into a language that members of a nation-state could
all understand vis-à-vis mechanical reproduction94 made possible by the
printing press and the proliferation of capitalism.95 Print-capitalism
allowed nations to consolidate numerous vernaculars into a unified
language representative of the nation, as will be seen with the
Magyarization of Hungary.96
Nation-states are socially constructed imagined communities that
purport to unify groups of peoples based on shared identity within the
confines of their finite borders. Under this framework of nationalism,
88

ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 6 (“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion.”).
89
Id. at 7 (“The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other
nations.”).
90
Id. (“It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical
dynastic realm.”).
91
Id. (“Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions
of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”).
92
Id. at 46.
93
Id. at 44–45 (“These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three distinct
ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and
above spoken vernaculars. . . . Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the
long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. . . . Third,
print-capitalism created languages of power of a kind different from the older administrative
vernaculars. Certain dialects inevitably were ‘closer’ to each print-language and dominated their final
forms.”).
94
See also WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217, 219–20 (Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (“Around 1900 technical reproduction had
reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause
the most profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its own among
the artistic processes.”).
95
See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 37–44 (tracing the development of mass and mechanical
reproduction and its effect on the consolidation of languages).
96
See infra note 113 (discussing the history of Magyarization in nineteenth century Hungary).
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“[t]he formulation of the nation thus appears as the fulfillment of a
‘project’ stretching over centuries.”97 As illiberal democracies narrow the
perception of who belongs in their imagined community, two questions are
raised. First, “[w]hat makes the nation a ‘community’?”98 And second, who
are “the people” that are accepted into the community? The
nation-as-community conceived of by Anderson is inherently tied to the
fraternité expressed by those within the nation-state. Étienne Balibar99
writes:
Every social community reproduced by the functioning of
institutions is imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the
projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective
narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on
traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (even
when they have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent
past). But this comes down to accepting that, under certain
conditions, only imaginary communities are real.100
Therefore, the socially-constructed “community” is reified by the
people that further the collective narratives and mythologies of the
nation-state. Balibar argues that theoretically, this community of people
recognizes itself as an entity or group distinct from other states prior to the
foundation of the institutional state.101 But this is clearly contradictory and
impossible to actualize. Therefore, the nation cannot precede the state:

97
ÉTIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS
IDENTITIES 86 (Chris Turner trans., 1991).
98
Id. at 93.
99
Étienne Balibar wrote, “Thinking about racism led us back to nationalism, and nationalism to
uncertainty about the historical realities and categorization of the nation.” Étienne Balibar, The Nation
Form: History and Ideology, 13 REV. (FERNAND BRAUDEL CTR.) 329, 329 (1990). Balibar sought to
understand how the nation-state arose and found current explanations to be unsatisfactory. The state
refers to the institutional apparatuses of a country, while the nation connotes some sort of identity.
Balibar argues that logically, states must have predated the nation-state and could not have arose
simultaneously. Therefore, he held, “it was by becoming ‘national’ that the states transformed
themselves, more or less completely, into what we call the modern state.” Id. at 330. Balibar theorized
that nation-states are created in one of three ways:

Either the states came into existence “endogenously,” seemingly autonomously, in
tandem with a process of nationalizing the state that was already located in that
territory, or they came into existence via “nationalist” (or “national liberation”)
movements, by struggling against national states that already existed or were being
created, or against “non-national” sovereign states (such as “multinational” empires,
which thereby came to seem anachronistic).
Id. at 331.
100
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93.
101
Id.
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In reality, the idea of nations without a state, or nations
“before” the state, is thus a contradiction in terms, because
the state always is implied in the historic framework of a
national formation . . . . But this contradiction is masked by
the fact that national states . . . project beneath their political
existence to a preexisting “ethnic” or “popular” unity.102
As such, the nation must be a product of the state, which adopts the
“nation” as its identity. By “becoming ‘national,’”103 the state transforms
itself into “the modern state”:104 the nation-state.105 In order to become
“national,” the nation-state must manufacture an identity to define the
confines of the community: “The fundamental problem is therefore to
produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself
continually as a national community.”106
For Balibar, who was investigating the nation-state to understand “the
causes and ‘deep’ structures of contemporary racism,”107 that manufactured
identity is “fictive ethnicity.”108 An imagined community can become a
nation-state only if it is made up of persons that embrace the fraternité that
binds together the community, which does not exist naturally within any
state.109 A nation-state requires “the people” to be more than a mere
abstraction and to share a common bond that legitimizes the “national”
aspect of the nation-state.110 This is instituted through fictive ethnicity,
especially in the case of ethnic nationalism. By constructing a fictive
ethnicity that appeals to an imagined community and convinces
community members of their shared “ethnicity,” the nation-state and the
102

Balibar, supra note 99, at 331.
Id. at 330.
104
Id.
105
Balibar argues that the modern nation-state can be identified by: “its ideology and collective
sovereignty; its juridical and administrative rationality; its particular mode of regulating social
conflicts, especially class conflicts; and its ‘strategic’ objective of managing its territorial resources and
population to enhance its economic and military power.” Id. at 330–31.
106
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93.
107
Balibar, supra note 99, at 329.
108
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96.
109
See id. at 93 (“A social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a
network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle
to grave, at the same times he or she is instituted as homo œconomicus, politicus, religious. . . . [S]uch a
people does not exist naturally, and even when it is tendentially constituted, it does not exist all the
time. No modern nation possesses a given ‘ethnic’ basis, even when it arises out of a national
independence struggle.”).
110
See id. (“In the case of national formations, the imaginary which inscribes itself in the real in
this way is that of the ‘people’. It is that of a community which recognizes itself in advance in the
institution of the state, which recognizes that the state as ‘its own’ in opposition to other states and, in
particular, inscribes its political struggles within the horizon of that state—by, for example, formulating
its aspirations for reform and social revolution as projects for the transformation of ‘its national
state’.”).
103
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patriotism that accompanies it is reified. In the metamorphosis of the
state into the nation-state, the population within the borders of the new
nation-state is “ethnicized” in a chrysalis that treats the group “as if they
formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins,
culture and interests which transcends individuals and social
conditions.”112 Ethnicity is produced through two modes—language113 and
race—and is established through various state institutions, including
schooling.114 Fictive ethnicity is weaponized by nationalistic illiberal
democracies and is instrumental in understanding who are “the people”
that are admitted to illiberal régimes and the compatriots that are excluded.
2. Majoritarianism, Dictatorship of Law, and Absolute Sovereignty
Despite its resemblance to democracy, illiberal democracies, informed
by ethnic nationalism, have mobilized alternative values that challenge
post-Cold War democratic norms. First, illiberal leaders tend to embrace
majoritarianism, the notion that the majority of a population should be
granted primacy when determining the outcome of a decision.115
Majoritarianism has long been rebuked by foundational democratic
111
Id. at 96 (“Fictive ethnicity is not purely and simply identical with the ideal nation which is the
object of patriotism, but it is indispensable to it, for, without it, the nation would appear precisely only
as an idea or an arbitrary abstraction; patriotism’s appeal would be addressed to no one. It is fictive
identity which makes it possible for the expression of a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, and
continually to measure the state against its ‘historic mission’ in the service of the nation, and as a
consequence, to idealize politics.”).
112
Id.
113
In Hungary, the fictive ethnicity of the Magyar is deeply rooted in language. Hungarian is an
extremely distinct language in the Finno-Ugric family whose closest relatives are Finnish and Estonian.
Hungarian has no relation to the Slavic languages spoken in the nations surrounding Hungary.
Finno-Ugric Languages, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Finno-Ugriclanguages (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). In the late nineteenth century, Hungary began the process of
Magyarization, under which non-Magyar minorities in Hungary were forced to assimilate by adopting
the Hungarian language and culture. See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 101–07 (detailing the process of
Magyarization). Linguistic nationalism still exists in Hungary, and can be seen as a common theme in
Orbán’s speeches. See, e.g., Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Orbán Viktor’s Ceremonial Speech on the
170th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (Mar. 15, 2018) (“They want us to hand it over
to foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who do not respect our
culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace what is ours with what is theirs.”);
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Address After Swearing the
Prime-Ministerial Oath of Office (May 10, 2018) (“We are a unique species. We have a language that
is unique to us. There is a world which we alone see and which we alone render through the prism of
Hungarian language and culture. Without us human civilisation would certainly be deprived of a
language, a view and a characterisation of the world. . . . I believe that Hungary, and the Hungarian
language and culture, exert an enormous magnetic power, which will attract those Hungarians whom
the wind has blown from the Carpathian Basin.”).
114
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96 (“History shows us that there are two great competing routes to
this: language and race.”).
115
Nicholas
Capaldi,
Majoritarianism,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
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political philosophers and is exemplified in Mill’s “tyranny of the
majority.”116 Majoritarianism is prevalent when illiberal democracies
approach elections as a “winner-take-all affair[] in which the victor has an
absolute mandate, with little or no interference from institutional checks
and balances.”117 These governments will often disregard the existence of
institutional checks on their authority—particularly with the judiciary—or
actually dismantle the democratic checks that were already in place, as
seen with Hungary.118 These actions delegitimize national legal systems
and endanger pluralism both within governance and the country. Second,
illiberal democracies will employ the “dictatorship of law,” originally
coined by Vladimir Putin119 to describe “the adoption of laws that are so
vaguely written as to give the authorities wide discretion in applying them
to regime opponents.”120 Generally, these vague laws are paired with a
weakened court system saturated with régime supporters that manipulate
the legal system to carry out the régime’s political agenda.121 Finally,
illiberal democracies frequently invoke the doctrine of absolute
sovereignty in order to insulate the state from international obligations and
“criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the
persecution of political opposition, and the repression of minority
groups.”122 Sovereignty rhetoric is also deployed against international
organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union, that
challenge state actions that run counter to international law and legal
norms.123
3. Anti-Intellectualism
The final characteristic of illiberal democracies is anti-intellectualism.
The term “anti-intellectualism” was coined in Richard Hofstadter’s
116

MILL, supra note 73, at 7.
PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7.
118
See infra Part II.D (discussing the dismantling of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by the
Fidesz party).
119
Russia’s
Dictatorship
of
Law,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
20,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/opinion/21sun2.html. Putin’s “dictatorship of law” is
exemplified in the case of Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch who had helped finance Yeltsen’s
reelection. In 2003, Berezovsky was granted political asylum by the United Kingdom and in 2013 was
found dead in his home. His death remains an open investigation. Mary Dejevsky, The Weird World of
Boris Berezovsky: Alexander Litvinenko’s Inquest Has Provided an Intriguing Insight into the Dead
Tycoon, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-weirdworld-of-boris-berezovsky-alexander-litvinenkos-inquest-has-provided-an-intriguing-insight10117927.html.
120
PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7–8.
121
Id. at 8 (“Such measures are typically paired with a court system that uses law merely to justify
political instructions from the executive branch, making a mockery of due process and international
conceptions of the rule of law.”).
122
Id. at 7.
123
Id.
117
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Anti-Intellectualism in American Life to describe the “resentment and
suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to
represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize that value of life.”124
Anti-intellectuals that operate within populist political structures espouse
anti-elitist and anti-rationalist125 attitudes. Rational discourse is
inextricably linked to values protected by constitutional liberalism,
including those of free speech, assembly, and academic freedom.126
Although Hofstadter’s book was written in response to McCarthyism in the
United States,127 his general framework of anti-intellectual thought can be
transferred to the disdain for the intelligentsia expressed by authoritarians
around the world.
Authoritarian governments instrumentalize anti-intellectualism to
suppress political dissent by systematically removing the intelligentsia
from power and public life.128 Critical discourse and free thought, core
components of that intellectual life, can undermine authoritarian projects
by vocalizing opposition. Hannah Arendt reflects: “Intellectual, spiritual,
and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster
initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political
opposition.”129 Authoritarian governments “seek[] to undermine public
discourse by attacking and devaluing education, expertise, and
language.”130 By restricting access to education and spheres of critical
124

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 27 (1963). Hofstadter
also recognizes the difficulty in defining the term: “One reason that anti-intellectualism has not even
been clearly defined is that its very vagueness makes it more serviceable in controversy as an epithet.”
Id. at 26.
125
In this context, anti-rationalism is a refusal of the “commitment to the value of critical thought
and reasoned discourse in general,” not to be confused with anti-rationalist philosophical
doctrine. Daniel Rigney, Three Kinds of Anti-Intellectualism: Rethinking Hofstadter, 61 SOC.
INQUIRY 434, 436 (1991).
126
Id. at 440 (“Rational discourse has its social bases in a constitutional system that protects free
speech and assembly, in an adversarial system of political and judicial decision-making, in the
institutions of scientific and scholarly inquiry and academic freedom, and in an emerging class of
intelligentsia for whom the ‘culture of critical discourse’ is a shared ideology.”).
127
HOFSTADTER, supra note 124, at 17–18 (“Primarily it was McCarthyism which aroused the
fear that the critical mind was at a ruinous discount in this country. Of course, intellectuals were not the
only targets of McCarthy’s constant denotations—he was after bigger game—but intellectuals were in
the line of fire, and it seemed to give special rejoicing to his followers when they were hit.”).
128
For example, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic imprisoned philosopher and dissident,
Václav Havel, numerous times between 1977 and 1989 before he became the first Czechoslovak
president following the collapse of the communist régime. Vaclav Havel: Timeline of the Former Czech
(Dec.
18,
2011,
1:46
PM),
President,
TELEGRAPH
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ czechrepublic/8964070/Vaclav-Havel-timelineof-the-former-Czech-president.html. Another example: Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist
philosopher, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment under the Mussolini régime where he died in
a medical clinic while serving his sentence. Antonio Gramsci, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Antonio-Gramsci (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
129
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339.
130
JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM 36 (2018).
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debate, the capacity for intelligent discourse is limited, allowing the
government to promote their single, “legitimate” ideology.131 The very
presence of critical academic discourse threatens the collective narratives
and mythologies constructed to support the nation-state, especially when
these narratives are recently constructed and do not conform to actual
history.
When respected, free intellectual criticism may hold more weight than
other forms of opposition, because of its ability to destabilize the flimsy
theoretical grounds that authoritarian régimes use to legitimize their rule.
Régimes, however, can also use a perversion of the university to their
advantage to prop up fascistic ideology.132 The university campus has
become a battleground site for illiberal attacks on free thought, both at
home and abroad.133 Professors, students, disciplines, and universities are
frequently targeted by illiberal régimes as dangerous voices that work to
“indoctrinate” the nation’s children.134 At the same time, régimes suppress
critical viewpoints and manipulate the education system to reify mythic
narratives of the nation-state as fact. Under these hyper-nationalist
régimes, “the function of the education system is to glorify the mythic past,
elevating the achievements of members of the nation and obscuring the
perspectives and histories of those who do not belong.”135 Disciplines such
as gender studies are frequently attacked by far-right nationalist
movements as undermining the traditions of the nation and its patriarchal
ideology136 and instead, disciplines that indoctrinate “hierarchal norms and
national tradition”137 are exalted by the régime. Higher education generally
is depicted as an elitist institution symbolic of excess.138 By rejecting and
131
See id. (“In fascist ideology, there is only one legitimate viewpoint, that of the dominant
nation.”).
132
See id. (“Education therefore either poses a grave threat to fascism or becomes a pillar of
support for the mythical nation.”).
133
See infra note 367 (describing recent attempts by governments to limit academic freedom).
134
Marxist thought tends to become the academic bogeyman for the far-right. Take, for example,
“dangerous” university, course, and professor watchlists, like those promulgated by David Horowitz.
See STANLEY, supra note 130, at 38–39 (“In 2006, Horowitz published a book, The Professors, naming
the ‘101 most dangerous professors in America,’ a list of leftist and liberal professors, many of whom
were supporters of Palestinian rights. In 2009, he published another book, One-Party Classroom, with a
list of the ‘150 most dangerous courses in America.’”).
135
Id. at 47.
136
See id. at 42–43 (analyzing motives of the far-right in attacking gender studies). Particular
anti-intellectual attacks on feminism and gender studies date back to Nazi-peddled myths that
“feminism was a Jewish conspiracy to destroy fertility among Aryan women.” Id. at 43–44.
137
Id. at 48.
138
See id. at 37, 56 (“The media largely ignored these motivations [of the Black Lives Matter
movement] and, representing protesting black students as an angry mob, used the situation as an
opportunity to foment rage against the supposed liberal political excesses of the university. . . . In
fascist politics, universities are debased in public discourse, and academics are undermined as
legitimate sources of knowledge and expertise, represented as radical ‘Marxists’ or ‘feminists’
spreading a leftist ideological agenda under the guise of research.”); see also HOFSTADTER, supra note
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mocking the value of academic expertise, the régime disrupts reality and
inserts its own one-dimensional “reality.”139 When the régime “is
successful, its audience is left with a destabilized sense of loss, and a well
of mistrust and anger against those who it has been told are responsible for
this loss.”140 By delegitimizing and forcibly targeting academics and
universities, illiberal régimes aim to stall the possibility for robust debate
and silence their critics. As such, anti-intellectualism remains in the toolkit
of modern authoritarian leaders and their illiberal democracies. This is
exemplified in the targeting of higher education institutions by modern
authoritarian leaders in Central European countries, such as Hungary and
Poland, as well as all over the world.
II. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION
A. What is Central Europe?
This Paper investigates how illiberal democracy has developed in
Hungary. To analyze how illiberal democracy has proliferated in Hungary,
it is imperative to understand the historical conditions under which norms
of governance and national image have developed in the region. But first,
this begs the question: What is Central Europe?
Hungary is located in Central Europe—a region of small nation-states
whose very existence is constantly under threat from larger surrounding
powers.141 Since the inception of the Cold War, Europe is often viewed as
a dichotomy between Western and Eastern Europe, leaving little regard for
the nations that lie somewhere in between.142 Following the Second World
War, nations whose cultures were traditionally associated with Western
European values, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, found themselves
on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Czech author Milan Kundera
described this experience in “The Tragedy of Central Europe.”143 As a
result of the sudden partition of some Central European nations, “three
124, at 53 (“Intellectuals, it may be held [by anti-intellectuals], are pretentious, conceited, effeminate,
and snobbish; and very likely immoral, dangerous, and subversive.”).
139
Id. at 57.
140
Id.
141
See Milan Kundera, Die Weltliteratur: How We Read One Another, NEW YORKER (Jan. 1,
2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/die-weltliteratur (“What distinguishes the
small nations from the large is not the quantitative criterion of the number of their inhabitants; it is
something deeper. For the small nations, existence is not a self-evident certainty but always a question,
a wager, a risk; they are on the defensive against History, that force which is bigger than they, which
does not take them into account, which does not even notice them.”).
142
Stephen Shulman, Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of
Nationalism, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 554, 582–83 (2002) (“[T]he traditional civic-West/ethnic-East
argument is a gross simplification of concepts of nationhood in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern
Europe.”).
143
Milan Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 26, 1984, at 33.
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fundamental situations developed in Europe after [the Second World War]:
that of Western Europe, that of Eastern Europe, and, most complicated,
that of the part of Europe situated geographically in the center—culturally
in the West and politically in the East.”144 Kundera characterized Central
Europe as being “[b]oxed in by the Germans on one side and the Russians
on the other”145 and as “the least known and the most fragile part of the
West,”146 despite Central Europe’s wide contributions to the “European
canon” from intellectuals such as Sigmund Freud, Béla Bartok, and Franz
Kafka. Following the First World War, Central Europe was “transformed
into a region of small, weak states, whose vulnerability ensured first
Hitler’s conquest and ultimately Stalin’s triumph.”147 Kundera argues that
Central Europe is defined not by political power, but by its culture: “the
great common situations that reassemble peoples, regroup them in ever
new ways along the imaginary and ever-changing boundaries that mark a
realm inhabited by the same memories, the same problems and conflicts,
the same common tradition.”148 Despite the vast cultural contributions
made to “Western European culture” by Central Europe, as soon as the
Iron Curtain closed around Central Europe, Western Europe was incapable
of understanding the region as anything more than its politics, which was
decidedly Eastern European.149 But, Soviet usurpation was far more than a
political struggle—it was also an attack on Central European civilization
itself. The revolts in response to these existential attacks on Central
European civilization were led by the intelligentsia150 as a “struggle to
preserve [Central European] identity—or, to put it another way, to preserve
their Westernness.”151 But, because the region became regarded as an
Eastern political régime, “Europe [had not] noticed the disappearance of its
cultural home because Europe no longer perceive[d] its unity as a cultural
unity.”152 This struggle for identity was completely ignored by Western
Europe and, yet again, Central Europe was forgotten by its cultural
brethren.153 Kundera’s tragedy—that Central European nations had all but

144

Id.
Id. at 34.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 35.
149
Id. at 37.
150
Id. These revolts “were prepared, shaped, realized by novels, poetry, theater, cinema,
historiography, literary reviews, popular comedy and cabaret, philosophical discussions—that is, by
culture.” Id.
151
Id. at 34.
152
Id. at 36.
153
Id.
145
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vanished from the map of Western Europe—rests not on the Soviet Union,
but on Western European nations for abandoning them.154
Kundera ultimately defines Central Europe as “[a]n uncertain zone of
small nations between Russia and Germany.”155 Unlike their neighbors,
“the small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at
any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it.”156 At the time
of writing, all of Central Europe, except Austria, had been swallowed up
by the Soviet Union.157 Kundera argues that once the majority of Central
Europe was subjugated by the Soviet Union, the region was forgotten by
Western Europe.158 Leading up to the true independence of Central
European states, the region faced immense political strife: Nazi invasion, a
long stretch of failed revolutions, and finally, Soviet domination. Even
prior to the Second World War, Hungary’s struggles were often
overlooked by the larger European community. Unlike larger Western
nations, such as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany, the histories of
these small Central European nations have been “turbulent and
fragmented.”159 Their histories, including Hungary’s, have been ones of
frequent invasion and in turn, “[t]heir traditions of statehood have been
weaker and less continuous than those of the larger European nations.”160
Hungary’s history includes long occupations by the Mongols, the Ottoman
Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the Third Reich, and the Soviet Union.161
Unlike their western neighbors, Central European nation-states experience
constant existential threat. István Bibó aptly reflects:
“The death of the nation” or “the annihilation of the nation”
rings empty in West European ears; Westerners can imagine
extermination, subjection, or slowly going native, but
political “annihilation” overnight is sheer bombast to them,
yet it is a palpable reality for the nations of Eastern Europe.
Here there is no need to exterminate or expel a nation to

154
Id. at 38 (“The real tragedy for Central Europe, then, is not Russia but Europe: this Europe that
represented a value so great that the director of the Hungarian News Agency was ready to die for it, and
for which he did indeed die. . . . He did not suspect that the sentence he was sending by telex beyond
the borders of his flat country would seem outmoded and would not be understood.”).
155
Id. at 35.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 36.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 34.
160
Id.
161
Hungary Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
country_profiles/1054642.stm.
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make it feel endangered; it is enough to call its existence into
doubt with a sufficiently aggressive rhetoric.162
This persistent existential threat to independent nationhood has
impacted the democratic development of Central Europe and “has been the
decisive factor in making democracy and democratic development waver
in these countries.”163 The embedded identity of the existential anxiety of
the nation-state guides political and legal decision-making and may even
interfere with Hungary’s democratic prospects.
B. Hungarian Political History (Hapsburg—1989)
Developments in Hungarian history uniquely positioned the nation to
be susceptible to the rise of the far-right. Wilkin contends that “the roots of
illiberalism in the modern world-system are a reaction, in part, to the threat
that liberalism presented to established social hierarchies, secular or
religious”164 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Elements of
illiberalism have been persistent throughout Hungarian political history.
Wilkin argues that four major periods of history shaped the development of
the Hungarian nation-state and its relationship to illiberalism. First, the
restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, following the defeat of the democratic Hungarian Revolution of
1848, was reactionary and anti-modern.165 Monarchical systems are,
unsurprisingly, adverse to the classical liberal values that threaten the
social hierarchies entrenched in traditional monarchies.166 Second, the
crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War bred
animosity within the nation-state after “it suffered drastic loss of territory
and population through the Treaty of Trianon.”167 Hungary’s experience
during the inter-war period mirrors that of other Central Powers, like
Germany, whose reactionary fascist forces rose to power as a response to
the aftermath of the war.168 This massive loss of territory “left a lasting
162

ISTVÁN BIBÓ, The Miseries of East European Small States, in THE ART OF PEACEMAKING 130,
150 (Iván Zoltán Dénes ed., Péter Pásztor trans., 2015).
163
Id. at 151.
164
Peter Wilkin, The Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: The Orbánization of Hungarian Political
Culture, 24 J. WORLD-SYS. RES. 5, 9 (2018).
165
Id. at 13.
166
Id. at 13–14 (“[The Hungarian monarchy was] understandably[] deeply hostile to liberal ideas
of universality and equality, preferring instead to entrench social life in traditional social hierarchies
shaped through the church and respect for secular authority in the forms of the King and the
aristocracy.”).
167
Id. at 14.
168
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 308 (“After the first World War, a deeply anti-democratic,
prodictatorial wave of semitotalitarian and totalitarian movements swept Europe; Fascist movements
spread from Italy to nearly all Central and Eastern European countries . . . .”). Also note,
Austro-Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and two-thirds of its population. Treaty of Trianon,

2021]

THE TRAGEDY OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

1213

legacy of resentment amongst the country’s right-wing social forces, which
still manifests itself rhetorically today with both Fidesz and Jobbik.”169
Third, Hungary’s experience with fascism and Nazism during the Second
World War impacted the rise of illiberal democracy in the country today by
bringing anti-Semitism, racism, and other prejudices to the fore.170 The
Second World War presented an opportunity for Hungary to reclaim its
lost territory; but, by 1944, Hungary had become a puppet state for Nazi
Germany after a coup d’état by the far-right fascist Arrow Cross Party.171
Finally, after the defeat of the Axis forces in the Second World War, the
Soviet Union army invaded Hungary and instituted another authoritarian
régime. Between 1945 and 1989, Hungary was occupied by Soviet forces
that quashed democratic revolutions172 and decimated civil society.173
These eras of Hungarian history shaped its development as a nation-state in
the longue durée and influenced the rise of Orbán’s illiberal democratic
project.
C. Fledgling Democracy: The Interim Years (1989–2010)
Prime Minister Orbán’s rise to power directly resulted from the
missteps of the governments in power during the democratic transitionary
period.174 Just as democracy emerged, neo-fascist and anti-Semitic
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Trianon (accessed Mar. 19,
2019).
169
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 14.
170
Id. at 15 (noting the role that Hungarians and the Hungarian government played in the Final
Solution).
171
JACK R. FISCHEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE HOLOCAUST 122–23 (1999). Ferenc
Szálasi, the Prime Minister of Hungary and leader of the Arrow Cross Party, was found guilty for war
crimes and was sentenced to death. Militiamen of the Arrow Cross Party conducted a reign of terror
that resulted in the violent murder of many Hungarian Jews. Hungary After the German Occupation,
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hungaryafter-the-german-occupation (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). By the end of the Second World War, an
estimated 563,000 Hungarian Jews died at the hands of the Arrow Cross Party and the Nazi régime. Id.
Wilkin notes that Szálasi’s “enthusiasm for the Final Solution was implacable. . . . [A]t times SS
officers in Hungary had to restrain the Hungarian forces from their enthusiastic slaughter of the Jewish
population.” Wilkin, supra note 164, at 15.
172
See Ben Cosgrove, A Rip in the Iron Curtain: Photos From the Hungarian Revolution, 1956,
TIME (Oct. 22, 2013), http://time.com/3878232/the-hungarian-revolution-of-1956-photos-from-thestreets-of-budapest/ (collecting photographs from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution).
173
See Péter Krasztev, Social Responses to the “Hybridization” of the Political System: The Case
of Hungary in the Central and Eastern European Context, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL
OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 167, 171 (Péter Krasztev et al. eds., 2015) (“The historian
Stephen Kotkin has called state socialist societies ‘uncivic societies,’ and the Hungarian example
certainly proves this: the Kádár regime was efficient enough to make opposition seem futile and thus
eliminate social solidarity and autonomy, and these attitudes still live on today.”).
174
András Bozóki, Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism, in THE
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (Péter Krasztev et al.
eds., 2015) (“This antiliberal turn did not emerge out of the blue: it was a direct response to the hectic
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movements, fueled by nationalism, simultaneously rose to mainstream
discourse.175 This Section will explore how internal failures in Hungarian
government and external factors influenced the rise of illiberal democracy
under Orbán by using Huntington’s factors176 that contributed to prior
reverse waves of democracy. The most relevant factors for this period of
time are: (1) the weakness of democratic values; (2) severe economic
setbacks; (3) social and political polarization; (4) the exclusion of
non-elites by elites; and (5) the breakdown of law and order.177
The weakness of democratic values and increasing political
polarization in the transitional period were instrumental in prompting the
rise of the far-right. The post-Cold War Hungarian democratic process was
deeply flawed. Bozóki identifies three institutional factors that contributed
to Orbán’s success: the qualified majority vote, informal rulemaking, and
partocracy. 178 The Hungarian Founding Fathers placed an emphasis on
“strengthen[ing] the new democratic order, its stability, and its
governability”179 when drafting the new democratic institutional system.
The Founding Fathers attempted to achieve these goals by instituting
required qualified majority votes in many arenas of the decision-making
process.180 Bozóki writes:
These measures created a democracy in which, between
elections, the ruling government’s power became almost
cemented. It became nearly impossible to remove an
incumbent government from the outside; however, this
simultaneously made effective governance more difficult.
The government in power, due to the large number of
qualified majority rules, had to rely on the opposition to
make decisions on basic issues. Paradoxically, the
constitution thus both greatly increased the power and
limited the political responsibility of the government.181
By overvaluing stability, the constitutional system that existed between
1990 and 2010 created systematic inefficiencies that, in turn, contributed to
the devaluing of democracy. Bozóki also remarks that Hungary’s history of
occupation “produced a political culture characterized by a prevalence of
reforms implemented by previous governments between 2006 and 2010, as well as the ensuing
corruption and economic crisis.”).
175
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18.
176
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 290–91.
177
Id.
178
Bozóki, supra note 174, at 5–9.
179
Id. at 5.
180
Id. (“[T]he Founding Fathers believed that they could safeguard freedom by increasing the
number of decisions that required a qualified majority vote.”).
181
Id.
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informal practices and a lack of institutional accountability.” In order to
cope with occupation, a dual system of contradictory formal and informal
rules developed whereby the official rules of the occupier would be
followed while finding loopholes and cutting corners so as to undermine
official rule.183 This dual rule system persisted throughout the Kádár era of
communism and, Bozóki argues, made the system more bearable than
those of its neighbors.184 Because of Hungary’s long history of occupation,
Bozóki contends that “in 1989 Hungarians broke only with the institutional
system of dictatorship, not with the customs and informal procedures
associated with that system.”185 While this dual rule system was vital
during occupation, the persistent culture of rule-bending delegitimized
democratic rule in post-occupation life. Finally, “partocracy,” the form of
government by which a single party rules hegemonically,186 is culturally
endemic in Hungarian politics and at odds with democratic norms.187 The
anti-pluralism that current day Hungary is experiencing is not novel to
Orbán’s régime and in fact predates it. Political parties, including those on
the left, dominate all aspects of the political process: public discourse,
civic duties, and candidate nominations were all controlled by the major
political parties.188 Thus, the Hungarian democratic system, in its most free
state, was highly politicized and plagued by the excessive control of areas
of public life that should have remained free from government interference

182

Id. at 6.
Id. (“Hungarians learned that they only had to feign obedience to the rules imposed upon them
by foreign invaders: below the surface, they established a system of informal rules governing society
and culture. . . . Therefore, Hungarians learned to get their way around these rules in a conniving
fashion, finding loopholes and cutting corners, and this behavioral pattern remains deeply engrained in
Hungarian society.”).
184
Id. (“The reason [the regime] became more livable is that the system often did not take its own
rules seriously. . . . Under Kádárism, citizens grew accustomed to those procedures that made the
dictatorship bearable. For Hungarians, the old system was not nearly as bad as it had been for the Poles,
the Czechs, or the Romanians.”).
185
Id.
186
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18–19 (“Hungary’s political system [was] dominated by either
neoliberal parties such as the reform communists and liberal parties (MSZP and SZDSZ) who governed
between 1994–[19]98 and 2002–2010; or conservative-nationalist coalitions led initially by the MDF
who governed from 1990–[19]94, with Fidesz in office between 1998–2002, leading a coalition
including the Christian Democrats and the Smallholders Party.”).
187
See Bozóki, supra note 174, at 7 (“During the second decade of democracy in Hungary, party
politics superseded almost all other aspects.”).
188
See id. at 7–8 (“Public discourse was based on party allegiance. . . . It was the parties that
organized movements; it was the parties that established public benefit foundations, professional
groups, and civic circles. . . . The particular features of the Hungarian political system—including the
collection of candidate nomination slips, the high threshold to enter parliament, the large number of
regulatory areas in which a qualified majority is required in order to create new laws, the opacity of
political party financing, the privileged position of political party foundations, and so on—facilitated
the survival of existing parties and made it difficult for new political forces to enter parliament.”).
183
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but were instead controlled by the dominant political party. Partocracy
only served to further polarize the Hungarian public in an already turbulent
time, creating an atmosphere of a “cold civil war” between those on the left
and right.190 Unchanged, all three practices made the chances of a lasting,
stable democracy dead on arrival.
Throughout the late 1990s and persisting to the current day, Hungary
has faced many economic crises. As the formerly communist nation
transitioned to democracy, Hungary also transitioned to capitalism.
Hungary slowly privatized and the transition resulted in an unstable
economy.191 Hungary experienced rapid deindustrialization, widening
regional inequalities.192 As a result of this rough transition, Hungary
became increasingly reliant on external financial investments, primarily
from the European Union and Japan.193 In Hungary’s first decade of
democracy, the country “experienced periods of massive contraction,”194
but began to steady itself in the new millennium.195 This quasi-stability was
quickly quashed by the unpopular austerity measures pushed through by
the MSZP-SZDSZ government196 in 2006 and the global recession in
2008.197 Tóth and Grajczjár speculate that “the recovery period was too
short to solve the internal societal tensions, poverty and underemployment,
to bridge the wide gap between the eastern and western parts of the
country, and to stop the deterioration of public institutions.”198 These
austerity measures promoted by elite members of the MSZP-SZDSZ
coalition ran contrary to what the majority of Hungarians actually
desired.199 The political scene only became more polarized when a
confidential speech by then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in

189

Id. at 8–9 (“The Hungarian system was characterized by a highly politicized society and by the
excessive sway that political parties held in various areas of public life.”).
190
Id. at 8 (describing the depths of political polarization in Hungary as a result of partocracy).
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Wilkin, supra note 164, at 20.
192
Id. at 18.
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Id. at 20.
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Id.
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Id.
196
The MSZP-SZDSZ was a coalition government between the Hungarian Socialist Party
(Magyar Szocialista Párt) and the Alliance of Free Democrats’ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a
Magyar Liberális Párt) party which held a close majority before Fidesz won a majority. Csaba
Nikolenyi, Strategic Co-Ordination in the 2002 Hungarian Election, 56 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1041, 1041
(2004).
197
Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.
198
András Tóth & István Grajczjár, The Rise of the Radical Right in Hungary, in THE
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 133, 158 (Péter Krasztev &
Jon Van Til eds., 2015).
199
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 19 (“The problem was that these austerity policies were against
what the majority of the Hungarian population actually wanted at the time.”).
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Balatonőnszöd was leaked. In the speech, Gyurcsány said that he and the
MSZP-SZDSZ government “had knowingly lied to the public concerning
the economic situation in Hungary,”201 causing an eruption of “violent
street protests”202 on the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution.203 This
economic crisis was intensified by the global recession and occurred
“when the government was rapidly losing its political credibility
domestically.”204 The mishandling of the economic crisis decimated
support for MSZP and opened the door for far-right parties to rise to
prominence.205 In addition to Fidesz, the Jobbik party, a radical far-right
party that has been described as neo-fascist,206 emerged during the
economic crises.207 By the 2010 parliamentary elections, support for MSZP
dropped to 20 percent208 while Jobbik captured 16.67 percent of the vote,
becoming the third largest party in parliament.209
Finally, during the interim period of democratization, far-right parties
peddled “law and order” narratives that targeted the Roma.210 Tóth and
Grajczjár argue that anti-Roma “law and order” rhetoric entered public
discourse in 2006 after a tragic murder was committed by a group of Roma
in Olaszliszka.211 This event was the catalyst for an outpouring of
anti-Roma sentiments, with Jobbik leading this discourse as “protector of

200
Philipp Karl, Network Analysis of Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary, in MINORITIES UNDER
ATTACK: OTHERING AND RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 221, 222
(Sebastian Goll et al. eds., 2016).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 137.
204
Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.
205
Id. at 3, 4.
206
Jobbik, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/
files/threat_pdf/Jobbik-12172018.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
207
PETER KREKÓ ET AL., BROOKINGS, ANTI-MUSLIM POPULISM IN HUNGARY: FROM THE
MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-inhungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/.
208
Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 137.
209
Id. at 139.
210
The Roma are a richly diverse, historically nomadic group of people who likely originated in
northern India and migrated towards Europe in approximately the tenth or eleventh centuries.
Throughout their history, the Roma have been subjected to abuse, enslavement, and extermination. In
Romania, the Roma were enslaved between the fourteenth century until the 1850s. In Nazi Germany,
between 250,000 and 500,000 Roma perished in the Holocaust. An additional note: while the Roma are
also referred to as “Gypsies,” this is a widely recognized slur and will be omitted from quoted
materials, except for in the case of direct quotes from far-right speeches. Samira Shackle, Roma
Holocaust: Amid Rising Hate, ‘Forgotten’ Victims Remembered, A LJAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/roma-holocaust-rising-hate-forgotten-victimsremembered-191029173851099.html; see Adrian Marsh, Gypsies, Roma, Travellers: An Animated
History, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (June 5, 2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/gypsiesroma-travellers-animated-history (detailing the history of the Roma people).
211
Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 138.
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‘the honest, hardworking common people’” against “Gypsy crime.”213
The Jobbik propagation of this racist discourse was ultimately successful in
widening their voter base and bringing far-right politics to the fore:
“[M]any [Hungarians] felt themselves being finally liberated from the
left-liberal stranglehold of political correctness and allowed themselves to
give vent to long-suppressed resentment, naming the causes of their real or
imagined grievances.”214 In 2007, Jobbik spurred the creation of the
Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda),215 a paramilitary group dedicated to the
“defence” of Hungary against “Gypsy criminality.”216 Other anti-Roma
extremist groups, such as Véderő and Szebb Jövőért, scheduled marches so
hostile and aggressive that they caused Roma populations to evacuate
towns, such as Gyöngyöspata, in fear for their safety.217 This xenophobic
mainstream law and order rhetoric is echoed in the contemporary far-right
discourse surrounding the refugee crisis.218
D. Rise of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy (2010–present)
The tumultuous period of democratic transition preceding Fidesz’s
régime greatly contributed to the party’s triumph.219 The nascent illiberal
democracy became cemented as Hungary’s new system of governance
through sweeping unilateral legal reforms. These reforms enshrined the
illiberal principles of majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, dictatorship of
law, nationalism, and anti-intellectualism.220 The following section will
examine how Orbán instrumentalized the law to claim the government for
his own party and apply it to the typical characteristics of an illiberal
democracy. The cumulative effect of these reforms is demonstrated in
Freedom House’s decision to downgrade Hungary’s freedom ranking from
“free” to “partially free” in 2019.221 These legal reforms attacked six arenas
212
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Id.
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Id.
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The Magyar Gárda was disbanded by Metropolitan Court of Budapest in 2009. After
unsuccessful appeals in the national judicial system, the Magyar Gárda brought their case to the
European Court of Human Rights and alleged that the national decision violated freedom of assembly
as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. The court held that Article 11 was not
violated and upheld the judgments of the Hungarian national courts. Vona v. Hungary, App. No.
35943/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) paras. 16–18, 72.
216
Id. para. 10.
217
Karl, supra note 200, at 223.
218
See infra Part II.D.
219
See supra Part II.C.
220
Id.
221
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: HUNGARY (2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/ country/hungary/freedom-world/2019 (“Hungary’s status declined from Free
to Partially Free due to sustained attacks on the country’s democratic institutions by Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, which has used its parliamentary supermajority to impose restrictions on
or assert control over the opposition, the media, religious groups, academia, NGOs, the courts, asylum
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of democracy: the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the presidency,
independent institutions, the media, and civil society.
Before Orbán’s Fidesz came into power, Hungary “was a liberal
democracy characterized by a multiparty system, free elections,
representational government, a strong opposition, free media, strong, and
credible institutions that protected the rule of law (i.e., the Constitutional
Court and Ombudsman’s Office), and independent courts.”222 In stark
contrast, the Orbán government approaches law not as an entity to be
respected, but as a body to be manipulated in order to fit the needs of
Fidesz’s political agenda.223 This is first and foremost exemplified with
Fidesz’s unilateral rewriting of the Constitution. The framers of the old
Constitution, drafted after the fall of communism, had two concerns when
structuring the new government: first, “a fractured parliament in which
small parties would be unable to form stable majority coalitions” and
second, “a deeply entrenched constitution that would be too hard to change
once the new democrats figured out how they wanted to design their
political institutions.”224 The resulting constitution was one that favored
larger parties with a provision allowing parliament to alter any part of the
Constitution so long as they secure a two-thirds majority.225 This fatal flaw
in the Constitution revealed itself after Fidesz secured 53 percent of the
popular vote, translating into 68 percent of the seats in parliament.226 This
meant that Fidesz was now capable of unilaterally amending the
Constitution. In their first year in power, Fidesz amended the Constitution
twelve times, altering more than fifty separate provisions and weakening
any and all checks and balances.227 Fidesz used their two-thirds majority
power to erase the last measure restraining constitutional amendments: the
requirement of “a four-fifths vote of parliament to set the rules for writing
a new constitution.”228 The elimination of this rule allowed Fidesz to draft
a completely new constitution while barring any opposing voices from
sitting at the table.
seekers, and the private sector since 2010.”). Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018:
HUNGARY (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2018 (displaying a 72/100
Global Freedom Score and designating Hungary as “free”).
222
András Bozóki, Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary, 19 DEBATTE: J. CONTEMP.
CENT. & E. EUR. 649, 649 (2011).
223
See id. at 651 (“[T]he new government saw the 1989 Constitution as a heap of purely technical
rules, which Orbán has since shaped to fit the needs of his current political agenda. If any of his new
laws proved to be unconstitutional, it was not the law, but the Constitution that had to be changed.”).
224
Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling
the Constitution, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 37,
37 (Péter Krasztev & Jon Van Til eds., 2015).
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Now in control of the executive and legislative branches, Fidesz’s next
target was the Constitutional Court. Before Fidesz’s reign, the
Constitutional Court was a powerful check on the government.229 First,
Fidesz utilized its newfound amendment powers to change the judicial
nomination process by allowing the party in power to nominate candidates
to be elected to the court by a two-thirds majority, completely eliminating
pluralism from the process.230 The Constitution had previously “required a
majority of parliamentary parties to agree to a nomination and then a
two-thirds vote of parliament’s members to elect the nominee to the
court.”231 Second, Fidesz attacked the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction
after it declared a retroactive tax law that punished members of the former
MSZP-SZDSZ government unconstitutional232 and retaliated by “amending
the Constitution and limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.”233
Parliament barred the Constitutional Court from reviewing any law about
fiscal matters unless it affects “rights to life, dignity, data privacy, thought,
conscience, religion, and citizenship.”234 Finally, the Fidesz government
packed the Constitutional Court and delegated themselves the power to
name seven of the fifteen judges as well as the chairperson of the
Constitutional Court.235 As to be expected, all of the nominees are
Fidesz-affiliates.236
In addition to the Constitutional Court, Fidesz uprooted the
appointment procedure for judgeships in every single court in the country.
Before Fidesz, lower court judges were independently appointed by a panel
of their fellow judges.237 Under the new system, Fidesz established the
National Judicial Office (KIH) to oversee the judiciary and holds “the
power to select new judges, to promote or demote any judge, to begin
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Id.
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. (“In order to plug gaping budget holes, the Fidesz government established a 98 percent
retroactive tax on the customary departing bonuses of those who had left public employment in the
preceding five years. The Constitutional Court, before it could be packed with a working majority of
new judges, struck down this tax as unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)).
233
Bozóki, Occupy the State, supra note 222, at 651.
234
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 39. Bánkuti et al. note that the Constitutional Court is
explicitly barred from reviewing “budget or tax laws if they infringe other rights that are much easier to
limit with fiscal measures, such as the right to property, equality under the law, the prohibition against
retroactive legislation, and the guarantee of fair judicial procedure.” Id. Fidesz also sought to
nationalize private pensions, directly resulting in the European Court of Human Rights being flooded
with 8000 cases on the matter due to the Constitutional Court’s inability to act. Id.
235
See Bozóki, Occupy the State, supra note 222, at 651–52 (“In addition, the number of judges
was increased from eleven to fifteen, and the Court was packed with right-wing personalities and
former politicians known to be close to Fidesz.”).
236
Id.
237
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 42.
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disciplinary proceedings, and to select the leaders of each of the courts.”238
The president of the KIH has a nine year term and is selected by a
two-thirds majority vote in parliament, again guaranteeing that the head of
this “independent” body would be a friend of Fidesz.239 In this case, current
Chairperson Tünde Handó is quite literally “a close friend of Prime
Minister Orbán and the wife of József Szájer,” the Vice President of Fidesz
and principal architect of the new constitution.240 In contrast to other legal
systems, Chairperson Handó also has the sole authority to reassign cases
throughout the country at will.241 As such, the legitimacy of the entire
Hungarian judicial system has been decimated in under a decade.
The checks delegated to the president’s office and purportedly
independent accountability institutions have also been delegitimized. First,
under the old constitution, the president’s main check was that of the
suspensive veto power.242 In the case of the president’s office, parliament
simply elects hardline Fidesz supporters, like Pál Schmitt and János Áder,
who refuse to veto Fidesz legislation.243 Second, Hungary’s old
ombudsman system comprised of “four separate ombudsmen with separate
staffs and independent jurisdictions”244 that monitored human rights issues.
Now, there is a single parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights
that operates with a severely reduced staff.245 The Data Protection
Supervisor was abolished and a new, non-independent office was
established.246 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union found
that in doing so, Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1995
Data Protection Directive.247 Third, the State Audit Office, once an
independent body with the power to investigate the misuse of public funds,
is now led by a former Fidesz MP with no professional auditing
experience. 248 Fourth, the National Election Commission (NVB), the
238

Id.
Id. at 42–43.
240
Id. at 42.
241
Id. at 43.
242
Id. at 40.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 44.
245
Id.
246
Case
C-288/12,
Comm’n
v.
Hung.,
2014
E.C.R.
I-nyr,
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:227:0015:0016:EN:PDF.
247
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 44.
248
Id. at 39. Independent Hungarian media allege that the State Audit Office is selectively
enforcing auditing regulation aimed at harming opposition parties, while dismissing like investigations
on Fidesz. Jobbik is facing fines of 662 million forints ($2.4 million) for illegal in-kind campaign
contributions, while three parties are facing fines for “renting office space below market rates”: The
Democratic Coalition, 16 million forints ($58,000); Együtt, 16 million forints ($58,000); and Politics
Can Be Different 8.8 million forints ($31,900). Christopher Adam, The Hungarian State Audit Office’s
Assault on Democracy, HUNGARIAN FREE PRESS (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:35 PM),
http://hungarianfreepress.com/ 2018/01/09/the-hungarian-state-audit-offices-assault-on-democracy/.
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independent body charged with regulating election law, has been filled
with a Fidesz majority.249 In addition to monitoring elections and drawing
electoral maps,250 the NVB also has the power to decide what referenda
will be voted on in elections.251 This is particularly notable as referenda are
one of the most substantial areas that civil society can attempt to influence
the Fidesz government.252 Finally, the new constitution created the Budget
Council that may “veto any budget produced by parliament that adds even
a single forint [(0.004¢)] to the national debt.”253 The terms for Budget
Council officials exceed that of a standard parliamentary election cycle,
therefore allowing the Budget Council to “exercise dead-hand control over
future elected governments.”254 Even worse, “if parliament fails to agree on
a budget by March 31 of each year, then the president may dissolve
parliament and call new elections.”255 If the Budget Council utilizes its
veto power right before the deadline, it could force a new election.256 Thus,
Fidesz’s partocracy extends beyond the three branches of government and
invades purportedly independent institutions as well.
Fidesz has usurped power horizontally by controlling the vast majority
of mainstream media. The Fidesz government established the National
Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH), a regulatory agency
and an “independent” Media Council, charged with monitoring media
outlets and fining outlets that do not have “balanced” news
programming.257 Like other “independent” government agencies, Orbán
appointed a former Fidesz MP to lead the NMHH, and parliament elected
Fidesz loyalists fill all the seats on the Media Council.258 Although the
Hungarian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the
press,259 the public television broadcaster is biased in favor of Fidesz and
249

Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 39.
Fidesz’s ability to modify election law without cooperation from outside parties has allowed
them to manipulate previously independent institutions to preserve their two-thirds majority. For
example, in 2014, Fidesz won only 44 percent of the popular vote, but still maintained their two-thirds
majority in parliament. Martino Comelli & Vera Hovárth, What Orbán Knows and His Enemies Don’t,
JACOBIN MAG. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/viktor-orban-hungary-fideszauthoritarian-opposition.
251
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 39.
252
Id. at 44.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 40.
258
Id.
259
MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY
art. IX [hereinafter HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION] (“(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression. (2) Hungary shall recognize and protect the freedom and diversity of the press, and shall
ensure the conditions for the free dissemination of information necessary for the formation of
democratic public opinion. . . . (6) The detailed rules relating to the freedom of the press and the organ
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actively undermines the opposition; Fidesz selectively awards advertising
contracts and radio station frequencies to supporters and pressures critical
news outlets into silence or closes them.260 Népszabadság, the largest
opposition newspaper, was unexpectedly suspended from operation after it
uncovered Fidesz scandals and its parent company was subsequently sold
to Optimus Press, a firm owned by Fidesz allies.261 The firm has no plans
to reopen Népszabadság.262 Fidesz affiliates and pro-government media
currently dominate the market,263 and much of the opposition media has
been pushed to the internet.264 Approximately 90 percent of all media in
Hungary is owned by either the government or allies of Fidesz and use
their publications to push pro-government views.265 For example, a study
by Democracy Reporting International and Mérték Media Monitor studied
broadcasts by television stations about the refugee resettlement program
referendum in Hungary, supported by the European Union, and found that
91 percent of programming by public television stations took antireferendum positions.266 Currently, Freedom House has ranked Hungary’s
freedom of the press as only “partly free.”267
supervising media services, press products and the communications market shall be laid down in a
cardinal Act.”).
260
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017: HUNGARY (2017),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/59fc67e6a.html. Additionally, the “donation” of most major media
outlets—over four hundred—to a pro-Fidesz foundation run by Orbán’s childhood friend is yet another
example that Orbán’s “economic patriotism” is merely a guise for his crony capitalism. Of course, this
mass donation to the Central European Press and Media Foundation must be approved by regulatory
authorities (led by Orbán appointees). If approved, “the deal will place most leading private Hungarian
outlets under the control of a single, state-friendly entity.” Patrick Kingsley, Orban and His Allies
Cement Control of Hungary’s News Media, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/hungary-orban-media.html.
261
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017, supra note 260.
262
Id.
263
Id. (“Opimus Press bought the publisher Mediaworks, which had recently merged with Pannon
Lapok Társasága, which controlled numerous regional newspapers. The business weekly Figyelő, was
acquired by Mária Schmidt, a government ally. Ripost, a progovernment print tabloid, was launched in
the fall of 2016. The free daily newspaper Metropol shut down in June 2016, after it lost a contract that
had allowed its distribution at metro stations. A government-affiliated free newspaper, Lokál, soon
emerged in its place. The license of Hungary’s only national private radio station, Class FM, was not
renewed in 2016.”).
264
See Krasztev, supra note 173, at 176 (“Independent media have been relegated to the
Internet.”).
265
Marius Dragomir, The State of Hungarian Media: Endgame, MEDIA@LSE (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/08/29/the-state-of-hungarian-media-endgame/.
A
second study demonstrated that in 2015, only 31 Hungarian news outlets took a pro-government stance,
but by 2018, the number increased to 500. In addition, many of these news sources were owned by
fourteen pro-Fidesz oligarchs, with Lőrinc Mészáros owning 205 media titles. Bátorfy Attila,
Infographic: Explore the Media Empire Friendly to the Hungarian Government, ATLATSZO (May 30,
2018),
https://english.atlatszo.hu/2018/01/16/infographic-explore-the-media-empire-friendly-to-thehungarian-government/.
266
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017, supra note 260.
267
Id.
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Hungarian civil society is also under siege. Like Fidesz’s strategy with
the media, the party prevents civil society from genuinely functioning by
smothering oppositional NGOs and replacing them with Fidesz allies or by
discrediting them based on their affiliation with George Soros.268 Scholars
have argued that Hungary’s “historically based tradition of a strong central
state, the restored (or rather surviving) authoritarian hierarchies . . .
successfully hindered the emergence of civil independence and
autonomy.”269 Prior to the Fidesz régime, civil society traditions in
Hungary were beginning to grow, for example, with the success of
impartial government watchdog groups.270 Many of these civil society
organizations have a high resource dependency and rely on government
grants to operate.271 Once Orbán took power in 2010, “the system of
partiality became legitimized, and grant distribution became overtly biased
as a ‘necessary restoration’ of the national and traditional value system,
which strictly excluded a number of values, critical voices, and watchdog
views.”272 In effect, the Orbán government was able to “dismiss”
opposition organizations by withdrawing funding and “replace” them with
new organizations run by Fidesz allies.273 Government Decree 49/2011
(III.30.) was enacted to achieve similar aims by ordering “direct provision
of financial support through some of the ministries to 525 organizations,
visibly recognizable from their names as NGOs that highlight national,
family, and other traditional values and share these with the government
parties.”274
Fidesz is keen to target “opponent” NGOs that are funded through
Soros’s charitable contributions and Open Society Foundations. The
Hungarian far-right perpetuates anti-Semitic myths claiming that Soros is
part of an international conspiracy to force “globalism” on unwilling
nations vis-à-vis civil society organizations.275 In 2018, Fidesz passed a
law informally known as the “Stop Soros” law that both imposes “a 25

268

See infra Part IV.B for a more in-depth discussion of George Soros and Fidesz.
Ágnes Kövér, Captured by State and Church: Civil Society in Democratic Hungary, in THE
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 81, 84 (Péter Krasztev &
Jon Van Til eds., 2015).
270
See Zsolt Enyedi, Democratic Backsliding and Academic Freedom in Hungary, 16 PERSP. ON
POL. 1067, 1070 (2018) (“These watchdogs have been critical of government practices for many years,
no matter which party was in power.”).
271
Kövér, supra note 269, at 82–83.
272
Id. at 83.
273
Id. at 84 (“As a result, hundreds of formerly successful organizations disappeared, a process
which can be followed by searching the web, where the virtual corpses of once-flourishing NGOs are
scattered.”).
274
Id. at 83–84.
275
See Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1070 (“The ‘observation’ that civil-society organizations
backed by Soros are part of a global conspiracy is not unique to Hungary.”).
269
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percent tax on foreign donations to NGOs that back migration” and also
criminalizes the vague practice of “promoting and supporting illegal
migration.”277 This is another instance in which the illiberal value of
absolute sovereignty appears. In a recent speech, Orbán said: “We are up
against media outlets maintained by foreign concerns and domestic
oligarchs, professional hired activists, troublemaking protest organizers,
and a chain of NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up
by and embodied in the name George Soros.”278 We can again observe the
law and order rhetoric, similar to the anti-Roma beliefs discussed earlier,279
but this time deployed as a weapon against humanitarian aid organizations.
The rhetoric put forth by Fidesz and Prime Minister Orbán is steeped
in ethnic nationalism and easily distributed as propaganda vis-à-vis the
enormous amount of media either owned by the state or by Fidesz allies.
The content of these messages is comprised “of nationalism and Christian
and patriarchal family values with demands for law and order.”280 The
Constitution’s preamble has been revised to emphasize themes of
“Christian values, national history, and a united nation as a cultural and
political community with state interests.”281 Much of Orbán’s rhetoric
invokes notions of “the family,” both with regard to valuing the ethnic
Hungarian nuclear family282 as well as referring to the nation-state as a
276
Krisztina Than, Civil Organizations in Hungary Brace for Government Crackdown on NGOs,
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-ngos/civilorganizations-in-hungary-brace-for-government-crackdown-on-ngos-idUSKBN1HW1ZN.
277
Zack Beauchamp, Hungary Just Passed a “Stop Soros” Law That Makes It Illegal to Help
Undocumented Migrants, VOX (June 22, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/6/22/17493070/hungary-stop-soros-orban.
278
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Orbán Viktor’s Ceremonial Speech on the 170th Anniversary of
the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (Mar. 15, 2018). Orbán then went on to claim:

[T]here are those who want to take our country from us. Not with the stroke of a
pen, has happened one hundred years ago at Trianon; now they want us to
voluntarily hand our country over to others . . . . They want us to hand it over to
foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who
do not respect our culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace
what is ours with what is theirs. . . . Those who do not halt immigration at their
borders are lost: slowly but surely they are consumed. External forces and
international powers want to force all this upon us, with the help of their allies here
in our country.
Id.

279

See supra Part II.C (discussing how “far right parties peddled ‘law and order’ narratives that
targeted the Roma”).
280
András Bozóki, The Illusion of Inclusion: Configurations of Populism in Hungary,
in THINKING THROUGH TRANSITION: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN PASTS, AND
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1989, at 275, 308 (Michal Kopeček & Piotr
Wciślik eds., 2015).
281
Id.
282
See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open
University and Student Camp (July 29, 2018) (“Our second tenet is that every country has the right to
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283

family to be protected. Frequently, Orbán characterizes Hungary as a
homogenous Christian nation under siege by refugees—and that
“migration and mass population movements are bad, dangerous things
which [Hungary] want[s] no part of. . . . In consequence [of migration] we
will not be able to keep Hungary as it has been for the past 1,100 years.”284
Orbán’s speeches conjure images of the Hungarian fictive ethnicity: that of
a traditional white, Christian Magyar that embraces traditional values and
rejects the moral decline of the West. This fictive Hungarian rejects the
multiculturalism “imposed” on them by the West: “We must state that we
do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our
own colour, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of
others. . . . We do not want to be a diverse country. We want to be how we
became 1,100 years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.”285 This fictive
ethnicity can be seen in play when a 2010 law granted citizenship rights,
including the right to vote in elections, to ethnic Hungarians living in
neighboring countries. Although many of these newly enfranchised ethnic
Hungarians have never visited the country, they account for approximately
ten percent of the electorate and vote for Fidesz at a rate of 95 percent.286
The Orbán administration is also in the process of reconstructing
Hungary’s history. The much-hated Treaty of Trianon that caused Hungary
to lose two-thirds of its territory after the First World War has become a
rallying cry for the far-right. In 2016, the central square of Pomaz, a small
town outside of Budapest, was renamed “Trianon Square” and features a
monument that is a map of greater Hungary prior to its loss of territory.287
Since Orbán’s 2010 election, the régime has sought to rewrite the nation’s
past vis-à-vis the construction of monuments that glorify what were once
defend the traditional family model, and is entitled to assert that every child has the right to a mother
and a father.”).
283
See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., “State of the Nation” Address (Feb. 10, 2019),
https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/02/11/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-state-of-the-nation-address-fullspeech/ (“Thirty years after the fall of communism, on the eve of a pan-European parliamentary
election, Europe finds itself in the position that we must stand up for our Hungarian identity, for our
Christian identity, protect our families and communities, and also protect our freedom. . . . We have our
own future which is the continuation of the lives of our parents and grandparents, the preservation of
the traditions of a thousand years, the protection of our economy, our families and our Christian
culture.”).
284
Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the
Association of Cities with County Rights (Feb. 8, 2018).
285
Id.
286
See Lili Bayer, Viktor Orbán Courts Voters Beyond ‘Fortress Hungary’, POLITICO (Aug. 22,
2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-courts-voters-in-transylvania-romania-hungarianelection-2018/ (“In Hungary’s 2014 election, over 95 percent of votes cast by non-domestic citizens
went to Fidesz.”).
287
Rosa Schwartzburg & Imre Szijarto, The Ghosts of a Fascist Past, JACOBIN (Jan. 26, 2019),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/01/hungary-fidesz-viktor-orban-memory-history?fbclid=IwAR0PX
U19MpJhYbFGAsoQxodTt-HP_PUjIHipRrXnZakPUj0eumF1g7dT4MA.
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considered dark times in history. These include monuments celebrating
Miklós Horthy, a right-wing leader and ally of Hitler, and the 2018
replacement of a statue of Imre Nagy, the martyred leader of the 1956
Revolution, with Gyula Gömbös, a fascist Prime Minister during the
interwar period.288 Other monuments erected under the régime downplay
Hungary’s culpability in the Holocaust.289 Orbán and Fidesz are in the
midst of constructing a new collective mythology of the nation-state,
through both legal instruments and national symbols, in order to support
their régime of illiberal democracy. Their new conception of what
constitutes a Hungarian and Hungarian values has been deployed against
intellectuals and academia in order to delegitimize their opposition and
tighten their grip on public discourse.
E. Emergency and Temporal Uncertainty in Hungarian Illiberal
Democracy
Orbán, like authoritarian leaders across the globe, received another
opportunity to consolidate power when the novel coronavirus arrived in
Hungary.290 On March 30, Parliament approved the “Corona Bill,”
allowing Orbán to indefinitely rule by decree with effectively unchecked
power.291 Under rule by decree, Orbán may bypass the national assembly
completely.292 The law granting rule by decree also stalled all elections and
created two to five year prison sentences for those that “distort facts” or
publish “false information.”293 Abuse of emergency power is not
288

Id.
Id. One such monument erected under the cover of night in Budapest’s Szabadság tér
(Freedom Square) depicts “innocent Hungary” as Archangel Gabriel being attacked by the German
imperial eagle and has been the site of a counterprotest exhibit due to the memorial’s downplaying of
Hungary’s complacency in the Holocaust. Former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány said “with this
gesture, Orbán is falsifying [history] and dishonouring all the Jewish, Roma and gay people who died
in the Holocaust.” This monument prompted thirty Jewish U.S. congressmen to pen a letter to Orbán
asking him to cancel the construction of the monument. Orbán responded to the criticism by claiming
that the memorial is “not a Holocaust memorial but a tribute to all the victims of the German
occupation.” Daniel Nolan, German Occupation Memorial Completed Under Cover of Darkness,
BUDAPEST BEACON (July 21, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/german-occupation-memorialcompleted-under-cover-of-darkness/.
290
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard: Hungary, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/hu (last accessed Oct. 30, 2020).
291
Imre Szijarto & Rosa Schwartzburg, Viktor Orbán Is Using the Coronavirus Emergency to
Crush Minorities, JACOBIN MAG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/viktor-orbancoronavirus-pandemic-hungary-authoritarianism; Guy Verhofstadt, Is COVID-19 Killing Democracy?,
BALKAN INSIGHT (May 18, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/18/is-covid-19-killingdemocracy/.
292
Verhofstadt, supra note 291.
293
Edward Szekeres, Hungary ‘No Longer a Democracy’ After Coronavirus Law, BALKAN
INSIGHT (Mar. 31, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/31/hungary-no-longer-a-democracy-aftercoronavirus-law/.
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unfamiliar to Orbán. The government, for example, has renewed the state
of emergency declared for a “crisis situation due to mass migration” eight
times since the European refugee crisis began in 2015.294 Subverting the
division between emergency and normalcy serves two functions: to expand
executive authority beyond legislature oversight and to normalize the
régime. Through enduring vacillations between emergency and normalcy,
“the authorities may turn to rule by decree as easily as switching on a
lightbulb.”295
When authoritarian governments fabricate indefinite emergency,
diminished speech and protest rights often follow. For Orbán, the Corona
Bill serves as an effective mechanism to suppress speech while painting
dissenters as active threats to the health of the nation. Opposition MP
Tímea Szabó argued that in reality, the Corona Bill lends “a free hand to
do away with even what’s left of the press and practically imprison
journalists, doctors, and opposition lawmakers if we say things that you
don’t like—namely, the truth.”296 Since the “fake news” and assembly
components of the Corona Bill passed, police launched about one hundred
investigations against individuals, though cases have yet to make their way
into court.297 The Fidesz government has also instrumentalized COVID-19
precautions to limit protest and assembly. For example, protesters in a
series of car demonstrations against Orbán’s rule by decree were subjected
to extreme fines of up to 750,000 forints (about $2,500).298 Protesters were
fined under an array of charges ranging from violating traffic laws to
COVID-19 assembly restrictions.299 Under illiberal rule, official sites of

294

Edit Inotai, Pandemic-Hit Hungary Harps on About ‘Migrant Crisis’, BALKAN INSIGHT (Mar.
19, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/19/pandemic-hit-hungary-harps-on-about-migrant-crisis/;
Akos Keller-Alant, Hungarian Police Accused of Abusing Powers to Arrest Critics, BALKAN INSIGHT
(May 13, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/13/hungarian-police-accused-of-abusing-powers-toarrest-critics/.
295
Orsolya Lehotai, Hungary’s Democracy Is Still Under Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 17, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/17/hungary-democracy-still-under-threat-orban-state-public-healthemergency-decree/.
296
Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291.
297
Keller-Alant, supra note 294. For example, the police arrested two people in rural Hungary for
criticizing Orbán’s COVID-19 response on Facebook. Id. One detainee, János Csóka-Szűcs, is disabled
and was left without transportation home after his release. Csóka-Szűcs was forced to walk home
without his cell phone or money, which were still in police custody. Id.
298
Keller-Alant, supra note 294. Szijarto notes that these fines are “several times the average
worker’s monthly income, and more than enough to cause serious difficulties even for relatively
well-off households.” Imre Szijarto, The Decline of Democracy in Hungary Is a Troubling Vision of the
Future, JACOBIN (June 14, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/6/2020/viktor-orban-hungary-democracycovid-19.
299
Gabriella Horn, Car Honking Protests Cancelled Due to Astronomical Fines Handed Out By
Budapest Police, ATLATSZO (May 25, 2020), https://english.atlatszo.hu/2020/05/25/car-honkingprotests-cancelled-due-to-astronomical-fines-handed-out-by-budapest-police/.
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301

public discourse such as media and universities are no longer free. The
advent of COVID-19 allows illiberal leaders to restrict access to the
abstract and literal town square under the façade of public health.302
This state of public health emergency also granted Fidesz the ability to
quickly pass expansive measures unrelated to COVID-19. On March 31,
just one day after the Corona Bill passed, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt
Semjén, introduced and passed an omnibus bill proposing fifty-seven
legislative changes.303 Although this bill was passed under the guise of
COVID-19, in reality, it functions to further consolidate power.304 First, the
bill financially enriches Orbán and his allies by ordering the construction
of Orbán’s pet projects: “the construction of new museum buildings in one
of the capital’s biggest public parks”305 and a new Budapest-Belgrade
railway.306 Second, the bill expands illiberal control over the arts by
packing the theater supervisory board with government appointees.307
Third, the bill attempted to suspend municipal autonomy.308 Finally, the
bill “forces trans people to have the same gender as they were assigned at
birth and bans gender reassignment altogether.”309 This aspect of the bill
not only functions as a literal attack against transgender Hungarians, but
also as an abstract attack against their identities.310 Denying trans existence
as deviant to the traditional heteropatriarchal norms of the Hungarian
nation-state serves to Otherize from “the people” of the imagined
community.311 This dual role of the new law serves two purposes: cast
aside trans people as non-members of the community and routinely out
them in regular aspects of national life.312
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régime).
301

See supra notes 258–70 and accompanying text (analyzing media freedom under the Orbán

Infra Part III.
Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
307
Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291. Régime control over the arts is directly related to the
anti-intellectual aspect of illiberal democracies. By restricting the arts and academic freedom,
authoritarians seek to manipulate and regulate national discourse. See supra Part I.C.3.
308
This portion of the omnibus bill was reversed after extensive outcry from the opposition, “who
made significant gains in the last municipal contests in fall 2019, including [Gergely] Karácsony’s
election in Budapest” as mayor. Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291.
309
Id.
310
See Szijarto, supra note 298 (“Since Hungarian society at large is anything but trans accepting,
this move is not only an attack on trans people’s right to their ‘identities’ in an abstract sense. It is
likely to turn regular interactions with society into recurring rituals of humiliation.”).
311
Supra Part I.C.1.
312
See Szijarto, supra note 298 (“This means outing trans people not only to employers and
landlords but even to receptionists and cashiers, whenever they use a credit card.”).
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On June 16, proposed legislation ending Orbán’s rule by decree passed
unopposed.313 The Orbán government issued about one hundred decrees
since March, many of which are completely unrelated to COVID-19
measures.314 This brief reprieve would not last for long: Keeping in line
with tradition, Parliament again pushed the nation into a state of
emergency. This time, Parliament passed legislation allowing Orbán to
enter a “state of medical emergency” and revert back to rule by decree
absent a mandated end date.315 Under a state of health emergency, the
government may restrict fundamental rights for a maximum of six months,
but critics argue that they may be extended indefinitely in practice.316
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee wrote that the formal June 20 end
to rule by decree “is nothing but an optical illusion: if the Bills are adopted
in their present form, that will allow the government to again rule by
decree for an indefinite period of time, this time without even the minimal
constitutional safeguards.”317 This looming state of emergency destabilizes
any normalcy that existed before the régime. Crisis legitimizes
authoritarian control. “When the coronavirus arrived in Hungary, Orbán
used it to illustrate that he was already fully in control of his system.”318
These states of emergency are cast as an offensive against the perceived
invasions of disease or the Other319 into the imagined community.320 The
aim is that the régime citizens will more readily accept losing civil
liberties—the “liberalism”321 of the old liberal democratic order—and the
tightening authoritarian grasp will begin to feel natural. Orbán’s illiberal
democracy is emblematic of this threat. Suspended in the strings of state
313

Lehotai, supra note 295.
Shaun Walker, Hungarian Government to End Orbán’s Rule-By-Decree Legislation,
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/26/hungarian-governmentto-end-orbans-rule-by-decree-legislation-emergency-coronavirus.
315
Never-Ending Story?, HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE (May 27, 2020),
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/never-ending-story/. The legislation also amended the Disaster
Management Act to authorize “the government [to] order any measures it deems necessary if the
measures previously specified by parliament are inadequate.” Id.
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
Nick Schifrin & Layla Quran, How Authoritarianism Has Spread Since the Coronavirus
Pandemic Began, PBS (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-authoritarianism-hasspread-since-the-coronavirus-pandemic-began.
319
Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism explains that European societies Otherize non-European
societies in order to legitimize their imperialist projects. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 7 (1994)
(“Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion
identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the
major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and
outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the
non-European peoples and cultures.”).
320
See supra Part I.C.1 (applying Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities to illiberal
democracy).
321
See supra notes 65–73 (explaining liberal democracy and constitutional liberalism).
314
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emergency, the régime order reifies amorphous crises into accepted
domination. As such, after the pandemic, we emerge only to find that the
system had long collapsed, replaced by hollow illiberal democracies.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM, ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Lex CEU: A Background
Central European University (CEU) is a highly-ranked graduate
research university in Budapest founded in 1991 by George Soros, Václav
Havel, and other intellectual members of the democratic opposition as a
direct response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.322 Their vision was
to establish a university dedicated to promoting the values of open society
and democracy as envisioned in Karl Popper’s philosophy.323 Since its
founding, Central European University has been regarded as a liberal
intellectual bastion of Central Europe and Hungary. Central European
University is accredited both in Hungary and in the state of New York and
leads all other Hungarian universities in receiving European research
grants. As such, it has become the target of Prime Minister Orbán’s attacks
on freedom of thought, academic freedom, and liberal opposition.
In April of 2017, the Hungarian parliament adopted amendments to the
existing Act CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education (“Lex CEU”).324
The new criteria for foreign universities operating in Hungary directly
targeted only Central European University.325 The most onerous
component of Lex CEU is the requirement of an international agreement
between Hungary and the university’s country of origin (in CEU’s case,
America).326 This requirement is particularly problematic as it “practically
means that the right to conduct educational activities will no longer depend
on professional criteria (e.g., on the decision of accreditation boards), but
on the preferences of the government.”327 This law also requires that all
foreign-accredited universities provide higher education services in their
country of origin and “restricts the possibility for non-European
universities to enter into cooperation with Hungarian universities.”328
322
Our Mission, CENT. EUR. U., https://www.ceu.edu/about/our-mission (last visited Jan. 12,
2020); History, CENT. EUR. U., https://www.ceu.edu/about/history (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
323
Our Mission, supra note 322.
324
This law quickly gained the nickname of “Lex CEU” because Central European University
(CEU) is the only higher education institution affected by the law.
325
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1067.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Griff Witte, Amid Illiberal Revolution in Hungary, a University with U.S. Roots Fights to Stay,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/amid-illiberal-
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Finally, Lex CEU “eliminates exemptions for work permits and requires
that the name of the university differs clearly from the name of already
registered universities even in foreign languages.”329 If a university fails to
comply with any aspect of Lex CEU, it will lose its license to operate.330
Although the stipulations of this amendment appear to be neutral, they
disparately impact Central European University. CEU is an
American-chartered university that is connected to the Hungarian higher
education system via a legal entity called Közép-európai Egyetem.331 The
university has a substantial population of non-European professors,
primarily from America and Canada, that relied on the recently eliminated
work permit exception.332 In order to fulfil the requirement of an
international agreement, the successful negotiation of two treaties—one
between Hungary and New York state and the other between Hungary and
the United States federal government—were now required by January 1,
2018, giving CEU less than a year to comply.333
The Orbán government faced immense backlash in response to this
absurd law. On April 2, 2017, approximately 10,000 people marched
throughout Budapest to parliament in support of CEU.334 Then, on April 4,
parliament voted in favor of Lex CEU in spite of a petition to the
government with over 30,000 signatures from 134 different countries.335
Finally, on April 9, an estimated 80,000 demonstrators took to the streets
in peaceful protest, with hundreds of international universities and over
twenty Nobel laureates expressing solidarity.336 Central European
University worked with the state of New York and launched an academic
exchange program at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
Despite complying with Lex CEU and successfully negotiating a mutually
accepted draft agreement with Governor Cuomo, the Orbán government
refused to ratify the treaty. This left the university in legal limbo by
extending the deadline of compliance to January 1, 2019, prompting
international condemnation.337 Without approval by the Orbán government,
revolution-in-hungary-a-university-with-us-roots-fights-to-stay/2018/09/03/7061771c-a547-11e8-a656943eefab5daf_story.html?utm_term=.9a2aa60e3ca5; Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1067.
329
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1067.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 1068.
334
CEU Thanks Organizers, Supporters of Today’s Event, CENT. EUR. U. (Apr. 2, 2017),
https://www.ceu.edu/node/17917.
335
Timeline of Events, CENT. EUR. U., https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithceu/timeline-events
(accessed Mar. 23, 2019).
336
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1068.
337
Id. (“Widespread public and international criticism of the law followed. During visits to CEU
at the height of the crisis, both former German President Joachim Guack and Nobel Prize-winning
writer Mario Vargas Llosa, condemned the law. Many other public figures contributed to the growing
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the university has been forced to shutter its United States-accredited
operations in Budapest and move its students to a satellite campus in an old
state hospital on the outskirts of Vienna, Austria for the fall 2019 academic
year.338
B. Anti-Intellectualism and Illiberal Democracy: A Hungarian Reprise
Illiberal democracies, our modern authoritarianism, are deeply
anti-intellectual. As discussed in Part I, critical intellectual discourse poses
a direct threat to authoritarian control.339 Illiberal leaders like Orbán that
espouse populism in their political platform are wont to espouse
anti-intellectual rhetoric. Populism can be defined as “[a] thin-centered
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general will) of the people.”340 Historically, the intelligentsia
have been classified as “the elite” and have become the scapegoat for the
ire of populist leaders. Other than the general inaccessibility of expensive
university degrees to the masses, academia and its intelligentsia are
targeted to suppress anti-régime discourse and preemptively neutralize the
opposition. This line of thought makes Central European University an
ideal target for Orbán. CEU is an institution that was founded with a
worldwide protest. On April 19, nine American senators, including John McCain and Chuck Schumer,
sent a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, arguing that the legislation threatens academic freedom
and calling on him to work with CEU to find a solution. The most important political statements came
from the European People’s Party (EPP, the center-right bloc in the European Parliament) and the
spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The U.S. State Department also expressed its
clear support for CEU and for academic freedom, and rejected the threat to an American university
abroad. . . . Parallel to American diplomatic efforts, the European Commission condemned the law as a
violation of EU regulations and core European values, including academic freedom.”); see also Letter
from Sen. Dick Durban, Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, Sen. Chris Murphy, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, Sen. Amy
Klobuchar, Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Sen. Cory A. Booker, Sen. Edward J. Markey,
Sen. Bernard Sanders, U.S. Senate, to Ambassador David B. Cornstein (Dec. 20, 2018) (on file with
Sen. Dick Durban) (supporting CEU and academic freedom in Hungary); Letter from Dr. Laura Schultz
et al., Professor Cognitive Sci., MIT, to H.E. Réka Szemerkényi, Ambassador of Hung. to the U.S. et
al. (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with Central European University) (letter from 1061 cognitive scientists in
support of Central European University); Statements of Support, CENT. EUR. U.,
https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithCEU/support-statements (accessed Mar. 23, 2019).
338
CEU Forced Out of Budapest: To Launch U.S. Degree Programs in Vienna in September
2019, CENT. EUR. U. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ceu.edu/article/2018-12-03/ceu-forced-out-budapestlaunch-us-degree-programs-vienna-september-2019; see also Rosa Schwartzburg, School’s Out
Forever, SLATE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/authoritarians-educationuniversities-hungary-brazilpopulism.html?via=rss_socialflow_facebook&fbclid=IwAR3kYxKbgCTBPcNHo4be6f
icbi661ewsRhOgwXvdcCn2d_n3FWetNn5VBk0 (describing CEU’s ousting to Vienna).
339
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339.
340
CAS MUDDE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 29 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al.
eds., 2017).
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dedication to open society, with programs such as their Nationalism and
Gender Studies departments341 that directly, and loudly, challenge illiberal
democracy. Universities are particularly dangerous to authoritarians
because their purpose “is [to] produce knowledge that is often critical of
the established ways of doing things . . . . And in the social sciences it’s
quite dangerous . . . because the knowledge that’s produced is calling into
question the habits and ‘ordinary ways’ that we go about doing things.”342
Likewise, the government-controlled press launched a campaign against
the “intellectual elite” that attacked philosophers associated with the Georg
Lukács School, like Ágnes Heller, by falsely claiming that they had
received overly generous government research grants.343 Authoritarians
rely on the closure of critical discourse to create a one-dimensional arena
of thought that is uncritical of the régime in order to successfully quell
opposition and maintain societal control.
Anti-intellectualism, especially in Europe, is inherently tied to
anti-Semitism. Arendt’s history of anti-Semitism in Origins of
Totalitarianism notes that European nation-states were hostile to Jewish
intellectuals in particular as an attempt to prevent Jewish assimilation in
the nineteenth century.344 But by the early twentieth century, the most
notable Central European intellectuals were Jewish: Sigmund Freud,
Edmund Husserl, Gustav Mahler, Franz Kafka, and so on.345 George Soros,
the primary founder of Central European University, is a Hungarian-born
Jewish financier and billionaire and has been the subject of anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories by the Hungarian far-right. Most recently, Fidesz has
launched a taxpayer-funded346 campaign against Soros and the European
Union that includes peddling the myth that Soros was “allegedly
341
Nationalism Studies Program, CENT. EUR. U., https://courses.ceu.edu/unit/nationalism
(accessed
Jan.
12,
2020);
Department
of
Gender
Studies,
CENT. EUR. U.,
https://courses.ceu.edu/unit/gender (accessed Jan. 12, 2020).
342
Schwartzburg, supra note 338 (quoting interview with Joan Wallach Scott, Professor Emerita
at the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study).
343
Bozóki, The Illusion of Inclusion, supra note 280, at 306.
344
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 32 (“From then on, the nation-state, equipped with conservative
arguments, drew a distinct line between Jews who were needed and wanted and those who were not.
Under the pretext of the essential Christian character of the state—what could have been more alien to
the enlightened despots!—the growing Jewish intelligentsia could be openly discriminated against
without harming the affairs of bankers or businessmen. This kind of discrimination which tried to close
the universities to Jews by excluding them from the civil services had the double advantage of
indicating that the nation-state valued special services higher than equality, and of preventing, or at
least postponing, the birth of a new group of Jews who were of no apparent use to the state and even
likely to be assimilated into society.”). Ultimately, this project was a failure: “What the nation-state had
once feared so much, the birth of a Jewish intelligentsia, now proceeded at a fantastic pace.” Id. at 52.
345
Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, supra note 143, at 35.
346
Lili Bayer, Hungary Launches Campaign Targeting Jean-Claude Juncker, POLITICO (Feb. 18,
2019),
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-launches-campaign-targeting-jean-claude-junckergeorge-soros/.
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347

responsible for the wave of migrants to Europe.” Deputy Prime Minister
Zsolt Semjén claimed in a recent radio interview that: “[T]he Soros-type
extreme liberalism which hates Christian traditions and, if possible even
more, nation states,”348 is dangerous to Hungarians, and he went on to
conclude that “leftist and liberal parties needed to import millions of
foreigners in order to defeat their nationalist opponents and, in cooperation
with immigrant Islamic forces, to rule the nations of Europe.”349 Jobbik
spokesman Ádám Mirkóczki pushed this narrative even further by
claiming that high-ranking Fidesz politicians, including Orbán, are
implicated in this conspiracy theory due to the Soros funding that they
received for their educations.350 The anti-Soros conspiracy theory directly
entered the parliamentary debate on Lex CEU when “the minister
responsible for education stated that ‘we are committed to use all legal
means at our disposal to stop pseudo-civil society spy groups such as the
ones funded by George Soros.’”351 Although Central European University
would still have been a likely target of the Fidesz régime, Soros’s
involvement threw fuel into the fire.
C. Illiberal Legal Challenges to Academic Freedom
Since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was elected in 2010, the Fidesz
government has centralized education and enacted a wide array of laws that
shrink academic freedom in the country.352 Fidesz has pushed through a
gradual overhaul of the public education system, slowly growing
government influence over school curricula.353 In 2014, legislation was
adopted that permits government-appointed chancellors to make significant
financial decisions at public universities,354 and in some cases, the Minister
of Education has even “imposed his own candidate for rector of
universities and political appointees without any academic record were
promoted to professorship at state-controlled universities.”355 Likewise, a
slash in government funding for the Hungarian Academy of Science and
347

Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1069.
Id.
349
Id. (summarizing the Semjén interview).
350
Fidesz Gets a Reminder Who Was Funded By George Soros, JOBBIK (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.jobbik.com/fidesz_gets_a_reminder_who_was_funded_by_george_soros (“He added that
when Szilárd Németh identified Soros’ protégés as organizations and individuals to be ‘cleaned away’,
the Fidesz politician forgot to mention that from 1984 through 1994 the Hungarian-born US
businessman funded such persons as PM Viktor Orbán and several other individuals with ties to the
current government or the ruling party, including Tamás Deutsch, József Szájer, Zsolt Németh, István
Stumpf, Zoltán Cséfalvay, József Pálinkás, János Áder or László Kövér.”).
351
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1070.
352
Id. at 1071.
353
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: HUNGARY, supra note 221.
354
Id.
355
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1071.
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general reallocation of significantly less funds for academic research
institutions threatens institutional closures in the near future.356 Fidesz
leveraged the Corona Bill to forcibly transfer control over the University of
Theater and Film Arts (SZFE) to a private foundation, prompting students
to occupy campus buildings, professors to resign, and tens of thousands to
protest in Budapest.357 The battle for academic freedom in Hungary has
manifested itself as a culture war between the nationalistic illiberal
democracy and the liberal intelligentsia.
At the same time that the Orbán government refused to acknowledge
Central European University’s compliance with Lex CEU, Prime Minister
Orbán signed a decree revoking accreditation and funding for gender
studies departments, effectively banning the discipline.358 This decree only
targets programs from two universities in Hungary: Central European
University and Eötvös Loránd University.359 Effective immediately, the
accreditation of all gender studies programs has been revoked, although the
government is allowing currently enrolled students to finish their
programs. Anti-intellectual and misogynistic rhetoric surrounding the
gender studies ban date back to Fidesz’s seizure of power. In 2015, László
Kövér, one of the founders of Fidesz, stated:
We don’t want the gender craziness. We don’t want to make
Hungary a futureless society of man-hating women, and
feminine men living in dread of women, and considering
families and children only as barriers to self-fulfillment …
And we would like if our daughters would consider, as the

356
Szabó András Péter, Greetings from the Sinking Boat of Hungarian Academia, INDEX (trans.
Zoltán Kovács, Feb. 8, 2019), https://index.hu/english/2019/02/08/greetings_from_the_sinking_boat
_of_hungarian_academia/.
357
See supra Part II.F (discussing the Corona Bill and Hungarian states of emergency). SZFE is a
prestigious 155-year-old university that has educated prominent Hungarian artists. In March, the Fidesz
government passed the Corona Bill, which included a provision “that transferred ownership of the
public university to a private foundation. The government also appointed a new board of trustees—
actions that raised fears that the university, long a target of the government, will be forced to hew more
closely to Mr. Orban’s nationalistic and conservative vision for Hungary.” Benjamin Novak, Student
Blockade Protests Viktor Orban’s Reach at a Top Arts University, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/06/world/europe/hungary-students-blockade-orban.html. At the
time of writing, the students have refused to end their occupation “until [they] are guaranteed the
university’s autonomy.” Hungarian Students, Artists Protest Government’s Takeover of Famed Film
School, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY’S HUNGARIAN SERV. (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.rferl.org/a/hungarian-students-artists-protest-government-s-takeover-of-famed-filmschool/30901261.html (internal quotations omitted).
358
Anna Zsubori, Gender Studies Banned at University—the Hungarian Government’s Latest
Attack on Equality, CONVERSATION (Oct. 9, 2018), http://theconversation.com/gender-studies-bannedat-university-the-hungarian-governments-latest-attack-on-equality-103150.
359
Id.
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highest quality of self-fulfillment, the possibility of giving
birth to our grandchildren.360
Kövér went even further earlier that year to argue that “‘genderism’ is
‘an intellectual founding of such a human experiment that is nothing better
than, let’s say, eugenics in Nazi times.’”361 It is obvious that the
government’s decision to ban certain academic fields—and compare them
to Nazism—stems not from a genuine desire to improve the academic
endeavors of universities but to control freedom of thought based on
political ideology. Nationalist populist movements tend to yearn for a
return to “traditional” society and reject modernism, and as such, embrace
“traditional” gender roles.362 Hungary is a very patriarchal country invested
in traditional family structures,363 and Fidesz’s politics “signals opposition
to the moral-cultural transformation of developed societies.”364 The gender
studies ban is emblematic of the culture war between the Fidesz
government and Central European University. The ban primarily affects
Central European University, an institution that is one of the most diverse
universities in the world365 and embodies the spirit of open society,
multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, the ban, and its
targeting of CEU, functions as the Fidesz government’s rebuke of the
moral decline366 of the West. Academic institutions in other illiberal
democracies have experienced similar treatment, especially with regard to
teaching gender studies and other related subjects.367 This war on academia
360

Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
362
See Joane Nagel, Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of
Nations, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 242, 251–53 (1998) (discussing the distinct roles that men and
women tend to play in nationalist narratives).
363
See Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 10, 2017), https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/social-views-and-morality/ (finding that
Hungarians tend to hold conservative views on LGBTQ+ and gender issues: 54 percent believe that
homosexuality should not be accepted by society, 27 percent favor same sex marriage, and 77 percent
believe that women have a social responsibility to bear children).
364
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1069.
365
CEU Named #2 Most International University in the World by THE, CENT. EUR. U. (Apr. 27,
2017), https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-04-27/ceu-named-2-most-international-university-world.
366
See Orbán, supra note 282 (“[I]n liberal Europe being European means nothing at all: it has no
direction, and it is simply form devoid of content.”).
367
In Russia, the European University at St. Petersburg lost its license to teach for two years due
to an administrative ruling that began with a complaint by MP Vitaly Milonov, who was the key author
of the homophobic 2013 “gay propaganda” bill. Milonov said of the university: “[An alleged student
complaint] was the teaching of gender studies at the school. I personally find that disgusting, it’s fake
studies, and it may well be illegal.” Fred Weir, Why Is Someone Trying to Shutter one of Russia’s Top
Private Universities?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Europe/2017/0328/Why-is-someone-trying-to-shutter-one-of-Russia-s-top-private-universities.
In
Turkey, at least 146 academics face individual and separate trial hearings for signing a 2016 petition
condemning Turkey’s treatment of Kurds on the southeastern border and calling to resume peace talks
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. This petition was initially signed by a group of 1128 academics
361
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is not only ideological, but wrapped up in the very legal institutions of
Hungary. Further, Lex CEU flies in the face of the Hungarian Constitution,
which purports to protect academic freedom from government intrusion,
and is a reminder of the hollowness of democratic institutions in illiberal
democracies.368
Orbán and Fidesz’s attacks on Central European University exemplify
illiberal democratic principles in action. As has been demonstrated, the
majoritarian Fidesz partocracy quickly seized control of all government
organs, including purportedly independent ones, in order to bypass all
opposition checks in every stage of the democratic process. Fidesz’s reach
has extended beyond democratic institutions to control virtually all
mainstream media and restrict the operation of civil society to further
insulate the régime from opposition.369 In addition to manipulating the law,
they are controlling societal norms to produce the Magyar fictive ethnicity
and suppress non-conservative discourse.370 At the same time, Hungarian
history is actively being rewritten in a manner that glorifies past fascist
leaders and stokes anger over the perceived injustices of the Treaty of
Trianon.371 Orbán invokes principles of absolute sovereignty when he
known as Academics for Peace. A number of these signatories are facing between one and five years’
imprisonment for “spreading terrorist propaganda.” Over 360 academics have been fired from their
jobs and barred from teaching. Turkey: Academics on Trial for Signing Petition, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Dec. 5, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/05/turkey-academics-trial-signingpetition. On January 24, 2019, Professor Yonca Demir of Bilgi University was sentenced to three years
imprisonment, the longest prison sentence to date for members of Academics for Peace. John K.
Wilson, Turkey’s Ongoing Attack on Academic Freedom, ACADEME BLOG (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://academeblog.org/2019/01/24/turkeys-ongoing-attack-on-academic-freedom/.
In
Brazil,
President Jair Bolsonaro has “dismantl[ed] the Education Ministry, threaten[ed] to send the military to
take over public schools, and publish[ed] stringent new textbook guidelines. . . . Bolsonaro has made
ridding the Brazilian education system of ‘Marxist rubbish’ one of his administration’s top priorities,
with students being encouraged to report on teachers who attempt to ‘indoctrinate’ them.” Bolsonaro’s
new Education Minister, Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, swore in his inauguration speech to fight the
“aggressive promotion of gender ideology.” Schwartzburg, supra note 338. The Thai junta has detained
American academics and maintains a watchlist of academics and researchers. Suluck Lamubol, Junta
Steps Up Harassment of International Academics, U. WORLD NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.universityworldnews.com/ post.php?story=20190301083420506. In Egypt, Alexandria
University has required that thesis proposals for masters and doctoral students adhere to the
government’s incomplete Vision 2030 development plan. Ashraf Khaled, Concern Over Freedoms as
WORLD
NEWS
(Dec.
5,
2018),
University
Curbs
Thesis
Topics,
U.
https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20181205120855294.
368
“Article X: (1) Hungary shall ensure the freedom of scientific research and artistic creation, the
freedom of learning for the acquisition of the highest possible level of knowledge and, within the
framework laid down in an Act, the freedom of teaching. . . . (3) Hungary shall protect the scientific
and artistic freedom of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Arts.
Higher education institutions shall be autonomous in terms of the content and the methods of research
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259 (emphasis added).
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treats Central European University as yet another invasion of the West and
its “degenerate” ideology and paints Hungary as a nation that is still being
constantly invaded, this time by liberals under George Soros’s watch.372
Orbán has also deployed the “dictatorship of law” when passing Lex CEU
as a direct assault on the “elite intelligentsia” that, through critical
discourse and academia, threaten the legitimacy of the illiberal
democracy.373 Far-right nationalist and anti-intellectual rhetoric
characterizes Central European University and its intellectuals as a danger
to “the people” of Hungary, pitting them against each other in a culture war
that CEU did not sign up for.
While the situation in Hungary is grim, action can be taken.
Individuals can continue to protest Fidesz’s régime and draw international
attention to Hungary. Right now, “activists on the ground are setting up
underground education lectures and organizing queer theory readings and
poetry nights in people’s living rooms and basement bars.”374 Independent
media and the academic community can further support democracy and
academic freedom by publicizing the situation in Hungary and supporting
communities and individuals under threat. Likewise, the international
community can pressure illiberal democracies through diplomatic
measures. Political and economic unions such as the European Union can
adopt measures condemning the actions of illiberal democratic states and
impose sanctions on noncompliant governments. On September 12, 2018,
the European Union voted to pursue disciplinary action against Hungary
under Article 7 of the European Union Charter. This is the first time that
the EU has pursued action invoking Article 7, which lays out the ways that
EU bodies can act if a member state violates the core values of the
European Union.375 On March 20, 2019, the European People’s Party376
suspended Fidesz from the party in response to their campaign attacking
Soros and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, as well
as its actions against Central European University. EPP President Joseph
Daul stated: “We cannot compromise on democracy, rule of law, freedom
of press, academic freedom or minorities’ rights. And anti-EU rhetoric is
372

See supra notes 278–82, 349–54 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
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Rosa Schwartzburg, I’m a Gender Studies Student in Hungary & Americans Need to Know
What’s Happening Here, BUSTLE (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/im-a-gender-studiesstudent-in-hungary-americans-need-to-know-whats-happening-here-15574938.
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Maïa de la Baume & Ryan Heath, Parliament Denounces Hungary’s Illiberalism, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.eu/article/european-parliament-approves-hungary-censure-motion/ (last updated
Apr. 19, 2019, 1:39 AM).
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The European People’s Party is a center-right transnational organization founded by Christian
democratic parties in Europe. The EPP is currently the largest party in the European Parliament, the
European Council, and the European Commission. History, EUR. PEOPLE’S PARTY,
https://www.epp.eu/about-us/history/ (accessed Mar. 23, 2019).
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unacceptable. The divergences between EPP and Fidesz must cease.”377
Fidesz must end the anti-Junker and Soros campaign, solve the legal
dispute over Central European University, and “recognize the damage it
caused and refrain from similar action”378 in order to regain full
membership to the EPP. As a result from pressure by the EPP, on March
20, Orbán and Prime Minister Söder of Bavaria exchanged letters
supporting a partnership between CEU and the Technical University of
Munich on the condition that CEU be allowed to remain in Budapest.379 At
the time of writing, Orbán has yet to give CEU a legal guarantee to remain
in operation and “an international agreement guaranteeing the freedom of
CEU to operate in Budapest as a US degree granting institution”380 is
needed before celebration. If Central European University is ultimately
successful, it will be a testament to the sway of influence that European
institutions still hold over this illiberal democracy. Even if Central
European University is allowed to remain in Budapest, Hungary’s
democratic institutions are still under siege and many other liberties
enshrined under constitutional liberalism are still threatened.
CONCLUSION
We are currently in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse wave.
After decades of democratic prosperity, global democracy has entered a
“decade of decline.”381 Between 2006 and 2016, Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World report discovered that 105 countries suffered net
declines in their scores, while 61 demonstrated improvement. Given these
grim statistics, we have undoubtedly entered Huntington’s third reverse
wave. Based on the first and second reverse waves, Huntington concluded
that each reverse wave will give rise to a new form of authoritarianism.
Illiberal democracy is that form of authoritarianism.
Illiberal democracy differs from other forms of authoritarianism due to
the fact that some semblance of a democratic system remains. In many
cases, the authoritarian government comes to power through the
democratic process. However, once elected, they quickly consolidate
control, and greatly weaken democracy and the safeguards of civil liberties
377
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as guaranteed by constitutional liberalism. These régimes tend to value
majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, and the dictatorship of law while
embracing nationalism and anti-intellectualism. When illiberal
democracies operate under these values that run counter to the very nature
of democracy, their democratic institutions become hollow and operate in
name only. At the same time, illiberal democracies fail to protect the
individual with liberties typically ascribed to constitutional liberalism and
instead value the perceived needs of the community. This definition of
community, however, is guided by nationalism. Illiberal democratic
leaders determine which citizens are worthy of belonging to their imagined
community—and thus the nation-state—through fictive ethnicity and
national mythologies. For populist leaders like Orbán, “elite” intellectuals,
non-ethnic Magyars, and the opposition are not welcome. Intellectuals
pose a specific threat to authoritarians because critical discourse threatens
to destabilize their régimes. Taken together, we can begin to recognize the
warning signs of an illiberal democracy.
Huntington’s second generalization is particularly interesting as
applied to Hungary’s illiberal democracy and is worth expanding.
Huntington contends that transitions from democracy to authoritarianism
tend to take place either through a military coup d’état or through an
executive coup whereby a head of government concentrates power in the
executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law. As
opposed to concentrating power on an individual executive, Hungary’s
partocracy has concentrated Fidesz’s power. Fidesz controls all three
branches of government, independent government institutions, and the
media, and while strangling civil society and academia. And, not a single
action Fidesz has taken has been illegal under national law. Therefore,
Huntington’s second generalization should be expanded to include the
centralization of power by a group or party.
Finally, the large majority of Huntington’s factors under the first
generalization have manifested themselves in Hungarian illiberal
democracy. During the period of democratic transition, political scandals,
majoritarianism, and partocracy weakened public regard for democratic
values. Instability was intensified during this period due to the numerous
economic crises experienced during Hungary’s transition to capitalism and
in the 2008 economic recession. Third, the country is politically polarized,
in part due to partocracy, the failures of MSZP, and Orbán’s inflammatory
rhetoric. Fourth, MSZP’s missteps pushing through austerity measures and
other initiatives that were unpopular with the general public fueled populist
desires. Fifth, the use of law and order rhetoric, first with regard to the
Roma and then the refugee crisis, has sparked ethno-nationalist sentiments
and moved racist discourse into the political mainstream. Sixth, Hungary’s
long history of occupation by nondemocratic régimes and the dramatic loss
of territory resulting from the Treaty of Trianon, strengthened calls for
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absolute sovereignty. Now, Fidesz has identified the European Union,
“Western values,” and George Soros as the next invaders. Finally, the
illiberal democratic régime has snowballed and propagated itself both in
neighboring nation-states and internationally.
Hungary’s polarized political condition is exemplified in the clash
between Orbán and Central European University. This clash pits Central
European University—a symbol of Western liberalism and
cosmopolitanism—against Orbán’s ethno-nationalist illiberal democracy.
Other attacks on academic freedom, like the gender studies ban, slashed
funding for research institutions, and campaigns against the Hungarian
intelligentsia, demonstrate the serious threat that is posed to not only
academic freedom in Hungary, but also academic freedom globally as
illiberal democracies spread. There is some hope, however. Central
European University’s ousting caught international attention, prompting
criticism and solidarity from individuals, academia, powerful politicians,
and government institutions. Orbán experienced severe backlash from the
European Union for his actions—facing Article 7 disciplinary
proceedings—as well as from the conservative European People’s Party
that suspended Fidesz from the party. The European People’s Party’s
actions even went so far as to prompt a dialogue between Orbán and EPP
leaders that may result in the university being permitted to stay in Budapest
and remain U.S. accredited.
For some reason, academic freedom in Hungary has received immense
international attention that has been critical in CEU’s fight to exist in
Hungary. Perhaps academia is more alluring than amendments to
parliamentary procedure or executive power. Perhaps the international
community still holds high regard for universities. Or perhaps people have
rallied around Central European University for another reason. If CEU is
successful, the outcome could provide us with a potential strategy to
protecting academic freedom in Hungary and in other illiberal
democracies, and even allow us to glean perspective on how illiberal
democracies operate.

